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Abstract 
Plant protection is necessary to achieve high yields with high quality. The 
application of pesticides, however, leads to negative external effects to the 
environment. Society calls for stricter agri-environmental instruments in 
order to control pesticide use on farms. Intensively discussed topics are the 
introduction of a specific tax on pesticides and bans on pesticides such as 
glyphosate. The aim of this dissertation is to analyse potential effects of 
those two policy instruments on pesticide use on farms.  
This dissertation contains four studies. The first two studies deal with 
potential effects of specific pesticide taxes from a more general perspective. 
Gaps in literature on whether a pesticide tax can be effective in achieving 
policy objectives and whether farmers respond to price increases of pesti-
cide products are closed. In study three and four, a bio-economic model is 
developed in order to analyse potential effects of agri-environmental policy 
instruments in detail. Furthermore, these two studies close knowledge gaps 
by analysing economic and environmental effects of a glyphosate ban for 
the example of silage maize production. 
Both policy instruments could contribute to reducing the environmental 
risks caused by pesticide application. However, in case of a pesticide tax, 
the design is important and should be in line with policy goals. Differentiat-
ed pesticide taxes that impose higher taxes on more toxic products are more 
suitable than ad valorem or per unit taxes. In case of a glyphosate ban, a 
significant decrease of the pesticide load with respect to environmental tox-
icity, environmental fate and human health was found. On the other hand, a 
glyphosate ban would lead to an increase in energy consumption. Introduc-
ing measures to substitute pesticide applications by mechanical strategies 
thus reduce energy efficiency on farms. 
Farmer’s costs increase by a pesticide tax as well as a glyphosate ban. 
In the first case, the own-price elasticity of demand for pesticides was found 
to be inelastic, meaning that the demand for pesticides decreases relatively 
little if the price increases. However, demand is heterogeneous for different 
types of pesticides and herbicide demand was found to be relatively more 
elastic compared to fungicide and insecticide demand. In the second case, 
the substitution of glyphosate with mechanical strategies is more expensive 
and leads to higher labour demand. Moreover, a small but significant yield 
reduction was found in the analysis, at least in case of a glyphosate ban. On 
average, those losses do not lead to a significant decrease of the gross mar-
gin in this analysis. This is because the optimal control strategy was 
changed from direct or strip-till sowing with glyphosate application to con-
servation tillage without glyphosate application, which leads to lower sow-
ing costs. Instead of a full replacement of pesticides because of policy pres-
sure adapting the cropping strategy can thus help to mitigate losses at the 
farm-level. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Pflanzenschutz ist essentiell, um hohe Erträge mit guter Qualität zu erzielen. 
Die Anwendung von Pflanzenschutzmitteln (PSM) hat jedoch auch negative 
Umweltauswirkungen. Weite Teile der Gesellschaft fordern deshalb stren-
gere Auflagen, um den PSM-Einsatz zu reduzieren. In den letzten Jahren 
wurden u.a. die Einführung einer PSM-Abgabe und ein Verbot des Herbi-
zids Glyphosat intensiv diskutiert. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist, die potentiellen 
Effekte dieser beiden Instrumente auf die Landwirtschaft zu analysieren. 
Die Dissertation beinhaltet vier Teilstudien. Die ersten beiden beschäf-
tigen sich mit den Auswirkungen einer PSM-Abgabe. Hierbei wurden die 
Forschungsfragen beantwortet, ob Abgaben ein effektives Mittel sind, um 
umweltpolitische Ziele zu erreichen und wie landwirtschaftliche Betriebe 
auf Preisänderungen reagieren. In der dritten und vierten Studie wurde ein 
bio-ökonomisches Modell entwickelt, um den PSM-Einsatz detailliert zu 
untersuchen. Außerdem beantworten diese beiden Studien offene Fragen zu 
den möglichen ökonomischen und ökologischen Auswirkungen eines Gly-
phosatverbots am Beispiel des Silomaisanbaus in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
Beide Instrumente könnten dazu beitragen, die ökologischen Risiken 
des PSM-Einsatzes zu reduzieren. Allerdings ist im Falle einer Abgabe die 
Ausgestaltung maßgeblich und sie sollte mit den beschlossenen umweltpoli-
tischen Zielen übereinstimmen. Differenzierte Abgaben, die toxischere PSM 
höher belasten, sind besser geeignet als Wert- oder Mengenabgaben. Im 
Falle eines Glyphosatverbots wurde einerseits eine signifikante Reduzierung 
der Umwelttoxizität, des Umweltverhalten und der Belastung für die 
menschliche Gesundheit festgestellt. Andererseits wurde aber ein Anstieg 
des Energieverbrauchs ermittelt. Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung des PSM-
Einsatzes könnten somit zu einer Senkung der Energieeffizienz führen. 
Die Kosten der Betriebe werden sowohl durch eine Abgabe als auch 
durch ein Glyphosatverbot steigen. Im ersten Fall ist die Eigenpreiselastizi-
tät der Nachfrage unelastisch. Bei steigenden Preisen sinkt die Nachfrage 
nach PSM somit relativ schwach. Allerdings ist die Nachfrage heterogen, 
was u.a. bedeutet, dass die Nachfrage nach Herbiziden elastischer ist im 
Vergleich zu Insektiziden und Fungiziden. Im zweiten Fall wird Glyphosat 
durch teurere und arbeitsintensivere mechanische Unkrautbekämpfungsstra-
tegien ersetzt. Zudem wurde, zumindest im Falle eines Glyphosatverbots, 
eine geringe aber signifikante Ertragsreduktion festgestellt. Im Durchschnitt 
führen diese Verluste in dieser Analyse hingegen nicht zu einer Reduktion 
des Deckungsbeitrags, da die optimale Unkrautbekämpfungsstrategie von 
Direktsaat- bzw. strip-till-Verfahren mit Glyphosateinsatz zu nichtwenden-
der Bodenbearbeitung wechselt. Dies führt in der Simulation zu Einsparun-
gen bei der Aussaat. Anstelle einer vollständigen Substitution von PSM als 
Folge politischen Drucks kann deshalb eine Anpassung der Anbaustrategie 
helfen die Verluste landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe gering zu halten. 
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  Chapter 1
Introduction 
Plant protection has always played an essential role in the cultivation of 
crops (e.g. Jaskolla, 2006). High yields with high quality have hardly been 
achieved without protecting crops from external influences. While some of 
the well-known plant protection strategies like crop rotation or ploughing 
are still applied today, other techniques, often labour and capital intensive 
ones like weeding or collection of insects by hand, were substituted by 
modern plant protection strategies starting in the mid 20th century (Swinton 
and Van Deynze, 2017). Modern plant protection is based mainly on apply-
ing synthetic plant protection products.
1
 Their application increased quickly 
since they were introduced and the high yield levels that are reached in to-
day’s agriculture are amongst others credited to the application of plant pro-
tection products (Oerke, 2006). 
The downside of achieving higher yield levels are negative external ef-
fects on the environment that often go hand in hand with the application of 
pesticides, even though, in Europe, they go through a detailed risk assess-
ment before they are approved in the European Union (Regulation EC No 
1107/2009). Concerns regarding pesticide use are, for example, negative 
effects on biodiversity (e.g. Hallmann et al., 2017), potentially dangerous 
residues in the ecosystem (e.g. Munz et al., 2012) and potentially toxic ef-
fects to humans even by very small doses (e.g. Vandenberg et al., 2012).  
Member states of the European Union but also other countries like 
Switzerland and Norway have therefore implemented National Action Plans 
(NAPs) on the sustainable use of plant protection products, aiming to reduce 
                                                 
1
 In the following, the term ‘pesticides’ is used frequently as a synonym for plant protection 
products. 
2  Introduction 
the risks caused by their application (Directive 2009/128/EC). Those NAPs 
include different environmental objectives to be fulfilled by a catalogue of 
measures. In Germany, the risks that can be caused by pesticide application 
to the ecosystem shall be reduced by 30% until 2023, compared to the aver-
age of 1996-2005. In addition, the maximum residue limits of pesticides on 
domestic and imported food shall be exceeded in less than 1% of the sam-
ples (BMELV, 2013; BMEL, 2017). The objectives shall be reached, among 
others, by better education (e.g. the certificate of competence was intro-
duced as part of the NAP) and promotion of integrated crop protection.  
Many critics of pesticide application, not only in Germany, but also in 
other European countries, argue that the measures of the NAP do not go far 
enough. Stricter guidelines for application are demanded as well as further 
measures to reduce overall application of pesticides. Especially after the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer classified glyphosate as 
“probably carcinogenic” (Guyton et al., 2015), bans on pesticides with po-
tentially dangerous effects on the ecosystem (e.g. the herbicide glyphosate 
and insecticides of the class of neonicotinoids) and specific incentive taxes 
on pesticides have been debated (for overviews on the debates see the article 
in the thesis appendix and Tarazona et al., 2017). Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark and France have already implemented taxes on pesticides and coun-
tries such as Germany and Switzerland have been discussing them inten-
sively. During this debate, it was the Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture 
that commissioned the University of Bonn and ETH Zurich to analyse po-
tential effects of an incentive charge on pesticides in Switzerland (Finger et 
al., 2016, 2017a, 2017b; thesis appendix). Switzerland aims in its NAP to 
halve the environmental risks caused by pesticide application until 2027 
compared to a reference period of 2012-2015, and introducing an incentive 
charge was discussed to contribute to fulfilling this aim (Bundesrat Schweiz, 
2017). Analytical results of this dissertation have also been used for the pro-
ject report (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). 
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The project work motivated later parts of this dissertation by unveiling 
the lack of (public) detailed pesticide application models. By selecting, for 
example, profit- or utility maximising strategies, such simulation models 
can be used to analyse pest management decisions in detail, and different 
scenarios can be analysed by changing the assumed legislative circumstanc-
es. Policy measures like introducing a tax on pesticides or banning specific 
ones can be analysed in detail before they are introduced. Those ex ante 
analyses are necessary to avoid unintended side effects of policy measures. 
For example, in the discussion about banning the broad-spectrum herbicide 
glyphosate, critics often argue that a ban would lead to more intense appli-
cation of alternative herbicides being more toxic to the ecosystem (e.g. Fair-
clough et al., 2017; Schulte et al., 2017). Existing models are, however, not 
detailed enough for many analyses since they either aggregate pesticides 
into different groups (e.g. herbicides, fungicides or insecticides; e.g. Bab-
cock et al., 1992; Kuosmanen et al., 2006) or use the amount of applied pes-
ticides as a measure of efficacy (e.g. in litres; Karagiannis and Tzouvelekas, 
2012) not accounting for different efficacies of different products. In Chap-
ter 4 and Chapter 5 of this dissertation, a new bio-economic model is devel-
oped and presented to analyse weed control decisions. More specifically, a 
production function-based approach is developed for cultivation of silage 
maize in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) depending on 
weed control inputs (e.g. tillage, broad-spectrum herbicide respectively 
glyphosate application, selective herbicide application).  
Plant protection products are typically not applied to increase yield lev-
els but to abate damage from the potential harvest. Thereby, it is often em-
phasised that plant protection reduces the economic production risk. After 
describing the research aims of this dissertation, the influence of production 
risk and the damage abatement characteristic of pesticides are described. In 
addition, a policy overview is provided with frequently used and potentially 
introducible measures. This part is followed by an outline and the major 
contributions of this dissertation. Afterwards, the contributions of this thesis 
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are discussed and future research recommendations are depicted. Finally, 
general conclusions of this thesis are given. This introduction is followed by 
four chapters, each of them comprising one original research article, and an 
appendix, comprising a comment that summarises the project of the Swiss 
Federal Office for Agriculture. 
1.1 Research Aims 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to evaluate farm-level effects of policy 
measures on pesticide application. Furthermore, a specific research objec-
tive is pursued in each of the four articles presented, focussing on different 
problems with respect to policy measures on pesticides. In order to evaluate 
pesticide taxation schemes, experiences and developments from countries 
having implemented such a tax can be used. However, firstly, there was no 
up-to-date and in-depth analysis on the four different tax schemes, and sec-
ondly, there was no assessment of the taxation schemes with respect to their 
effects on pesticide use and their coherence to the aims proposed in the dif-
ferent NAPs. Therefore, the aim of the article presented in Chapter 2 is: 
(I) Present an up-to-date, detailed overview and assessment of the 
existing pesticide taxation policies in Europe including Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and France. 
One crucial factor for the effectiveness and for the efficiency of such 
tax schemes is the own-price elasticity of demand for pesticides, i.e. to what 
extent does the demand for pesticides change if the price increases by one 
percent. The estimates of the price elasticity of demand depend on different 
study characteristics, for example on the time horizon considered, the agri-
cultural system and the pesticide products investigated. Nevertheless, there 
was no coherent analysis of the different estimates reported in the large 
body of literature. Because of this large literature collection, a meta-analysis 
is a reasonable method in order to give reliable estimates for the price elas-
ticity of demand. The aim of the article in Chapter 3 is thus: 
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(II) Analyse the own-price elasticity of demand for pesticides in or-
der to give a coherent estimate for the responsiveness of farmers 
to changes in pesticide’s prices. 
Farm models can be used to analyse effects of potential policy measures 
on agriculture ex ante, so that decision support concerning the design and 
evaluation of policy measures can be given. To reflect pesticide application 
decisions in a realistic way, such models need to be very detailed. In the 
application of the developed model, we focussed on another important de-
bate in German and European agriculture: the potential ban of the broad-
spectrum herbicide glyphosate. This topic dominated many agri-
environmental policy debates throughout 2015 to 2017, and the relicensing 
of glyphosate for five years in 2017 will not end the debate.
2
 The research 
aim of Chapter 4 is therefore: 
(III) Develop a bio-economic model to analyse different policy 
measures on plant protection products in detail and apply the 
model to a potential ban of glyphosate. 
The first study on a potential ban of glyphosate focused on economic 
factors that could be influenced, for example yield effects, labour demand 
and changes in weed control costs and the gross margin. Production risk was 
so far neglected in the analysis. The first objective in the next study was to 
consider herbicides in the model as influencing production risk. Therefore, 
the new objective is not the gross margin being maximised but the utility 
depending on the variations of the gross margin. Moreover, important as-
pects in debates focus less on economic factors but are more concerned with 
environmental benefits or drawbacks of a glyphosate ban. Supporters of a 
ban assert that banning the herbicide would lead to a better protection of 
nature and human health – irrespective of whether or not glyphosate is car-
cinogenic. Opponents of a glyphosate ban bring forward the arguments that 
                                                 
2
 The approval of active substances can legally be renewed for a period of up to 15 years 
according to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. 
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i) alternative and more toxic herbicides would substitute for glyphosate, and 
ii) a ban would lead to higher energy consumption on farms due to more 
intense cultivation with different tillage techniques. For those reasons, the 
aim of Chapter 5 is: 
(IV) Consider production risk in the decision making process and as-
sess environmental effects of policy measures on pesticides by in-
tegrating agri-environmental indicators into the model. 
1.2 Background on Pesticide Application and Policy 
Several different categories of pesticides are distinguished in relation to the 
target organisms. Each pesticide contains one or more active substances 
(AS) and adjuvants, e.g. surfactants or emulsifiers to improve mixing char-
acteristics. Herbicides are used to control for herbs and grasses, fungicides 
are used against fungi, insecticides against insects, molluscicides against 
molluscs and rodenticides against rodents. Therefore, all pesticides control 
for potential direct or indirect damage to the crop – except for growth regu-
lators, which are typically applied to steer the crop growth in a specific di-
rection, e.g. they shorten the length of the internodes and/or thicken the 
stems. With this purpose, pesticides are not applied to increase yields but to 
protect the crop from damage. Hence, they are characterised as damage 
abating or damage control inputs (similar to hail nets, frost-protection sprin-
kling or drainage) (Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1986). On the other hand, 
productive inputs like fertiliser or seed lead to high yields per hectare, and 
of course, some inputs may have both a productive and a damage-
controlling component, for example, tillage practices on specific soils.  
1.2.1 Pesticide Application in German Agriculture 
Table 1.1 presents average applied pesticides in Germany for selected crops. 
The application index depicts the number of applied products on a field 
weighted with the authorised amount to apply, i.e. the standard area dose. 
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The application frequency represents the spraying passes on a field. It can 
be seen that potatoes and apples are highly dependent on fungicides. Cereals 
such as wheat and barley depend both on fungicides and on herbicides. Pes-
ticide application in maize, which is analysed in detail in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5, is generally lower than in other crops and it relies almost exclu-
sively on herbicide application. Insecticide application, e.g. against the Eu-
ropean corn borer (Ostrinia nubilalis) or against the Western corn rootworm 
(Diabrotica virgifera), plays only a minor role. 
Table 1.1. Average application of pesticides in selected crops in Germany 
measured with two application indices 
 
Winter 
wheat 
Winter 
barley 
Rape 
seed 
Potatoes Maize Apples 
Application index (number of pesticide products applied per hectare): 
Pesticides total 5.5 4.1 6.8 12.3 1.9 32.2 
Fungicides 2.2 1.4 1.9 8.9 0.0 26.0 
Herbicides 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.3 1.9 0.9 
Insecticides 0.7 0.4 2.7 1.1 0.0 4.6 
Other 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 
       Application frequency (number of sprayer passes per hectare): 
Pesticides total 4.3 3.5 5.7 9.3 1.4 22.1 
Fungicides 2.4 1.7 2.8 7.2 0.0 20.2 
Herbicides 1.7 1.6 2.3 2.4 1.4 0.7 
Insecticides 0.7 0.5 2.7 1.1 0.0 5.5 
Growth regulators 1.6 1.3 - 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Reference: Julius-Kühn-Institut (2017). 
The amount of sold pesticides in Germany is depicted in Fig. 1.1. The figure 
shows both the overall volume of sold AS and the average amount of ap-
plied AS per hectare by dividing the volume by the agricultural area in 
Germany. One can see both an increase in total sales volume and in the 
amount applied per hectare, especially since the mid-2000s. However, this 
increase is only partly the cause of higher ‘classical’ pesticide sales, such as 
herbicides or fungicides. One further reason is that the ‘other AS’ were sold 
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Fig. 1.1. Sold active substances (AS) in Germany as total volume and aver-
age amount applied per hectare agricultural area [kg AS/ha]. 
Note: The amount applied per hectare includes also pesticides that are used in non-
agricultural areas. The values are, however, relatively small. Other ASs include, among 
others, mineral oils, vegetal oils, soil sterilants (incl. nematicides) and rodenticides. 
References: Eurostat (2017), Statistisches Bundesamt (1991-2016). 
at higher volumes. This group contains, on the one hand, nematicides and 
rodenticides, which use should be relatively constant in Germany (see Table 
1.1 for average applied pesticides on different crops), but on the other hand, 
also mineral and vegetable oils are included (Eurostat, 2017). The latter are 
applied especially in organic farming. For example, rapeseed oil can be used 
as an insecticide against potato beetles and aphids and paraffin can be used 
as an acaricide against spider mites and as an insecticide against aphids 
(BVL, 2017). It is likely that the use of both oil types increased due to the 
growth of organic farming in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1991-
2016). The vast variety of pesticides described above points already to the 
Chapter 1  9 
fact that the quantity of AS does not describe the adverse environmental 
effects very well. Pesticide indicators that include the biochemical charac-
teristics of each AS are needed (see also the subsequent sections of the In-
troduction as well as Chapter 5). 
1.2.2 Plant Protection and Risk Management 
Since pesticides are used to control damage from crops, they are often seen 
as a substitute for crop insurance (Carlson, 1979; Smith and Goodwin, 
1996), which means that they are an input to reduce the production risk, i.e. 
an input that reduces the variation of yield (e.g. Carpentier and Weaver, 
1997; Skevas et al., 2014). In this case, risk averse decision makers, which 
farmers typically are (e.g. Maart-Noelck and Musshoff, 2014; Meraner and 
Finger, 2017), would apply an amount of plant protection products exceed-
ing the profit maximising level. However, under certain conditions pesti-
cides can also be risk-increasing, meaning that the variation of income may 
increase by applying pesticides (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993, 1994). 
The risk-increasing effect was found in empirical analyses, for example, on 
arable farms in Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands (Regev et al., 1997; 
Di Falco and Chavas, 2006; Gardebroek et al., 2010). It seems to be relevant 
at unfavourable environmental conditions, when pesticides are applied, but 
do not lead to improved yields by damage control (Saha et al., 1997). Nev-
ertheless, the risk-effect of pesticides depends also on the indicator used 
(Möhring et al., 2017). When applying a quantity indicator (the authors use 
kg of product per hectare), a risk-increasing effect of fungicides and herbi-
cides is found. However, when applying a pesticide load indicator measur-
ing the toxicity of the products (see Chapter 5 for a description of the indi-
cator), they find a risk-reducing effect of fungicides and herbicides. This 
means that risk averse farmers apply more toxic products than risk neutral 
or affine farmers do.  
10  Introduction 
Both the property of damage control and the pesticides’ effect on in-
come variation are important to take into account when analysing policy 
measures on pesticides. Ignoring the risk-effect of pesticides could lead to 
over- or underestimated input use in agricultural economic analyses or to 
wrong interpretations of farmer’s behaviours. For example, introduction of 
crop insurance, which was said to substitute for pesticides, has not led to a 
reduction in pesticide use (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993). Ignoring the 
damage abating effect in a production function can lead to an overestimation 
of the pesticide’s productivity (Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1986). Among 
other reasons, this is because classical production function forms such as 
Cobb-Douglas define inputs to be strictly positive (Saha et al., 1997: 774). 
However, zero use of pesticides is a legitimate scenario in specific cases. 
Higher than optimal amounts of pesticides would thus be calculated. 
1.2.3 Policy Instruments to Regulate Pesticide Application 
Pesticide application is highly regulated in developed countries and there is 
a large variety of policy instruments. Those instruments comprise measures 
in the category of i) information, persuasion and awareness, ii) voluntary 
arrangements by stakeholders, iii) private law instruments, iv) economic 
instruments, v) technical or institutional change, and vi) regulation. An 
overview of specific measures that can be introduced is given in Table 1.2. 
Several measures of the six categories are already in force in Germany. 
There are many regulatory measures regarding the application and mixing 
the pesticides. Training and education on pesticide application is obligatory 
for professional applicants since 2015 (certificate of competence; see Pflan-
zenschutz-Sachkundeverordnung 2013). Biological pest control is promoted 
by the Plant Protection Authorities (e.g. against Ostrinia nubilalis). Firms 
develop techniques to reduce drift when applying pesticides and farmers 
need a certification of the technical inspection association for their boom 
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sprayers (see e.g. the German Plant Protection Act and the Plant Protection 
Products Regulation). 
Table 1.2. Instruments for environmental policy on pesticides 
Policy category Regulatory instrument  
Information, 
persuasion and 
awareness 
Training and education 
Decision support systems for pest manage-
ment (good agricultural practice) 
Labelling of farm produce 
Arrangements Agreements by farmers and retailers 
Voluntary agreements for water protection 
Private law 
instruments 
Reduced use clause in land lease contracts 
Contracts between water suppliers and farm-
ers 
Economic in-
struments 
Tax or levy on pesticides 
Marketable rights or permits 
Premiums to prevent water contamination 
Stimulation of alternative pest management 
Insurance against yield risk 
Adjusting agri-environmental measures of 
Common Agricultural Policy (Greening) 
Technological or 
institutional 
change 
Breed resistant cultivars (also genetic modi-
fication) 
Promotion of biological pest control 
Promotion of extensification 
Promotion of long-term set aside areas 
Abolishing price support systems 
Improvements in application technology 
Remove residues from water  
Regulation (Re-)registration of pesticides 
 
Permission and recording of trade 
Labelling of pesticide products 
Disposal of containers and residuals 
(Water) protection zones 
Fixed quota of pesticides per farm or ha 
Restricted access to (high risk) pesticides 
Restriction of spraying methods 
Monitoring of residues 
Reference: adapted from Oskam et al. (1997) 
Economics instruments are established predominantly via the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the European Union, although there are many possi-
bilities. Only selected countries have established a tax scheme on pesticides 
Calls for not re-
licensing/banning 
glyphosate in the 
EU 
 Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 
Calls for introduc-
ing a specific tax on 
pesticides in Ger-
many and Switzer-
land 
 Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 
Bio-economic 
model necessary 
to analyse policy 
instruments 
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and France is even testing a quota/permit system (Belassen, 2015). A reason 
for the minor relevance of economic instruments could be the uncertainty of 
success and a lack of knowledge about them. Regulatory measures, such as 
a ban of glyphosate, are more straightforward at first glance, because the 
major outcome is often defined by the measure itself – in case of a glypho-
sate ban, the AS is not applied anymore. However, side effects of such 
measures have to be taken into account as well. For example, are other herb-
icides applied more intensively if glyphosate is banned? Biologic and eco-
nomic models can contribute to taking into account those effects. In the fol-
lowing section, the study outline and major contributions of this thesis are 
described.  
1.3 Study Outline and Major Contributions 
Each of the following four chapters of this dissertation focuses on one of the 
postulated research aims that were previously defined. In Chapter 2, the 
analysis of policy measures starts with comparing existing pesticide taxation 
schemes in Europe. Sweden, Denmark, Norway and France have imple-
mented a special tax on pesticides. All countries have different schemes and 
tax levels. The country’s proposed aims on pesticides in their NAPs are 
compared to the effects of introducing the tax. We found that taxes on pesti-
cides can be effective in fulfilling the objectives of the NAPs, but are highly 
dependent on the design of the scheme. Because those objectives often 
comprise a reduction of environmental risks caused by pesticide application, 
differentiated tax schemes, e.g. according to an eco-toxicological indicator 
such as in Denmark and Norway, seem to be more suitable to meet the na-
tional objectives than ad valorem or per unit taxes.  
The price elasticity of demand for pesticides is investigated in a meta-
analysis in Chapter 3. With a median of -0.28 the average price elasticity of 
demand was found to be inelastic over all included studies. A price increase 
of 10% would thus lead to an average reduction of 2.8% of pesticide use. 
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However, differences in elasticity with respect to variability of inputs, the 
production system and the time of publication were found. More specifical-
ly, long-term demand is more elastic than short-term demand due to the 
higher variability in input use (e.g. changes in crop rotations are possible). 
With regard to the agricultural system, pesticide demand in special crops 
was found to be more inelastic than demand in arable farming. This can be 
explained by the lower flexibility of orchard fruits, the higher value per hec-
tare, more application of preventive pesticides, and fewer available substi-
tutes. The type of pesticide applied is found to be relevant as well. Particu-
larly herbicides have a more elastic demand than fungicides or insecticides. 
One reason could be that mechanical alternatives exist, especially for pre-
sowing weed control (see also Chapter 4). Moreover, we found that the 
price elasticity of demand decreased over time and that peer-reviewed stud-
ies tend to find less elastic demand. 
In Chapter 4, the bio-economic model is developed and presented to an-
alyse policy measures on plant production products in detail. The model 
consists of a first part, in which a production function for herbicide applica-
tion is developed, and of a second part, in which profit-maximising weed 
control strategies are selected, depending on economic and spatially explicit 
environmental conditions. The focus is on herbicide application in cultiva-
tion of silage maize in NRW and the model is applied to a potential ban of 
glyphosate. Glyphosate application is found to be the optimal strategy on 
light soils and on heavy soils under current conditions. This means that the 
highest gross margin per hectare can be reached. Banning glyphosate would 
lead to a small but significant yield loss and an increase of labour demand 
on farms. A significant increase in the application of more selective herbi-
cides was not found and glyphosate application was mainly substituted by 
mechanical weed control strategies. Furthermore, a ban of glyphosate does 
not lead to significant reductions of the gross margin in most regions. The 
reason is that some cost savings in sowing are assumed in the model if sev-
eral passes of mechanical weed control are applied. 
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In Chapter 5, production risk is implemented into the model, which 
means that the utility per hectare is maximised by taking into account varia-
bility of the gross margins over time. In addition, two agri-environmental 
indicators are incorporated. One focuses on the environmental load of the 
applied pesticides, the so-called Pesticide Load Indicator (PLI), and the se-
cond one consists of a process energy balance. On the one hand, the results 
of this analysis reveal that a ban of glyphosate would lead to a reduction of 
the environmental load with respect to all three dimensions of the PLI, i.e. a 
reduction in pesticide toxicity, environmental fate and human health load. 
On the other hand, the results show an increase in direct energy demand and 
a loss of energy efficiency mainly due to an increase of diesel consumption 
and a yield loss. Thus, a goal conflict exists between policy objectives to 
protect nature and human health and those to reduce energy consumption.  
1.4 Discussion of Thesis Contributions 
In this dissertation, stricter economic and regulatory instruments were ana-
lysed and a tool was supplied to analyse such policy instruments. A specific 
tax on pesticides is found to be effective in reducing the environmental risks 
caused by pesticide application if it is properly designed in relation to the 
aims defined in the NAP. Such a tax does not necessarily lead to a reduction 
in total pesticide application (in litre or kg of AS) but to a substitution with 
less toxic products or non-chemical plant protection strategies. When intro-
ducing a tax on pesticides, it is important to consider the inelastic demand 
for pesticides. In order to achieve agri-environmental policy targets by a 
pesticide tax, it has to be either high enough or additional reinforcement 
measures need to be introduced. Reinforcement possibilities include labels 
of the tax level to raise awareness or re-funding of the tax revenues into 
measures that further reduce the pesticide’s risks. For example, promoting 
investments in new spraying equipment with nozzles having little drift and 
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save pesticides or investments in better information systems for early warn-
ing of insects or fungi to prevent unnecessary applications.  
The own-price elasticity of demand for pesticides has been estimated by 
many studies and we analysed the results coherently in a meta-analysis. In 
general, the elasticity of demand is inelastic. However, many differences 
were found between the studies as outlined above. When implementing pol-
icy measures such as pesticide taxes the findings should be taken into ac-
count. For example, special crops often rely highly on pesticide application 
(Table 1.1), so that regions with many special crops probably also face more 
negative external effects of pesticide application. However, if the farmer’s 
response to higher prices due to a tax on pesticides is small, the diminish-
ment of negative external effects will be small as well. Furthermore, a sim-
ple tax decreases herbicide use more than fungicide or insecticide use, alt-
hough the latter pesticide groups are often more toxic to the environment 
(e.g. Kovach et al., 1992; Ørum and Sommer Holtze, 2017: 47). This rela-
tively high elasticity for herbicides was also found in the application of the 
bio-economic model, mainly because mechanical substitutes are available 
(e.g. chisel ploughing instead of applying glyphosate; see also Chapter 4). 
The reduction of negative environmental effects could therefore be smaller 
than expected. This highlights the need for a differentiated tax scheme if 
policy makers decide to introduce a tax.  
Bio-economic models such as the presented one are valuable tools to 
analyse policy measures on farm-level in detail. Especially for pesticide 
application analysis, such models can be used to account for the large heter-
ogeneity of the products. In addition, the heterogeneity of different regions 
can be included by geographic information systems. Of course, not all de-
tails of an agri-environmental system can be described in a model, but it can 
be attempted to approximate closely if it is reasonable. If the model simu-
lates spatially explicit policy measures, the modeller has to weigh up the 
scale of the geographical focus region. He or she could focus, for example, 
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on a county or on a national level. A county level allows analysing on a 
small scale by including many details of a region. In addition, a smaller size 
of the regional unit can be chosen, e.g. a 1x1 km raster. A larger scale often 
leads to some aggregation of parameters and thus to a loss of details, but 
regions can be compared with different biological and economic conditions. 
In our modelling approach, the regional focus was set to the state of North-
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the regional units are the municipalities. On 
this regional level, we can still account for many regional differences such 
as yield levels, soil texture and weed pressure. The developed model could 
theoretically also be used on a smaller scale, e.g. at a 1x1 km raster. How-
ever, in order to analyse effects of policy measures for the whole state of 
NRW, this would make the evaluation of results more cumbersome (NRW 
has a size of 34,110 km², compared to 396 municipalities) and the simula-
tion process would have taken much more time. 
1.5 Future Research Recommendations 
While society and policy discuss about implementing administrative instru-
ments to reduce the environmental risks caused by pesticide application, 
scientists and researchers in agriculture and engineering work on smart, 
technical solutions to reduce pesticide input on farms (see Walter et al., 
2017). Digitalisations of agricultural machinery and of farm management 
are two important dimensions where computer systems can assist farmers in 
reducing pesticide use. Visions for such precision farming techniques in-
clude fleets of robots that physically control for weeds, precise application 
of pesticides so that only areas are sprayed where weeds, pests or disease 
occur, and better farm management methods to identify where alternative 
crop protection strategies are economically optimal (e.g. Slaughter et al., 
2008). Data collected by humans, machinery, drones or satellites can sup-
port those techniques. Adoption of precision farming techniques offer indi-
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vidually tailored technical solutions to generate sustainable reductions of the 
environmental risks caused by pesticide application. 
The approach of the developed bio-economic model could be imple-
mented in such smart farming techniques. The model code is available with 
open access in Böcker et al. (2017). In its current version, silage maize is 
the only crop in the model. Since the production factor ‘land’ is thus fixed, 
only short- to mid-term results are obtained. Future research could adapt this 
approach to other crops, other pesticide categories and/or include livestock 
production. For example, the increase in labour demand may influence the 
whole farm management. Furthermore, the objective in the optimisation 
model could be altered, for example to a safety threshold approach. With 
such an approach a certain yield has to be reached (e.g. because the cattle 
has to be fed). Thus, such an approach can partly be used to avoid creating a 
whole farm model. 
The bio-economic model can be used to analyse both bans of specific 
herbicides, as we did for glyphosate, or to analyse taxes on herbicides. Dif-
ferent types of taxes might be analysed: ad valorem taxes where a surcharge 
is added as percentage to the value of the product, quantity taxes where the 
amount of AS in a product is taxed and differentiated taxes where a tax is 
calculated based on the biochemical characteristics of a product. Since there 
was also a debate on introducing taxes on pesticides in Germany, future 
applications of the model could analyse potential changes in weed control 
after introducing a tax on pesticides.  
Technically, the model could also be used for market research on herbi-
cides. Questions in this field are whether a new herbicide product can com-
pete with existing ones or what has to be done so that a product has an ad-
vantage to existing ones (e.g. reducing the herbicide’s price). 
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1.6 Thesis Conclusions 
Reducing environmental risks caused by pesticide application is one of the 
core goals of current agri-environmental policy. With analysing the poten-
tial effects of a specific pesticide tax and a potential ban of glyphosate, two 
different agri-environmental measures were brought into focus in this dis-
sertation. Both of the measures have been discussed intensively in the pub-
lic, but none of them was implemented so far in Germany, also because their 
effectiveness and efficiency have been open questions. Glyphosate has been 
relicensed by the European Commission for additional five years at the end 
of 2017. 
Both of the analysed policy instruments could contribute to reducing 
the environmental risks caused by pesticide application (see Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 5). In case of the glyphosate ban, we found a significant decrease of 
the PLI with respect to all three dimensions of the indicator, environmental 
toxicity, environmental fate and human health load. On the other hand, pes-
ticides contribute to higher energy efficiency of agricultural systems 
(Chapter 5). Introducing measures to reduce pesticide application thus may 
lead to higher energy demand on farms, especially more direct energy con-
sumption in form of diesel. Which of the effects is finally predominating 
and steering the debate has to be defined by policy makers. As in the case of 
glyphosate, compromise solutions are often likely if no decision can be or 
no decision wants to be made.
3
 
Farmer’s costs will increase by both a pesticide tax and a glyphosate 
ban (at least of those who use pesticides or glyphosate). In the first case, the 
own-price elasticity of demand for pesticides was found to be inelastic, 
meaning that the demand for pesticides decreases relatively little if the price 
                                                 
3
 In Germany, the Federal Minister of Food and Agriculture, Christian Schmidt, announced 
in an interview with the Rheinische Post to ban glyphosate for private users and to intro-
duce an obligation to report for professional users if glyphosate is applied in cereals before 
harvest. 
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increases (Chapter 3). In the second case, glyphosate is substituted by more 
expensive mechanical strategies. This substitution goes hand in hand with 
higher labour demand per hectare. Such a labour demand increase is also a 
likely consequence of a pesticide tax if it leads to substitution of herbicides 
by more time consuming mechanical techniques. Furthermore, a small but 
significant yield reduction was found in the analysis – at least in case of a 
glyphosate ban (Chapter 4). However, in our simulation of the glyphosate 
ban, those losses do not lead to a significant decrease of the gross margin on 
average. This is because the optimal, i.e. the profit maximising, control 
strategy was changed from direct or strip-till sowing with glyphosate appli-
cation to conservation tillage without glyphosate application, which leads to 
savings in sowing costs in the simulation. Instead of fully replacing pesti-
cides because of political pressure, adapting the cropping strategy can help 
to mitigate losses at farm-level.  
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  Chapter 2
European Pesticide Tax Schemes in Comparison: An 
Analysis of Experiences and Developments
4
 
Abstract 
Policy measures are needed to reduce the risks associated with pesticides’ 
application in agriculture, resulting in more sustainable agricultural systems. 
Pesticide taxes can be an important tool in the toolkit of policy-makers and 
are of increasing importance in European agriculture. However, little is 
known about the effects of such tax solutions and their impacts on the envi-
ronment, farmers, and human health. We aim to fill this gap and synthesize 
experiences made in the European countries that have introduced pesticide 
taxes, i.e., France, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The major findings of 
our analysis are: (1) overall, the effectiveness of pesticide taxes is limited, 
but if a tax on a specific pesticide is high enough, the application and the 
associated risks will be reduced significantly; (2) in all countries, hoarding 
activities have been observed before a tax introduction or increase. There-
fore, short-term effects of taxes are substantially smaller than long-term 
effects; (3) differentiated taxes are superior to undifferentiated taxes because 
fewer accompanying measures are required to reach policy goals; (4) tax 
scheme designs are not always in line with the National Action Plan targets. 
Low tax levels do not necessarily lead to a reduction of pesticide input and 
differentiated taxes do not necessarily lead to fewer violations of water resi-
due limits. 
                                                 
4
 This chapter is written in American English and published in the journal Sustainability as: 
Böcker, T. and Finger, R. (2017). European Pesticide Tax Schemes in Comparison: An 
Analysis of Experiences and Developments. Sustainability 8(4): 378/1-22. 
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grated pest management; Sweden; Denmark; Norway; France. 
2.1 Introduction 
Policy measures are required in order to reduce the risks and negative exter-
nal effects associated with pesticides’ application in agriculture, resulting in 
more sustainable agricultural systems. Among others, pesticide taxes are an 
important tool in the toolkit of policy-makers and these taxes are of increas-
ing importance. Hereby, pesticide taxes could foster the agro-ecological tran-
sition to integrated pest management practices via reducing pesticide use and 
substituting chemical inputs for biological and mechanical ones. Particularly 
with the implementation of National Action Plans (NAP) in Europe (Di-
rective 2009/128/EC), pesticide taxes are an often discussed instrument in 
various European countries. For instance, a pesticide tax has recently been 
discussed intensively in Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germa-
ny (ARCADIS Belgium, 2014; EAER, 2014; Hof et al., 2013; Möckel et 
al., 2015). Despite the fact that Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and France have 
introduced pesticide taxes, little is known about the effects of such tax solu-
tions and its impacts on the environment, farmers, and human health. Thus, 
an overview and assessment of the different taxation schemes as well as 
experiences made is topical and of high relevance for both researchers and 
policy-makers. 
Only few reviews on this topic have been provided (Oskam et al., 1997; 
Hoevenagel et al., 1999; ECOTEC et al., 2001; Gregoriou et al., 2009; Ske-
vas et al., 2013). This literature, however, has some limitations: firstly, the 
mentioned studies deliver outdated information due to changed policies.  
This limitation is particularly important because pesticide taxation policies 
have lately been revised completely in countries such as Denmark. A recent 
article by Lefebvre et al. (2015) gives a short, up-to-date description of the 
different tax schemes, but an in-depth analysis was not in the scope of their 
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paper. Secondly, descriptions and comparisons across all four countries that 
introduced a pesticide tax are lacking. Thirdly, none of these papers provides 
an assessment of the pesticide taxation schemes with respect to its effects on 
pesticide use and risk indicators as well as its coherence to the recent chang-
es in NAPs. We aim to fill these gaps by presenting an up-to-date, detailed 
overview and assessment of the existing pesticide tax policies in Europe, 
including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and France. Our assessment particu-
larly focuses on the effects these policies have on farmers’ pest management 
practices and the associated environmental and health risks. In addition, we 
summarize recent debates and depict future developments on pesticide taxes 
in other European countries. Moreover, the current fiscal pesticide policies 
are evaluated, also regarding their coherence to the targets of the recent 
NAPs of the four countries. To this end, different indicators are explained 
and analyzed. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in Section 2.2, we 
present frameworks for the evaluation of policies on pesticide use in general 
and pesticide taxation schemes especially. Next, fiscal instruments used in 
European countries are introduced and their effects on pesticide application 
and associated risks are assessed. Subsequently, the different fiscal policies 
are integrated in the presented framework for evaluation. Finally, the exist-
ing tax schemes are discussed and the conclusions are drawn. 
2.2 Methodology for Pesticide Policy Analysis 
During the 1990s, several studies evaluated political measures in order to 
reduce the pesticides’ application and/or the environmental risk possibly re-
lated to the use of certain pesticides. In particular, the studies of Reus et al. 
(1994), Oskam et al. (1997), and Falconer (1998) have presented theoretical 
foundations for the evaluation of economic instruments such as taxes for the 
reduction of environmental and human health risks associated with pesti-
cides. The different criteria for the analysis are presented in Table 2.1. In all 
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three studies, six criteria were applied. A combination of those criteria is 
also used in this article for the evaluation of existing pesticide tax schemes. 
Table 2.1. Criteria used in pesticide policy evaluations 
Reus et al. (1994: 77f.) Oskam et al. (1997: 176) Falconer (1998: 49) 
Effectiveness Effectiveness Effectiveness 
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 
Feasibility and maintain-
ability 
Enforceability Maintainability  
Polluter pays principle Homogeneity Polluter pays principle 
Economic consequences 
for farmers 
No income and property 
rights disturbance  
Economic consequences 
for farmers  
Support among farmers Acceptability  
Ability to differentiate 
policies 
Effectiveness refers to the ability of a political instrument to achieve its 
desired objective. Efficiency describes the costs of an instrument in relation 
to its objective achievement. Feasibility and maintainability, together with 
enforceability and maintainability, consider possibilities of control and fraud. 
The polluter pays principle stands for the justification of an instrument and the 
person responsible for pollution being charged. Private and societal benefits 
have to be balanced with private and societal costs (see e.g., Popp et al., 
2013; Zilberman and Millock, 1997). The criteria homogeneity focuses on 
the additional financial burdens among farmers and their distribution. For 
example, fruit and vegetable growers, as well as potato growers, generally 
need to apply more pesticides than maize growers or grassland farmers and 
will, therefore, be taxed higher. In addition, the measure economic conse-
quences for farmers and no income and property rights disturbance describe 
if losses occur due to a political instrument and how high those costs are. 
Finally, support among farmers and acceptability are overall criteria spec-
ifying to what extent policy measures are supported by farmers and their 
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organizations. These criteria will be used to coherently assess the effects of 
the different pesticide taxation schemes. 
In order to actually be able to measure the effectiveness of an instrument, 
the reduction objective needs to be specified. In principle, there are three 
possibilities to specify and measure such policy targets (Eurostat, 2008). 
Firstly, pesticide use indicators measure the quantity of sold or applied active 
substances (AS). Those indicators are straightforward and the necessary data 
are easy to collect. For example, the treatment frequency measures the calcu-
lated number of pesticide applications under the assumption of a given stand-
ard area dose (SAD) (Bol et al., 2003). Secondly, pesticide risk indicators 
aim to measure the load of a pesticide such as its risks on the environment or 
human health. It can consist of several sub-indicators which can be created 
e.g., by using hazard statements (H-phrases or R-phrases, respectively), bee 
hazards (e.g., in Germany the B-scores), the half-life, the deadly dose for 
non-target organisms, or measures like the concentration that affects 50% of 
the test organisms, or the concentration at which no effect between the con-
trol and test group can be observed. However, in order to measure the over-
all environmental load reduction due to the introduction of a policy instru-
ment, very detailed data are necessary over a long period of time (Bol et al., 
2003). Thirdly, pesticide impact assessment systems aim to evaluate the ef-
fective impacts of pesticides on the environment, e.g., the influence of a pes-
ticide on non-target organisms or biodiversity. In contrast to pesticide risk 
indicators, pesticide impact assessment systems are, to a larger extent, based 
on expert judgments than on chemical analyses (Eurostat, 2008). 
The specific indicators used by the four different countries that intro-
duced pesticide taxes are introduced in the subsequent sections. 
2.3 Fiscal Instruments Established in Europe 
When analyzing fiscal instruments, a differentiation between special taxes or 
levies on pesticides (use), the general taxation of pesticides (for example 
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by the value added tax, VAT), and special charges on pesticides’ registra-
tion has to be made. All instruments are in force in Europe. Fees for regis-
tration exist e.g., in the UK (Plant Protection Products (Fees and Charges) Reg-
ulations), in Germany (Pflanzenschutz-Gebührenverordnung), and in Sweden 
(Förordning (2013:63) om bekämpningsmedelsavgifter). Usually, those fees 
have to be paid by the developer and/or distributor. A VAT on pesticides is 
collected in all European countries, but the rate differs considerably: in most 
countries of the EU, the regular (i.e., not reduced) rate is charged ranging 
between 17% in Luxembourg and 27% in Hungary. As exceptions, Cyprus, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain charge reduced VAT rates for pesticides 
(European Commission, 2015). Additionally, in Switzerland, a reduced VAT 
on pesticides of 2.5% exists (Art. 25 VAT Act). As these systems thus give 
quasi-subsidization to pesticides, adjustments towards full VAT taxation in 
Europe would be in line with current policy discussions on pesticide use. 
France has abandoned reduced VAT rates for pesticides in 2012, but now 
applies a combined system with the reduced rate on pesticides being al-
lowed in organic farming and the regular rate on other pesticides (Art. 278 
bis Code général des impôts). Until 2007, Finland had a special system, 
where the pesticides’ producing or retailing sector was levied by a percent-
age rate to cover the registration and administration costs (with a total reve-
nue of € 2 million/year; OECD, 2009). Except for France, the major purpose 
of those two fiscal instruments (i.e., VAT and registration fees) is not to re-
duce pesticide risks or give incentives to adjust pesticide use. 
In contrast, we focus on special taxation instruments that aim to especially 
reduce pesticide use or risks that are associated with pesticide use. In Table 
2.2, possible combinations in the design of a pesticide tax are presented with 
regard to (i) the tax base and the tax rate of the charge; (ii) the imposition 
point; and (iii) the use or refunding of the revenues. The tax base for specif-
ic or for all pesticides can, for example, be a price, a mass/weight, or an 
indicator.  Basically, the tax rate can be fix or differentiated and either a spe-
cific monetary value or a percentage. Note that for a wider organizational 
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level (for example EU) also other combinations exist. The special taxations 
in the four countries will be described using some of the aspects of this 
framework. 
Table 2.2. Variations of taxation on pesticides on state level 
Charge Imposition 
point 
Use/refunding of revenues 
Tax base Tax rate Organization Target 
- wholesale 
price, 
- retail price, 
- active sub-
stances, 
- environmental 
risk, 
- human health 
risk 
 
- tax on all 
pesticides, 
- specific pesti-
cides 
- fix, 
- differentiated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- tariff level 
either high, 
medium, or 
low, 
- percentage, 
- flat 
- industry, 
- wholesalers, 
- retailers, 
- farmers 
- states, 
- federal states, 
- agricultural 
sector, 
- farmers in-
volved, 
- other organiza-
tions 
- state budget/ 
deficit reduction, 
- Common Agri-
cultural Policy 
- direct pay-
ments/ha, 
- crop premiums, 
innovation pro-
grams for indus-
try and agricul-
ture, 
- supporting alter-
native tech-
niques, 
- other 
Reference: Following Hoevenagel (1999). 
2.3.1 Sweden 
As the first country worldwide, Sweden introduced a special flat tax on pes-
ticides based on the volume sold in 1984. Initially, the tax was introduced 
with SEK 4/kg AS and was increased stepwise to currently SEK 34/kg AS 
(~€ 3.64/kg) (Notisum AB, 2015). The last increase from SEK 30 to 34 took 
place at the beginning of August 2015 (§ 2 Lag (1984:410) om skatt på 
bekämpningsmedel). In addition to the pesticide tax, a price regulation fee 
was charged between 1986 and 1992, which ranged between SEK 29–
46/SAD. The fee was used for supporting the export of agricultural goods, but 
abolished in the course of the EU accession (ECOTEC et al., 2001). 
Until 1995, the financial means of the tax were used for agri-
environmental programs aiming to reduce pesticide application and to pro-
mote integrated pest management (ECOTEC et al., 2001). After 1995, the 
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revenues have been directly allocated to the state’s treasury. The revenues 
are expected to be about SEK 70 million in 2015 and SEK 75 million in 
2016 (~€ 7.5 million and ~€ 8 million, respectively) assuming that the sales 
quantity stays constant. 
The first Swedish NAPs that were adopted during the 1980s focused on 
the reduction of overall pesticide use and application (Landsbygdsdeparte-
mentet, 2013). The present NAP still aims to reduce the use of pesticides, 
but more important is the reduction of the environmental risk that may be 
associated to the application of pesticides. These goals are, for example, the 
reduction of residues in surface water or food and the establishment of farm-
ing techniques that are less dependent on chemical pesticides (Lands-
bygdsdepartementet, 2013). Fig. 2.1 shows that the absolute sales of AS in 
Sweden have been reduced by more than 50% since the 1980s, even though 
statements about sold amounts AS have to be treated with caution, because 
the amount of AS does not reveal any information about environmental 
quality. In the last two decades, however, tax increases have not led to fur-
ther reductions. In contrast, slight increases of several indicators are re-
vealed in Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2. Regarding residues in water, detection of 
very high values (greater than 0.5 µg/L) declined from 1987 to 2014. On the 
other hand, more residues between 0.1 and 0.5 µg/L were found (Larsson et 
al., 2014). Focusing on the share of wells with a minimum of one AS great-
er than 0.1 µg/L, a reduction can be seen for the period 2010–2014 com-
pared to the decade before (Larsson et al., 2014). Nevertheless, fewer sam-
ples were taken in this period, so that overall ambivalent effects can be ob-
served. 
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Fig. 2.1. Sold active substances (1,000 t) in selected European countries: 
(a): France, Germany, and the Netherlands; (b): Denmark, Sweden, and 
Norway.  
Note: A “■” symbolizes the introduction of a pesticide tax, a “▲” symbolizes a tax in-
crease, and a “♦” a change of the tax scheme. Please note the different scales in the dia-
grams. Gaps in 2009 and 2010 are due to methodological changes in data collection. For 
Germany, until 1991, data are for West-Germany. For Norway, until 1990, data are esti-
mated according to Spikkerud (2005). Data reference: Eurostat (2016a) 
Fig. 2.2 also shows the development of the aggregated Swedish pesticide 
risk indicator indexed to the year 1988 (index value of 100; disaggregation 
of the index is not possible). The health and environmental risk indicators 
are calculated by a point system and a set of scores. Among others, the envi-
ronmental score, the application method score, the persistence score, and the 
operator toxicity score are used (see Bergkvist, 2004, for the exact calcula-
tion). Fig. 2.2 indicates that especially the human health risk decreased 
sharply in the beginning of the 1990s and is now relatively constant at a level 
between 20% and 40% compared to the 1988 level. In contrast, the envi-
ronmental risk indicator shows a less clear pattern with levels between 50% 
and 80% if compared to 1988. Thus, positive developments coincide with 
the introduction of the tax. However, it is unlikely that the pesticide tax is 
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Fig. 2.2. Development of Swedish Pesticide Risk Indicator with respect to 
environmental and human health risks.  
Note: In addition, the average dose/ha is shown as an index. The Pesticide Risk Indicator is 
indexed to the year 1988 (index value of 100). The “▲” symbolizes a tax increase.  
Data reference: Naturvårdsverket (2015) 
the only determinant for the decrease of sales and risk. Other factors also 
contributed to these reductions. For instance, this development was caused 
by a consulting policy aiming at an integrated pest management, stricter 
permissions for the registration and application of pesticides, and the intro-
duction of AS with low doses in the 1980s, e.g., by an increased application 
of seed dressing (Bergkvist, 2004). Overall, the pesticide tax was only a small 
part of the bundle of additional financial burdens that were introduced in the 
1980s: a tax on artificial nitrogen fertilizer and cadmium/phosphorus was in 
place from 1984 until 2010 and the above mentioned price regulation charge 
was applied to fertilizers until 1992 as well (ECOTEC et al., 2001; Statskon-
toret, 2010). Those taxes potentially contributed to a reduction of pesticides 
sold and their application as high fertilization rates increase pest and disease 
pressure and vice versa (for example a high-nitrogen fertilization might lead 
to a higher mildew and weed pressure; Baeumer, 1992). Moreover, the value 
of the marginal product (the added value of one additional unit of input) 
Chapter 2  35 
decreases by reducing fertilizer input and thus causes lower optimal pesti-
cide application levels. However, since both political instruments were intro-
duced at the same time, it is difficult to identify the major influencing factor. 
2.3.2 Norway 
As the second European country, Norway introduced a tax on pesticides in 
1988. First, the tax was designed as an ad valorem tax as a percentage of the 
import value (Spikkerud, 2005). In 1999, the tax was changed into a differen-
tiated scheme and now consists of a base rate and an additional rate. Pesticides 
are sorted into seven different categories. The base rate is a tax per ha, which 
is calculated by multiplying NOK 25/ha times a specific factor being associ-
ated with the category of a certain pesticide (ranging from 0.5 to 150). The 
categories are assessed by two sub-categories: (i) risks for human health and 
(ii) environmental risks. All pesticides for professional use are tested accord-
ing to several criteria and then categorized in a low, medium, or high risk (§ 
28 Forskrift om plantevernmidler). The human health-criterion is based on 
the intrinsic properties (according to R-phrases) and the exposure during ap-
plication and mixing (Spikkerud et al., 2005). The environmental criterion is 
compounded by eight sub-scores. They measure effects on earthworms, on 
bees and other arthropods, on birds, on aquatic organisms, the leaching po-
tential, the persistence, the bioaccumulation, and the formulation type 
(Spikkerud et al., 2005). The categorization of the factors can be seen in 
Table 2.3. The additional rate is calculated via the SAD (Norwegian: 
normert arealdose NAD). The SAD refers to the highest possible application 
dose (in ml or g per ha), which is recommended for the main crop in the field 
of application (Spikkerud, 2005; for the product list see Mattilsynet, 2014a). 
Using the example of liquid products, the final tax is calculated as follows: 
  
36  Pesticide Tax Schemes in Comparison 
 
tax in 
NOK
l 
   =    base rate               *   additional rate  
                         =   
NOK 25
ha
* factori  *   
1000
ml
l
SAD  
ml
ha   
 
(2.1) 
Table 2.3. Norwegian factor categorization for base rate calculation 
Tax category i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P
es
ti
c
id
e 
c
h
a
ra
c-
te
r
is
ti
cs
 
Human 
health 
risks Both 
risks 
low 
One low 
and one 
medium 
risk 
One low 
and one 
high 
risk or 
both 
risks 
medium 
One 
medium 
and one 
high 
risk 
Both 
risks 
high 
Concen-
trated 
prod-
ucts for 
hobby 
use 
Ready-
to-use 
prod-
ucts for 
hobby 
use 
Environ-
mental 
risks 
Factor i  
(* NOK 25/ha) 
0.5 3 5 7 9 50 150 
Tax (NOK/ha) 12.5 75 125 175 225 1,250 3,750 
References: §28 Forskrift om plantevernmidler (as at 2015); Strøm Prestvik et al. (2013) 
Products that are allowed in organic farming are exempted from the tax 
(§§ 27–28 Forskrift om plantevernmidler). Producers and importers have to 
pay the tax to the authorities. The government estimates to earn about NOK 
50 million in 2015 (~€ 5.8 million) (Stortingets administrasjon, 2015). An 
in-depth analysis of the tax scheme was presented by Spikkerud (2005). 
There are various disadvantages associated with such an assessment that is 
based on different categories. For instance, products, which are close to the 
threshold at several criteria, are classified, e.g., as low-risk products. In con-
trast, products that exceed the threshold value for one criterion but are far be-
low the threshold for the other criteria are categorized as high- or medium-
risk pesticides. Therefore, relatively large tax differences can occur for 
products that may actually differ little in their riskiness to human health or 
the environment (Spikkerud, 2005). Furthermore, the SAD measure is prob-
lematic because a low SAD leads to a higher taxation and vice versa. The 
underlying assumption is that pesticides with a high application dose are 
less risky (even though environmental toxicity is additionally accounted for 
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in specific factors). In total, this could lead to a higher total application of 
pesticides, while the human health and environmental risk decreases (Spik-
kerud, 2005). Finally, the usage of the maximum recommended dose for a 
specific main field of application is critical. For some pesticides, this deter-
mination is not easily feasible. For instance, for vegetables and fruits differ-
ent doses are usually recommended per crop type and per production system 
(for example field-grown vs greenhouse production) so that probably an 
incorrect or inappropriate tax base is used (Spikkerud, 2005). 
The quantity of pesticides’ sold reduced slightly since the introduction 
of the tax (Fig. 2.1). After changing the tax to a differentiated scheme in 
1999, the sold quantity stayed constant except for a break shortly after the 
change. One reason for the latter might be that the taxation of some low risk 
products actually was reduced when switching to a differentiated tax scheme 
since before already an ad valorem tax on pesticides was established. The 
greater popularity of no-till cultivation and the accompanied application of 
glyphosate also contributed to the non-reduction of the sales quantity of pes-
ticides (Gianessi et al., 2009). The two Norwegian NAPs from 1998 to 2008 
aimed to reduce the health and environmental risk of pesticides by 50% 
(Landbruksdepartementet, 2004). The pesticide risk indicator being used for 
the assessment of this target is divided into a human health risk indicator and 
an environmental risk indicator (Norwegian Agricultural Inspection Service, 
n.d.). Analyzing those two pesticide risk indicators, a small to medium re-
duction can be observed (Fig. 2.3 and Strøm Prestvik et al., 2013). The fig-
ure presents the development of the annual sales data of the retailers and the 
development of the pesticide risk indicator. The marked peaks represent 
large increases of pesticides sold in advance of the introduction or of chang-
es in the tax scheme. Note that the retailers’ behavior is reflected more than 
the farmers’ behavior, although it is likely that also farmers hoarded pesti-
cides to save tax payments in future periods. For this reason, the human 
health and environmental criteria should only be analyzed in the long-term. 
Furthermore, Strøm Prestvik et al. (2013) observe a decline in the range of 
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highly taxed products (categories 4 and 5) and an increase in the range of 
category 1 and 2 pesticides. In 2014, one product of the tax category 5 was 
registered in Norway (Mattilsynet, 2014a). At the single crop level, Strøm 
Prestvik et al. (2013) show that in 2011, hardly any fungicides of category 4 
are used anymore in cereal production and fungicides of category 3 have 
been substituted by products of category 1 or 2 in potato production. Along 
these lines, in 2001, almost no category 1 products were applied, but they 
were used in 50% of the applications in 2011 (Strøm Prestvik et al., 2013). 
However, due to the hoarding activities of farmers (before 1999 at the 
change of the tax scheme and before 2005 due to minor revisions of the 
scheme; Fig. 2.3), it took several years until the tax became effective and a 
more constant reduction of the pesticide risk indicator could be observed. 
The latest NAP was in place from 2010 to 2014, but did not specify any con-
crete reduction targets like the two preceding NAPs. Rather, it was aimed to 
decrease the dependency of chemical pesticides and to increase the share of 
farmers that produce according to integrated farming practices specified in 
the good agricultural practice (Landbruks- og matdepartementet, 2009). 
More specifically, a particular goal is to avoid violations of threshold values 
of standards for groundwater, surface water, and food. Regarding residues 
on food products, however, most cases of threshold violations occur in 
products that are imported (Mattilsynet, 2014b). Moreover, the recent devel-
opments show indeed that fewer violations of threshold values could be ob-
served across space (for different regions) and across various AS (Bechmann 
et al., 2014). However, the analyses show that many violations already de-
clined before introducing the differentiated tax. Measures that contributed to 
this are for example stricter application guidelines and better spraying tech-
niques to avoid point source contamination and drift. Additionally, the over-
all number of detected residues (i.e., not exceeding the threshold) has not 
decreased (Øgaard and Skaalsveen, 2015) and challenges with newer AS 
appear (e.g., increasing residues of prothioconazole, imidacloprid, and aclon-
ifen; Bechmann et al., 2014). Therefore, no clear pattern is observable 
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whether the tax contributed to these improvements. Note that integrated pest 
management is also mandatory for countries in the EU since 2009 due to the 
Directive 2009/128/EC (to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides) and the 
Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2009 (concerning the placing of plant protection 
products on the market). 
 
Fig. 2.3. Development of the Norwegian Pesticide Risk Indicator with re-
spect to environmental and human health risks based on retailers’ sales data.  
Note: The average annual sales are shown, too. The index year is the average of 1996 and 
1997. A “♦”symbolizes a change of the tax scheme and a “▲” a tax increase. Data refer-
ence: Statistics Norway and the Norwegian Food Safety Authority Strøm Prestvik (2015) 
2.3.3 Denmark 
In 1996, Denmark introduced an ad valorem pesticide tax on the highest 
existing wholesale price. This tax was differentiated by the pesticide’s cate-
gory. For example, for insecticides a tax rate of 35% was charged and for 
herbicides, fungicides, and growth regulators a rate of 25%. In 2013, the tax 
scheme was changed into a more differentiated one, because the treatment 
frequency (measured by the AS’ sales, see also Fig. 2.1) and the pesticides’ 
load re-increased (Miljøministeriet, 2012). Similar to other countries, the 
latest increase in AS’ sales have been induced by the larger relevance of no 
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till practices and the associated application of glyphosate (Gianessi et al., 
2009). Moreover, high output prices and the corresponding higher value of 
marginal product contributed to increases in pesticide use (Pedersen et al., 
2015). In the new tax scheme, each single pesticide product receives its spe-
cific tax rate (LBK nr 232 Bekendtgørelse af lov om afgift af bekæm-
pelsesmidler as at 26 February 2015). Note that the old scheme is kept for 
biocides but with increased tax rates of 40% on insecticides (before: 35%) 
and 30% on herbicides and fungicides (before: 25%). The new differentiated 
tax for pesticides is a combination of a pesticide use and a pesticide risk indi-
cator and is calculated as follows (presented for a liquid product): 
tax in 
DKK
l 
     =       exposition tax            +            toxicity tax  
                           =    
DKK 50
kg AS
 * X
kg AS
l 
      +   ∑
DKK 107
l
 * factori L
3
i=1
 
(2.2) 
The exposition tax takes into account the amount of AS of the pesticide 
product (X kg AS/l) and multiplies it times DKK 50. The toxicity tax is cal-
culated with the help of a pesticide risk indicator, the so called Pesticide 
Load Indicator. This indicator comprises of three different factors (catego-
ries) measuring the environmental load of a pesticide: (1) environmental 
toxicity load; (2) environmental fate and behavior load; and (3) human 
health load.  The Danish scheme, thus, extends the scope of the Norwegian 
scheme by adding the dimension of environmental fate. The load score of 
each factor is defined by several sub-indicators and the score is then multi-
plied by DKK 107. The “human health load” is assessed by the R-phrases of 
a plant protection product and by the exposure during application 
(Miljøministeriet, 2012, 2013). The “environmental fate load” is measured 
by the AS’ degradability, potential for bioaccumulation, and its leaching 
potential. “Environmental toxicity load” consists of sub-scores for birds, 
mammals, fish, daphnia, algae, aquatic plants, earthworms, and bees. Addi-
tionally, there is a higher tax rate for seed treatment products at the factor 
“environmental effects” (Miljøministeriet, 2012, 2013). 
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The tax introduction was accompanied with the implementation of 
measures to compensate farmers. In particular, the property tax on agricultur-
al land was reduced by DKK 62–72/ha, depending on the county (ECOTEC et 
al., 2001). Moreover, tax revenues were used to support organic farming and 
for administrative services (ECOTEC et al., 2001; Hansen, 2013; Schou and 
Streibig, 1999). According to the current legislation, the revenues of the tax 
first flow into the states treasury (§ 1 LBK nr 232) but are then returned for 
agricultural and environmental purposes. In 2013, these revenues were DKK 
659 million (0.23% of the state’s budget; ~€ 88.4 million). For 2015, reve-
nues of DKK 600 million are estimated (Skatteministeriet, 2015). From that, 
DKK 250 million are designated for the agricultural fund (promilleaf-
giftsfonden for landbrug), which supports different measures concerning the 
Danish agriculture (Natur- og Landbrugskommissionen, 2012). About DKK 
175 million are destined for green growth measures – of which some are 
related to the NAP – and about DKK 75 million are used for administrative 
purposes. The current Danish NAP for the period 2013 until 2015 aims to 
reduce the total load of pesticides by 40% until the end of 2015 (Miljøminis-
teriet and Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri, 2013). The reduc-
tion is measured with the Pesticide Load Indicator. The differentiated tax 
has a main role in achieving this objective. 
Due to the short time span since the implementation of the new tax 
scheme, no conclusion can be drawn whether the objective is fulfilled. 
However, the new design of the Danish tax implies large burdens for some 
products. The heterogeneity of tax levels is higher compared to other taxa-
tion regimes. For example, the insecticide Cythrin 500 containing 500 g/L 
cypermethrin was taxed with DKK 7709/L (DKK 617/ha, ~€ 83/ha respec-
tively at a recommended dose for rapeseed of 0.08 L/ha) and the insecticide 
Gamma C containing 60 g/L gamma-cyhalothrin is taxed with DKK 6009/L 
(DKK 361/ha, ~€ 48/ha, respectively, at a recommended dose for rapeseed 
of 0.06 L/ha; see Table 2.4 for further examples). Even though allowing 
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more flexibility than bans of pesticides, high taxation levels could lead to the 
disappearance of those highly hazardous products (mostly insecticides) from 
the market. Critics are concerned that, as a consequence, problems of re-
sistances might be enlarged (Jørgensen and Ørum, 2013), which could lead 
to a more intense application of other, cheaper pesticides. It is, therefore, 
possible that a single application leads to a lower environmental load under 
the new tax scheme, but when summing up all applications, a load similar to 
the one under the old tax scheme or without tax is reached. In order to coun-
ter this effect, one opportunity would be to simplify the pesticide registration 
process, but since it is an EU policy matter, this is not easily possible. In 
contrast, the breeding and use of more resistant varieties is a positive side 
effect of the tax and would support the reduction of pesticide use. Further 
criticism indicates that farmers face extra burdens and have become less 
competitive compared to other European producers (Pedersen et al., 2015; 
Jørgensen and Ørum, 2013; Nørring, 2013). However, this depends on the 
crop that is produced since some pesticides are now burdened lower com-
pared to the old tax scheme (Hansen, 2013). 
 Table 2.4. Comparison of the taxation of different pesticides (selection)  
Type 
Product name (depending on 
country) 
Active substance 
Sweden Norway Denmark France 
€/kg or l 
(SEK/kg or l) 
€/ha 
(SEK/ha) 
€/kg or l 
(NOK/kg or l) 
€/ha 
(SEK/ha) 
€/kg or l 
(DKK/kg or l) 
€/ha 
(DKK/ha) 
€/kg or l €/ha 
Fungicide 
Acanto® 250 SC/Aproach® Picoxystrobin 250 g/l 0.91 0.91 14.45 14.45 13.54 13.54 0.50 0.50 
(SAD in NO = 1000 ml) (8.50) (8.50) (125.00) (125.00) (101.00) (101.00)     
Fungicide 
Amistar® Azoxystrobin 250 g/l 0.91 0.91 8.67 8.67 5.50 5.50 1.28 1.28 
(SAD in NO = 1000 ml/ha) (8.50) (8.50) (75.00) (75.00) (41.00) (41.00)     
Fungicide 
Comet® Pyraclostrobin 250  g/l  0.91 0.91 8.67 8.67 13.00 13.00 1.28 1.28 
(SAD in NO = 1000 g/ha) (8.50) (8.50) (75.00) (75.00) (97.00) (97.00)     
Fungicide 
Stereo® 312.5 EC Cyprodinil 250 g/l 1.14 1.71 9.63 14.45 20.91 31.37 - - 
(SAD in NO = 1500 ml/ha) Propiconazole 62.5 g/l (10.63) (15.94) (83.33) (125.00) (156.00) (234.00)     
Fungicide 
Switch® 62,5 WG Cyprodinil 375 g/kg 3.64 1.82 28.90 14.45 14.34 7.17 1.25 0.63 
(SAD in NO = 500 g/ha) Fludioxonil 250 g/kg (34.00) (17.00) (250.00) (125.00) (107.00) (53.50)     
Fungicide 
Talius® Proquinazid 200 g/l 
- - 
57.80 14.45 
- - 
1.02 0.26 
(SAD in NO = 250 ml/ha) (500.00) (125.00)     
Growth 
regulator 
Moddus® M/Moxa® Trinexapac-ethyl 250 g/l 0.91 0.36 3.61 1.45 4.42 1.77 0.50 0.20 
(SAD in NO = 400 ml/ha) (8.50) (3.40) (31.25) (12.50) (33.00) (13.20)     
Herbicide 
Ally® Class 50 WG/Allié® 
Express 
Metsulfuron-methyl 100 
g/kg 
1.82 0.09 28.90 1.45 
- - 
1.00 0.05 
(SAD in NO = 50g/ha) 
Carfentrazone-ethyl 400 
g/kg 
(17.00) (0.85) (250.00) (12.50)     
Herbicide 
Basagran® SG Bentazone 870 g/kg 3.17 5.07 5.42 8.67 15.15 24.24 1.74 2.78 
(SAD in NO = 1600 g/ha) (29.58) (47.33) (46.88) (75.00) (113.00) (180.80)     
Herbicide 
Boxer® Prosulfocarb 800 g/l 2.91 14.56 2.89 14.45 16.62 83.11 - - 
(SAD in NO = 5000 ml/ha) (27.20) (136.00) (25.00) (125.00) (124.00) (620.00)     
Herbicide 
Express® Gold SX/CDQ® SX 
Tribenuron-methyl 
222.2 g/kg  
- - 
42.50 1.45 16.76 0.57 - - 
(SAD in NO = 34 g/ha) 
Metsulfuron-methyl 
111.1 g/kg  
(367.65) (12.50) (125.00) (4.25)     
Herbicide 
Gratil® 75 WG 
(SAD in NO = 60 g/ha) 
Amidosulfuron 750 g/kg 2.73 
(25.50) 
0.16 
(1.53) 
144.51 
(1250.00) 
8.67 
(75.00) 
- - 
1.50 
  
0.09 
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Table 2.4. (continued)  
Type 
Product name (depending on 
country) 
Active substance 
Sweden Norway Denmark France 
€/kg or l 
(SEK/kg or l) 
€/ha 
(SEK/ha) 
€/kg or l 
(NOK/kg or l) 
€/ha 
(SEK/ha) 
€/kg or l 
(DKK/kg or l) 
€/ha 
(DKK/ha) 
€/kg or l €/ha 
Herbicide 
Hussar® OD Iodosulfuron-methyl-
sodium 100 g/l 
- - 
14.45 1.45 6.30 0.63 - - 
(SAD in NO = 100 ml/ha) (125.00) (12.50) (47.00) (4.70)     
Herbicide 
MaisTer® Foramsulfuron 300 g/kg 1.13 0.17 9.63 1.45 11.13 1.67 - - 
(SAD in NO = 150g/ha) 
Iodosulfuron-methyl-
sodium 10 g/kg 
(10.54) (1.58) (83.33) (12.50) (83.00) (12.45)     
Herbicide 
Roundup® Max/Roundup® 
680 Glyphosate 680  g/kg  
2.48 4.95 0.72 1.45 9.79 19.57 1.36 2.72 
(SAD in NO = 2000 g/ha)  (23.12) (46.24) (6.25) (12.50) (73.00) (146.00)     
Insecti-
cide 
Biscaya® OD 240 
Thiacloprid 240 g/l 
0.87 0.35 36.13 14.45 16.09 6.43 1.22 0.49 
(SAD in NO = 400 ml/ha) (8.16) (3.26) (312.50) (125.00) (120.00) (48.00)     
Insecti-
cide 
Calypso® 480 SC 
Thiacloprid 480 g/l 
1.75 0.35 101.16 20.23 
- - 
2.45 0.49 
(SAD in NO = 200 ml/ha) (16.32) (3.26) (875.00) (175.00)     
Insecti-
cide 
Confidor® 70 WG 
Imidacloprid 700 g/kg 
2.55 0.51 7.23 1.45 5.23 1.05 - - 
(SAD in NO = 200 g/ha) (23.80) (4.76) (62.50) (12.50) (39.00) (7.80)     
Insecti-
cide 
Karate® 5 CS/Karate® Foret Lambda-cyhalothrin 50 
g/l 
0.18 0.03 96.34 14.45 
- - 
0.26 0.04 
(SAD in NO = 150 ml/ha) (1.70) (0.26) (833.33) (125.00)     
Insecti-
cide 
Steward® 30 WG 
Indoxacarb 300 g/kg 
1.09 0.27 57.80 14.45 102.01 25.50 1.53 0.38 
(SAD in NO = 250 g/ha) (10.20) (2.55) (500.00) (125.00) (761.00) (190.25)     
Note: Hectare cost values were calculated in all countries on the basis of the Norwegian SAD to guarantee comparison of the results. It could be that the SAD in 
Norway differs in the other countries. The different pesticide products were selected on the basis of: 1) availability in Norway, 2) relevance of product, 3) dif-
ferent categories of products (risk and use class), 4) availability in other countries. Corresponding exchange rates in the first half of 2015 were as follows: EUR : 
SEK | NOK | DKK = 1 : 9.34 | 8.65 | 7.46 (Eurostat, 2015). 
References: author’s own compilation; lists of registered products and/or the corresponding taxes on them can be found at: Kemikalieinspektionen, 2015 (Swe-
den); Mattilsynet, 2014a (Norway); MEDDE, 2015 (France); Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet, 2015 (Denmark); SEGES P/S, 2015 (Denmark). 
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2.3.4 France 
France has introduced a volume tax on pesticides in 2000. First, the tax was 
introduced as the taxe générale sur les activités polluantes (TGAP), which 
was valid until 2009. Pesticides were divided into seven taxation categories 
(based on the eco-toxicological and toxicological properties according to the 
R-phrases) and the tax had to be paid by the pesticide distributors (Aubertot 
et al., 2005; MAP, 2006). Category 1 was tax free, category 2 was taxed at € 
381/t AS, category 3 at € 610/t, category 4 at € 838/t, category 5 at € 1067/t, 
category 6 at € 1372/t, and category 7 was taxed at € 1677/t AS. Initially, the 
values were in Francs, but then converted into Euro at the fixed exchange 
rate. 
In 2009, the TGAP was replaced by a fee on the non-point agricultural 
pollution (redevance  pour pollutions agricoles diffuses). Contrary to the 
TGAP, only three different pesticide categories are established. Pesticide 
products being based on mineral AS are charged at the lowest level (€ 
0.9/kg AS). Pesticides that are considered to be dangerous to the environ-
ment are charged at € 2/kg AS. Pesticides that are mutagenic, carcinogenic, 
or hazardous to reproduction are charged at the highest level, € 5.10/kg AS 
(Art. L213-10-8 and Art. R213-48-13 Code de l'environnement). The new fee 
has to be paid at the retail level by the customer. The distributors have to 
state the fee on the invoice in order to create consciousness for the aim of 
reducing environmental or health risks of pesticides (OECD, 2011; for more 
information about awareness raising see Oskam et al., 1997). The total reve-
nues of the fee amounted up to € 60 million in 2012 and 2013 (République 
Française, 2014). Half of these revenues are dedicated to water utility and 
sewage treatment operators in dependence of the regional pesticide contam-
ination in the water. The remaining tax revenues are invested in other 
measures of the NAP (OECD, 2011). However, 50% of the fee’s revenues 
cannot cover the expenses of the water operators for the cleaning of the pes-
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ticide contamination, which are estimated to be between € 50–100 million per 
year (Bommelaer and Devaux, 2012). Additionally, the OECD proposed to 
internalize further external costs, e.g., costs for biodiversity loss (OECD, 
2011). Therefore, the OECD evaluates the new fee as too low. 
The French NAP écophyto 2018 lasts from 2008 until 2018 and aims to 
reduce the total pesticide usage by 50% (MAP, 2008). This NAP was re-
vised in 2015 and the extended NAP écophyto II lasts from 2015 to 2025 still 
with a reduction goal of 50% compared to 2015 levels (MAAF and 
MEDDE, 2015). When assuming that the applied quantity is equal to the 
sales quantity, the sales quantity serves as a simple pesticide use indicator. 
This means that under écophyto 2018, a reduction from about 80,000 t AS 
in 2008 (Fig. 2.1) to 40,000 t in 2018 has to be achieved. Since the introduc-
tion of the tax, the sold amounts decreased sharply to about 66,700 t AS in 
2013. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the overall pesticide sales in 
France are quite volatile and that other factors also influence the amount of 
pesticides applied. Similar to Sweden, the substitution to low dose AS might 
be relevant, e.g., the market share of copper and sulfur ingredients decreased 
by 40% from 2001 to 2004 (Aubertot et al., 2005). For this reason, pesticide 
volume reduction targets in the NAPs are criticized because less hazardous, 
high-dose products are replaced by more hazardous, low dose products 
(Barzman and Dachbrodt-Saaydeh, 2011). The new NAP écophyto II is also 
of special interest, because a quota system is established and tested (certifi-
cats d’économie de produits phytopharmaceutiques), which is, to our 
knowledge, the first one worldwide. For more information, see (Belassen, 
2015). 
2.3.5 Tax Discussions in Other European Countries 
Recently, several other European countries have been discussing about im-
plementing pesticide taxes. The Netherlands, for example, have had several 
pesticide tax debates which led to the denial of a proposed taxation in the 
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beginning of the millennium (Hof et al., 2013; Tweede Kamer, 2003a). Ar-
guments against a fiscal instrument were the relatively high organizational 
effort (Tweede Kamer, 2003b), the low elasticity of demand, and the higher 
burdens for domestic producers as well as leakage through import (Hof et 
al., 2013; Boon et al., 2012; for the elasticity see also Skevas et al., 2012). 
The aims proclaimed in the NAP until 2010 were reached at least partially: 
large parts of targets regarding environmental load and residue limits in wa-
ter supply and food have been reached (Eerdt et al., 2012). Looking at the 
overall sold quantity of pesticides, it can be seen that the sales numbers re-
duced by almost fifty percent since the 1980s (Fig. 2.1). This decrease was 
mainly due to stricter obligations for soil fumigants, of which in 1985 
10,800 t AS were used and in 2005 only 1,400 t AS (CBS et al., 2015). 
Belgium is currently undertaking further research if a tax on pesticides 
would be useful and constructive (ARCADIS Belgium, 2014). In the 1990s, 
even a draft for a law was formulated in which selected pesticides should have 
been charged, but the law did not pass (ECOTEC et al., 2001). Meanwhile, 
stakeholders of the agri-food chain, which includes pesticide producers and 
distributors, have to finance the Belgian Federal Agency for the Safety of the 
Food Chain by a yearly fee depending on the number of authorized plant 
protection products that are sold (Art. 3 Loi relative au financement de 
l’Agence fédérale pour la Sécurité de la Chaîne alimentaire of 9 December 
2004 and the periodically amended Royal Decree Arrêté royal fixant les con-
tributions visées à l’article 4 de la loi du 9 décembre 2004 relative au fi-
nancement de l’Agence fédérale pour la Sécurité de la Chaîne alimentaire 
of 10 November 2005). 
Additionally, in Switzerland, there has been an ongoing debate about 
pesticide taxes since the 1990s. So far, the Swiss Agency for the Environ-
ment, Forests and Landscape argued against pesticide taxes due to the as-
sumed higher effectiveness of other measures (e.g., cross-compliance, regis-
tration guidelines, or agri-environmental measures), insufficient knowledge 
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about the tax effects, and too high burdens for Swiss farmers. However, there 
is some public and political pressure to further promote a reduced application 
of pesticides. In this context, the necessity of a NAP was analyzed and also 
the effects of a possible tax are re-analyzed (EAER, 2014). 
In Germany, the state minister of agriculture from Schleswig-Holstein 
proposed to introduce a tax on pesticides in October 2015. The proposal is 
based on a study of Möckel et al. (2015). The suggestion is a tax scheme 
which is related to the Norwegian one. A base rate of € 20/ha shall be multi-
plied by a human risk indicator. Additionally, ready-to-use products and 
pesticides that are on the EU list for substitution shall be levied at higher 
rates. The tax is proposed to be paid by the industry or the wholesalers. 
Short-term and long-term reductions of pesticide use are expected to be 
about 20% and 35% in arable farming. The tax would increase the costs of 
pesticides by 40% to 50% per hectare (Möckel et al., 2015). 
2.4 Analysis of Implementation and Objective Achievement 
While Norway, Denmark, and France established differentiated tax schemes, 
Sweden sticks to a fixed tax scheme, which has not changed since the 1980s 
apart from raising the tax rates and abolishing the additional price regulation 
charge. In Table 2.5, we present an overview of the different schemes based 
on the design variations introduced in Table 2.2. Norway, Denmark, and 
France use a pesticide risk indicator as well as the amount of AS for the 
calculation of the differentiated tax. Sweden only uses the amount of AS for 
the calculation of the flat tax. 
 
 Table 2.5. Overview of the different pesticide tax schemes currently in place 
State 
Charge 
Imposition point 
Use/refunding of revenues 
Tax base Tax rate Organization Target 
Sweden 
active substances fix industry, 
importers/ wholesalers 
Swedish state state budget 
all pesticides low/medium tariff, 
flat tax 
Norway 
active substances, 
environmental risk, 
human health risk 
differentiated industry, importer/ 
wholesalers 
Norwegian state state budget 
all pesticides low – medium – high 
tariffs 
Denmark 
active substances, 
environmental risk, 
human health risk 
differentiated wholesalers/ importers Danish state – different 
ministries 
state budget, agricultural 
fund, green growth 
measures, administra-
tion all pesticides low – medium – high 
tariffs 
France 
active substances, 
human health risk, 
(environmental risk) 
differentiated retailers/ distributor agricultural and envi-
ronmental sector 
water utility and sewage 
treatment operators 
measures of the NAP, 
 
cleaning of water 
all pesticides low – medium 
tariffs    
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All of the countries established NAPs in which different objectives for 
the reduction of pesticides’ application or the reduction of pesticides’ risks 
are defined. Building upon the framework derived above, we now analyze 
whether the different established tax schemes are consistent with the defined 
goals of the NAPs. The mentioned indicators for the analysis were applied 
to show the advantages and disadvantages of each scheme. The summarized 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.6. Moreover, a comparison of 
tax levels of selected plant protection products in the four countries is given in 
Table 2.4 and serves as decision support for the evaluation. 
The main advantage of the Swedish tax scheme is its simplicity. The 
transaction costs that occur due to the administrative effort of such a 
scheme are low. Essentially, Sweden could reach its NAP goals by this tax, 
but the tariffs of the scheme are relatively low and, consequently, not very 
effective due to the low price elasticity of demand for pesticides. In Sweden, 
herbicides have the highest share of sold AS. For the period 1950–1989, 
Gren (1994a, 1994b) reports a relatively high elasticity between -0.93 and -
0.97 for herbicides. Therefore, this is in line with the reductions of sold AS 
in the 1980s. In the last two decades, however, the elasticity of herbicides 
seems to be lower, probably due to high reductions in previous years but 
also due to the increased popularity of conservation tillage (see Section 
2.3.2 and 2.3.3). Furthermore, no differentiation between pesticides with 
different loads takes place. This may have led to a reduction of some select-
ed pesticides, which need a high dose, have relatively high price elasticities, 
or effective substitutes. Nevertheless, the tax increases in the past years 
(e.g., from SEK 20 to SEK 30/kg AS in 2003) have not led to a permanent 
reduction of the human health and environmental risk indicators, and the 
dose/ha even increased. For water threshold violations, only ambiguous 
results can be observed. 
Norway has defined two main objectives in the NAP. The established 
tax scheme has relatively high tariffs on more hazardous pesticides and the 
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tax scheme promotes farmers to use pesticides with a lower environmental 
load. This has led to a substitution of pesticides, but farmers’ reliance on 
pesticides remains relatively high. Therefore, this scheme is not fully effec-
tive in reaching the objective of increasing farmers’ compliance with inte-
grated pest management, which has resulted in increased doses being ap-
plied, although of less hazardous pesticides. Farmers are burdened by the 
tax when they substitute to pesticides of the lower risk categories as well. 
This has a restricting effect to not increase the use of less hazardous pesti-
cides too much. Whether the objective of fewer violations of maximum res-
idue limits can be achieved by such a tax scheme, remains unclear because of 
difficulties in observing effects that go along or are correlated with the tax 
introduction. At least, it seems that the tax has not led an increase of water 
threshold violations, as in most regions and for many AS a reduction can be 
found (Bechmann et al., 2014). However, other accompanying measures that 
are defined in the NAP are also relevant for this development. These com-
prise, for instance, better information techniques or the promotion of im-
proved and more precise spraying techniques. The tax calculation in the 
Norwegian scheme is sometimes not straightforward, because the SAD is 
determined based on the recommended pesticide dose in one crop only. In 
addition, in the calculation it is assumed that the higher the SAD, the lower 
the risk of a certain pesticide, which is not always the case. This is also re-
vealed by some big tax differences for single products between the Norwe-
gian and the Danish scheme (for example for the herbicides Boxer® and 
Roundup® Max, Table 2.4), where the latter system accounts for loads ex-
plicitly. 
 
  
Table 2.6. Advantages and disadvantages of existing pesticide taxation schemes. The range of this table is as follows: a “–“ is a dis-
advantage, a “+” is an advantage, and a “±” means that no specific effect can be observed 
Criteria for 
analysis 
(section 2.2) 
Country’s tax scheme 
Sweden 
fix, 
SEK 34/kg AS 
Norway 
differentiated, 
7 categories 
Denmark 
differentiated, 
individual tax 
France 
differentiated, 
3 categories 
Main objective 
of NAP 
NAP 2013-2017 
(1) No violations of residue 
limits 
(2) Reduce pesticides’ input 
NAP 2010-2014 
(1) 70% of farmers apply inte-
grated pest management 
(2) No violations of residue 
limits 
NAP 2013-2015 
40% load reduction 
NAP 2008-2018 
50% use reduction from 2008 
to 2018 and from 2015 to 2025 
Effectiveness 
± 
(1, 2) in principle possible but 
tax level too low to cause large 
reductions, no further long-
term reductions after the last 
tax increases 
(1) + 
farmers use less hazardous 
pesticides 
(2) ± 
farmers use same amount or 
more pesticides 
+ 
very high taxes on high load 
pesticides (use reduction) 
±/+ 
overall relatively low taxes for 
all three categories but never-
theless use reduction since 
implementation of tax 
Efficiency 
– 
(1, 2) additional burden for 
farmers but no reduction in use 
(1) ± 
Less hazardous pesticides are 
relatively cheap 
(2) – 
more costs but same amount 
used 
± 
farmers can choose for low 
taxed pesticides; some products 
may disappear – potential re-
sistance problems 
±/+ 
relatively low additional costs 
for farmers but use reduction is 
achieved 
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 Table 2.6. (continued)  
Criteria for 
analysis 
(section 2.2) 
Country’s tax scheme 
Sweden Norway Denmark France 
Feasibility, 
maintainability 
and enforceabil-
ity 
+ 
easy to enforce 
–/± 
for some products complicated 
tax determination 
± 
rather complicated scheme 
+ 
easy to enforce 
Polluter pays 
principle, ability 
to differentiate 
taxation 
– 
fix tax scheme, only choice to 
not pay is not using pesticides 
at all 
+/± 
seven different categories; 
disputes about tax calculation 
+ 
individual taxation, almost no 
tax for products with low load 
–/± 
only three categories; few 
choices can be made; revenues 
for water operators 
No economic 
consequences for 
farmers, homo-
geneity  
± 
relatively low tax per ha, espe-
cially for low dose products; 
only few intensive pesticide 
users in Sweden (few fruit and 
vegetable farming) 
– 
also when choosing less haz-
ardous pesticides a tax is 
charged, probably less effective 
plant protection; no return to 
the sector 
± 
reduction of property tax on 
agricultural land; revenues 
returned to sector; high tax 
when some products have to be 
used, maybe production losses 
or changes otherwise, hereby 
potential for tax savings com-
pared to old tax scheme 
± 
low tax per ha; tax revenues 
flow only partly back into the 
agricultural sector (e.g. via 
environmental programs) 
Support among 
farmers, accept-
ability 
– 
despite relatively low tax bur-
den, some cost increases occur; 
no tax in most other European 
countries 
– 
tax burden also when choosing 
for less hazardous pesticides; 
no tax in most other European 
countries 
– 
some products may be too 
expensive to use, e.g. insecti-
cides; no tax in most other 
European countries 
– 
despite relatively low tax bur-
den, some cost increases occur; 
few categories; no tax in most 
other European countries 
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In the Danish tax scheme, an individual tax is calculated according to the 
chemical, environmental, and application-specific characteristics of each 
pesticide. Similar to the Norwegian scheme, more hazardous pesticides are 
taxed at higher rates. Hereby, the tax differences between single products 
can be very high (Table 2.4). Focusing on the taxes per ha of single prod-
ucts, it can be observed that the tax range is much higher compared to the 
Norwegian scheme. The revenues are, to a large extent, designated for agri-
cultural and environmental measures. The aim of the Danish Government is 
to decrease the load of pesticides by 40% until the end of 2015. Such a 
scheme is in line with the polluter pays principle. However, since some 
products (often insecticides) are taxed very high, they may disappear from 
the market (like the above mentioned Cythrin 500; SEGES P/S, 2015). This 
also implies potentially large cost increases for some farmers, for example 
when growing cereals (Hansen, 2013). In contrast, other cropping systems 
(maize or grassland) are less affected or even have potential to save tax 
payments, at least when comparing to the old tax system (Hansen, 2013). 
When the cropping system cannot be changed, critics argue that a conse-
quence could be an increasing use of cheaper pesticides (Nørring, 2013) 
probably without considering the AS’ classification to avoid resistances, 
e.g., according to the chemical classification of the Herbi-
cide/Insecticide/Fungicide Resistance Action Committees. 
France has two tier tax schemes to foster a change in the use of pesti-
cides. Firstly, synthetic pesticides are taxed with the regular VAT rate. Pesti-
cides being allowed in organic agriculture are charged with the reduced 
VAT, giving a comparative advantage to organic farming. Secondly, a three-
category differentiated scheme was introduced. On the one hand, pesticides 
that are mutagenic, carcinogenic, or hazardous to reproduction are taxed rela-
tively high in this scheme. On the other hand, pesticides that are allowed in 
organic farming and those that are less hazardous are taxed at a lower rate. It 
appears that this scheme gives incentives for a reduction of products that are 
levied at the high rate. However, the overall tax that has to be paid by a 
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farmer also depends on the dose per ha of a product. Pesticides of the high 
tax categories often need a relatively small dose and, therefore, the tax bur-
den per ha might be low (see Table 2.4 for examples). In contrast, less haz-
ardous, low-levied pesticides get relatively cheaper at a first glance, but these 
products often have to be applied at a higher dose (e.g., a 20% copper sulfate 
product is taxed at € 0.18/kg, but their dose is 25 kg/ha, which results in a 
tax/ha of € 4.5). Thus, in some cases this policy gives incentives to switch to 
low-dose pesticides. For this reason, the French policy objective of reducing 
the overall pesticide use is consistent with the French tax but not fully con-
sistent with the targets of a differentiated scheme, which is to reducing the 
load caused by pesticides. Although the additional costs for farmers are rela-
tively low compared to Norway and Denmark, a use reduction (of AS) is 
achieved. Even though other measures contributed to this development, the 
relatively high reduction effects induced by a relatively low tax was con-
firmed in a simulation study by Jacquet et al. (2011), in which a 20% reduc-
tion is reached by a 16% ad valorem tax. 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Four European countries implemented special taxes in order to control the 
use of pesticides. Several other countries recently discussed such an instru-
ment. In this article, the tax schemes of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and 
France were presented and analyzed. European countries defined different 
objectives in their NAPs that comprise goals to promote agro-ecological 
transition, among others, the application reduction, the reduction of the pes-
ticides’ load, the increase of integrated pest management, and the non-
violation of maximum residue limits. Not all of the established tax schemes 
were found to be in line with the goals defined in the NAPs. A highly-
differentiated tax scheme which leads to a reduction of highly-hazardous 
pesticides can result in an increase of the application of less hazardous pes-
ticides if suitable alternatives are available. Those pesticides often need a 
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higher dose per hectare so that the overall sold volume is not reduced. If the 
environmental behavior of pesticides is not included adequately in the tax 
calculation, those pesticides can also be transported into bodies of water. 
Thus, violations of threshold values can still occur, although shifted to less 
hazardous products. Nevertheless, it can be stated that when the reduction 
objective is well defined and the chosen indicators are well developed, dif-
ferentiated taxes can be an effective environmental policy instrument in the 
long-term and a contribution to integrated pest management. However, in 
order to reduce the reliance on pesticides significantly (and not making them 
dependent on less hazardous ones), a tax scheme has to go hand in hand 
with accompanying measures promoting preventive measures of integrated 
pest management. In the short-term, no environmental and human health 
benefits will be observed due to large hoarding activities by retailers and farm-
ers (peaks in Fig. 2.1 – Fig. 2.3), and low price elasticities (Skevas et al., 
2012; Falconer and Hodge, 2000). So far, no clear indication could be found 
in the literature whether a tax is efficient or not: for example, Reus et al. 
(1994) find no notable or only a moderate effectiveness, whereas Oskam et 
al. (1997) and Falconer (1998) notice a high/positive effectiveness. Our analy-
sis shows that taxes are a potentially effective instrument, but appropriate 
economic, political, and environmental circumstances have to be given. 
The identification of the effects of taxes is hampered, because often 
many policy measures are introduced at the same time and farmers may 
change their behavior so that versatile effects occur. Many of those alterna-
tive measures are effective as well. Examples are regulatory measures, in-
creasing information, persuasion and awareness, technological or institution-
al change, arrangements, or other economic instruments (see Oskam et al., 
1997, for a list of measures). For instance, in the Netherlands, banning-alike 
permissions for soil fumigants led to a 50% reduction of total pesticides 
sold. Additional insights from micro-studies are, therefore, needed to evalu-
ate the efficiency of pesticide taxes, also accounting for accompanying 
measures. In addition, an enhancement of the indicators is necessary to bet-
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ter reflect the use and risks of different pesticides on farms. Ideally, as pro-
posed by Benbrook et al. (2002), such indicators should consist of both a 
pesticide use and a pesticide risk indicator, so that both the exposure and the 
toxicity are covered. This is, for example, done in the model SYNOPS 
(Gutsche and Strassemeyer, 2007), but also in the calculation of the tax in 
Norway and Denmark. The feasibility, maintainability, and enforceability 
should be unproblematic in developed countries with well-established insti-
tutions and modern pesticide application techniques. Moreover, all countries 
implemented taxes on pesticide products at the industry or distributor level 
and not on pesticide use at the farm level. Problems occur sometimes in the 
calculation of differentiated tax schemes, because, although they are often 
based on a pesticide risk indicator, some political judgments have to be 
made by the authorities. 
Taxes can have different targets. For example, the goal can be to gener-
ate revenues (either for the sake of general revenues or according to the pol-
luter pays principle) or to create incentives to use fewer or less hazardous 
pesticides. It is also possible to combine both targets, but sometimes the 
target pursued by a government remains unclear. The Danish scheme fol-
lows the polluter pays principle since every pesticide is taxed by its individ-
ual load. The French tax scheme follows both objectives, but by only differ-
entiating three categories, the polluter pays principle is not adequately fol-
lowed. The Swedish tax does not consider the polluter pays principle. Not-
withstanding this, also due to many accompanying measures, decreases of 
the pesticide risk indicator in the beginning of the 1990s could be observed. 
While the general structure of the tax is still in line with the objective of the 
NAPs, the tax seems not in line with current knowledge on the design of 
pesticide taxation and the developments in other countries. At first sight, the 
economic consequences for farmers are negative in most schemes since a 
higher price has to be paid for the products but the pesticide use reductions 
are small. This is due to the low price elasticity of demand for pesticides, 
which also limits the effectiveness of taxes with respect to pesticide use re-
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ductions. From a polluter pays-point of view, this is in line with policy tar-
gets and promotes transition to integrated agricultural systems that are less 
dependent on chemical inputs, albeit a change towards more organic farm-
ing could not be observed in the wake of tax introductions or increases – 
according to Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2016b). Additionally, no clear pattern 
could be observed if the transition to more organic farming influences the 
pesticide use statistics. Negative economic consequences for farmers might 
be reduced if tax revenues are fed back into the sector, as it is the case in 
Denmark and partly in France. Hereby, spending the tax revenues for explicit 
environmental measures (biocontrol, buffer zones, etc.) could generate a lev-
erage effect on the effectiveness of tax schemes. In differentiated tax 
schemes, less hazardous pesticides are also taxed. From an incentive creat-
ing-point of view, however, a differentiated tax scheme should offer untaxed 
or very low taxed, less hazardous pesticides, creating incentives to switch to 
these products. Nevertheless, the applicability of the polluter pays principle is 
limited due to the difficulties of calculating all (external) costs and benefits 
of a pesticide application. 
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  Chapter 3
A Meta-Analysis on the Elasticity of Demand for Pes-
ticides
5
 
Abstract 
There is an increasing policy interest in pesticide taxation schemes as a 
measure to reduce harmful effects of pesticide use. The effectiveness of 
such tax depends, however, on the price elasticity of demand for pesticides. 
Moreover, information on these demand elasticities and their determinants 
is of crucial relevance for policymaking and normative modeling approach-
es. In this article, we present a meta-analysis based on studies that have es-
timated pesticide demand elasticities in Europe and North America. Our 
meta-analysis reveals that the own-price elasticities of demand for pesticides 
are, with a median of -0.28, significantly smaller than zero, but also signifi-
cantly larger than -1, i.e. to be inelastic. We find that the demand for pesti-
cides for special crops is less elastic than that for arable and grassland. In 
addition, the demand for herbicides is more elastic than for other pesticides. 
Studies that consider only short-term horizons and little flexibility for farm-
ers to adjust to price changes generate significantly less elastic pesticide 
demands. The results also indicate that more recent studies identify lower 
pesticide price elasticities of demand. Furthermore, we find that peer-
reviewed studies tend to find more inelastic results compared to grey litera-
ture. 
Keywords: Agricultural policy; demand analysis; meta-analysis; own-price 
elasticity of demand; pesticide tax; pesticides; robust regression. 
                                                 
5
 This chapter was published in the Journal of Agricultural Economics as: 
Böcker, T. G. and Finger, R. (2017). A Meta-Analysis on the Elasticity of Demand for 
Pesticides. Journal of Agricultural Economics 68 (2): 518-533. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Reductions of harmful effects of pesticide use are high on agricultural poli-
cy agendas. For instance, national action plans have been established in 
countries of the European Union and pesticide taxation schemes have been 
established in some European countries (i.e. France, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark) (Böcker and Finger, 2016; Lefebvre et al., 2015). There have also 
been recent discussions on an introduction of a taxation scheme in other 
European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (AR-
CADIS Belgium, 2014; Hof et al., 2013; Möckel et al., 2015a,b). The effec-
tiveness of such taxes depends on the demand response of farmers to higher 
pesticide prices. More specifically, low own-price elasticities of demand 
have been claimed to be a major hurdle for effective regulation of pesticide 
use via taxes (e.g. Falconer and Hodge, 2000; Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 
1998). Overviews of estimates of pesticide demand elasticities in developed 
countries have been provided in studies by Capalbo and Vo (1988), Falcon-
er and Hodge (2000), Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1998) and Hoevenagel et al. 
(1999). These overviews are cited frequently and serve as important refer-
ences for assumptions made in normative modeling approaches (e.g. Möckel 
et al., 2015a) and for comparison with positive studies (e.g. Muñoz Piña and 
Avila Forcada, 2004; Skevas et al., 2012). 
Despite the importance of these overviews for policy analysis and poli-
cy recommendations, there are several shortcomings and unexplored poten-
tials. Most obviously, the existing overviews on pesticide demand elastici-
ties are now outdated – the most recent being 2000.6 Further limitations re-
sult from the fact that no comprehensive statistical meta-analyses on pesti-
                                                 
6
 More recently, Skevas et al. (2013) presented an overview based on Fernandez-Cornejo et 
al. (1998), Hoevenagel et al. (1999) and Falconer and Hodge (2000), without adding fur-
ther studies beyond 1997. 
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cide demand elasticities have been conducted.
7
 Specifically, no distinction 
between short- and long-term elasticities has been made that accounts for 
farmers’ flexibility to adjust to price changes, especially over longer time 
horizons. However, this distinction reflects crucial information for norma-
tive policy analysis of the effects of pesticide taxation (e.g. Möckel et al., 
2015a). Moreover, there has been no systematic analysis of differences of 
pesticide demand elasticities across different agricultural systems and types 
of pesticides. In addition, no distinction between methodological approaches 
underlying demand elasticity estimates has been considered, despite the fact 
that a large variety of methodological approaches has been used to derive 
elasticities (e.g. econometric vs. optimisation models). Finally, no distinc-
tion between peer-reviewed and grey literature has been made. In this note, 
we aim to fill these gaps and provide a meta-analysis on pesticide demand 
elasticities. We focus on results from developed countries of the northern 
hemisphere to include estimates from comparable agricultural systems. 
3.2 Methodology and Data 
To identify relevant studies, we used bibliographic databases such as Scopus 
and Google Scholar, and the key words ‘pesticide’, ‘pesticide 
tax/levy/charge’ together with ‘elasticity’ (singular and plural). In total, 31 
studies were identified that report original pesticide demand elasticities. We 
provide detailed argumentation on the inclusion and exclusion of studies in 
Appendix 3.A.  
From the selected studies, we obtained the following information, as 
available: (i) the year of publication, (ii) the period of analysis/data collec-
tion period, (iii) the country/ region that was the subject of the analysis, (iv) 
the cropping system investigated, with classification into arable and grass-
land farming, special crops (horticulture, fruit production, viticulture), and 
                                                 
7
 The study by Bergh et al. (1997) presents a structured meta-analysis of some studies on 
pesticide demand elasticities, not covering the addressed points here empirically. 
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an aggregate bundle when no specific production type was analysed, (v) the 
type of pesticide investigated, i.e. herbicides, fungicides, insecticides and 
pesticides in general, (vi) the considered flexibility/time span, i.e. short-
term/fix or long-term/variable,
8
 (vii) the estimated demand elasticity for 
pesticides, (viii) min–max values of these demand elasticity estimates, (ix) 
the method used, with distinction between econometric and normative mod-
els,
9
 and (x) information on whether the study was peer-reviewed. Note that 
publications can be listed multiple times if they present demand elasticities, 
for example, for different regions, agricultural systems, types of pesticides 
and/or use different methodologies. 
We use a non-parametric Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test to identify dif-
ferences across categories, i.e. differences between the size of the price elas-
ticities. More precisely, we test if pesticide demand elasticities (i) are differ-
ent from zero, (ii) differ across regions (Europe and North America), (iii) 
differ between long- and short-term horizons considered, (iv) differ across 
agricultural systems (arable and grassland, special crops and an aggregated 
sector), (v) differ between peer-reviewed and grey publications, and (vi) 
differ across methodological approaches (comparing econometric and nor-
mative models). 
We conduct a multiple linear regression analysis to assess the most im-
portant determinants of pesticide demand elasticity estimates (η) and to es-
timate marginal effects: 
η(y, L, S, H, E, P,M) = β0 + β1y + β2L + β3S + β4H + β5E + β6P + β7M +  ε (3.1) 
                                                 
8
 If time span and flexibility are not explicitly defined (self-declared) in the studies, the 
flexibility of variable inputs serves as a measure for long-term and short-term production. 
Therefore, longer periods of analysis or data collection periods can cover a short-term hori-
zon if the variables in the models are assumed to be fixed. 
9
 Normative approaches comprise mainly optimisation models such as linear programming 
approaches (profit maximisation or cost minimisation). 
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Specifically, we consider the following variables as potential determi-
nants of the estimates: the middle year of the analysis or data collection pe-
riod with the base year being defined as 1900 (y).
10
 We include dummy var-
iables for long-term horizon considered (L), special crops (as agricultural 
systems with particularly high pesticide use levels) (S), focus on herbicides 
(H), European study (E), peer-reviewed publication (P), and the type of 
methodology (using a dummy for econometric analysis) (M). b0, ..., b7 are 
the regression parameters that need to be estimated and e represents the er-
ror term. Due to the considerable number of outlying observations in our 
study (see Fig. 3.1), we use MM-regression, a robust regression technique.
11
 
To account for the fact that some studies report more than one observation 
for some variables, cluster-adjusted variance-covariance matrices are used 
to derive standard errors. If a study reported a range or an interval for the 
same measure, mean values are used in both the regression analysis and the 
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test, to avoid double counting (Table 3.1). All 
statistical analyses are conducted with R (R Core Team, 2015).  
                                                 
10
 In addition, we also employed the year of publication, which produced similar results. 
11
 The MM-estimator combines a high breakdown point S-estimator and an efficient M-
estimator to obtain a high robustness (avoiding biases in coefficient estimates) against out-
lying observations by maintaining a high level of efficiency (i.e. maintaining low standard 
errors) (see, for example, Finger, 2010). The interpretation of coefficient estimates remains 
similar to a standard OLS regression. 
  
Table 3.1. Studies with pesticide demand elasticities 
Author (publication year) Land/region Pesticide type (general or: 
f/fungicide, h/herbicide, 
i/insecticide (if appl. min. to 
max.) 
Flexibility 
(long-term/ vari-
able, 
short-term/fix) 
Period of analysis/ 
data collection 
Brown and Christensen (1981) USA -0.19 (-0.20 to -0.19) Long-term 1947-1974 
Schulte (1983) Germany/Rhineland f: -0.32 (-0.45 to -0.19) Short-term 1978-1980 
Schulte (1983) Germany/Rhineland f: -0.32 (-0.45 to -0.19) Long-term 1978-1980 
Schulte (1983) Germany/Bavaria f: -0.17 (-0.33 to 0.00) Short-term 1978-1980 
Schulte (1983) Germany/Bavaria f: -0.50 (-0.67 to -0.33) Long-term 1978-1980 
Schulte (1983) Germany/Schleswig-Holstein f: -0.21 (-0.27 to -0.14) Short-term 1978-1980 
Schulte (1983) Germany/Schleswig-Holstein f: -0.53 (-0.80 to -0.25) Long-term 1978-1980 
Schulte (1983) Germany/South Oldenburg f: -0.32 (-0.44 to -0.20) Short-term 1978-1980 
Schulte (1983) Germany/Hessen f: -0.63 (-0.76 to -0.50) Long-term 1978-1980 
Antle (1984) USA -0.19 Long-term 1910-1946 
Antle (1984) USA -0.25 Long-term 1947-1978 
Dubgaard (1987) Denmark -0.30 Long-term 1971-1985 
Dubgaard (1987, 1991) Denmark h: -0.69 
f: -0.81 
i: -0.81 
Long-term 1971-1985 
Capalbo (1988) USA -0.19 Long-term 1948-1983 
Capalbo (1988) USA -0.88 Long-term 1948-1983 
Capalbo (1988) USA -0.41 Long-term 1948-1983 
Capalbo (1988) USA -0.47 Long-term 1948-1983 
Capalbo (1988) USA -0.61 Long-term 1948-1983 
Capalbo (1988) USA -0.70 Long-term 1948-1983 
Elhorst (1990) Netherlands -0.29 Short-term 1980-1986 
Aaltink (1992), Master’s thesis, cit. from Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.13 (-0.23 to -0.03) Short-term unknown 
Aaltink (1992), Master’s thesis, cit. from Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.39 (-0.55 to -0.23) Long-term unknown 
Aaltink (1992), Master’s thesis, cit. from Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.39 (-0.55 to -0.23) Long-term unknown 
McIntosh and Williams (1992) USA/Georgia -0.11 Long-term 1950-1986 
Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.21 Short-term 1970-1988 
Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.22 Medium-term 1970-1988 
7
2
 
E
la
sticity o
f D
em
a
n
d
 fo
r P
esticid
es 
 Table 3.1. (continued)  
Author (publication year) Land/region Pesticide type (general or: 
f/fungicide, h/herbicide, 
i/insecticide (if appl. min. to 
max.) 
Flexibility 
(long-term/ vari-
able, 
short-term/fix) 
Period of analysis/ 
data collection 
Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.22 Long-term 1970-1988 
Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.25 Short-term 1970-1988 
Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.26 Medium-term 1970-1988 
Oskam et al. (1992) Netherlands -0.29 Long-term 1970-1988 
Rude (1992) Denmark -0.20 (-0.22 to -0.17) 
h: -0.07 (-0.08 to -0.06) 
f: -0.32 (-0.33 to -0.31) 
i: -0.35 (-0.40 to -0.29) 
Short-term 1987-2004 
Rude (1992) Denmark -0.24 (-0.27 to -0.20) 
h: -0.09 (-0.10 to -0.08) 
f: -0.39 (-0.42 to -0.35) 
i: -0.34 (-0.38 to -0.29) 
Medium-term 1987-2004 
Rude (1992) Denmark -0.28 (-0.32 to -0.23) 
h: -0.11 (-0.13 to -0.09) 
f: -0.49 (-0.57 to -0.40) 
i: -0.40 (-0.47 to -0.33) 
Long-term 1987-2004 
Villezca-Becerra and Shumway (1992) USA/California -0.09 Long-term 1951-1982 
Villezca-Becerra and Shumway (1992) USA/Florida -0.17 Long-term 1951-1982 
Villezca-Becerra and Shumway (1992) USA/Iowa -0.04 Long-term 1951-1982 
Villezca-Becerra and Shumway (1992) USA/Texas -0.21 Long-term 1951-1982 
Fernandez-Comejo (1993) USA/Illinois -0.10 Short-term 1949-1982 
Fernandez-Comejo (1993) USA/Illinois  -0.10 Short-term 1949-1982 
Fernandez-Comejo (1993) USA/Illinois -0.12 Long-term 1949-1982 
Fernandez-Comejo (1993) USA/Illinois  -0.38 Long-term 1949-1982 
Fernandez-Comejo (1993) USA/Indiana -0.08 Short-term 1949-1982 
Fernandez-Comejo (1993) USA/Indiana -0.08 Short-term 1949-1982 
Fernandez-Comejo (1993) USA/Indiana -0.09 Long-term 1949-1982 
Fernandez-Comejo (1993) USA/Indiana -0.60 Long-term 1949-1982 
Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994) USA -1.53 Long-term 1949-1990 
Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994) USA -1.50 Long-term 1949-1990 
Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994) USA 0.05 Long-term 1949-1990 
Chen et al. (1994) USA/Alabama -2.42 Long-term 1949-1986 
Gren (1994a) Sweden h: -0.97 
f: -0.34 
i: -0.15 
Long-term 1950-1989 
Gren (1994b) Sweden h: -0.93 
f: -0.39 
i: -0.52 
Long-term 1948-1989 
Oude Lansink (1994) Netherlands -0.12 Short-term 1970-1988 
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Table 3.1. (continued)  
Author (publication year) Land/region Pesticide type (general or: 
f/fungicide, h/herbicide, 
i/insecticide (if appl. min. to 
max.) 
Flexibility 
(long-term/ vari-
able, 
short-term/fix) 
Period of analysis/ 
data collection 
Papanagiotou et al. (1994) Greece -0.28 Short-term 1961-1990 
Papanagiotou et al. (1994) Greece -0.28 Short-term 1961-1990 
Shumway and Chesser (1994) USA/Texas h: -0.70 (-2.00 to +0.60) 
f: -0.24 (-1.08 to +0.60) 
i: -1.18 (-2.04 to -0.32) 
Long-term 1972-1986 
Bauer et al. (1997) Germany/Hessen f: -0.02 Short-term 1991-1993 
Carpentier and Weaver (1997) France/Ile-de-France, Centre, 
Champagne 
-1.55 (-1.97 to -1.13 Long-term 1987-1990 
Falconer (1997), Dissertation cit. from Falconer (1998) UK/East Anglia -0.20 (-0.30 to -0.10) unknown unknown 
Komen et al. (1997) Netherlands -0.14 Short-term 1990 
Komen et al. (1997) Netherlands -0.11 Short-term 1990 
Komen et al. (1997) Netherlands -0.25 Long-term 1990 
Oude Lansink and Peerlings (1997) Netherlands -0.48 Long-term 1970-1992 
Russell et al. (1997) UK/North West -1.11 (-1.12 to -1.09) Short-term 1989-1993 
Jacquet et al. (2011) France -0.77 (-1.25 to -0.28) Combined 2002-2007 
Ivanova et al. (2012) Bulgaria -0.11 (-0.12 to -0.09) Long-term 2002-2008 
Ivanova et al. (2012) Bulgaria -0.16 (-0.19 to -0.12) Long-term 2002-2008 
Ivanova et al. (2012) Portugal -0.19 (-0.22 to -0.16) Long-term 2002-2008 
Ivanova et al. (2012) Portugal -0.20 (-0.23 to -0.16) Long-term 2002-2008 
Skevas et al. (2012) Netherlands -0.02 (-0.03 to -0.0003) Short-term 2003-2004 
Fadhuile et al. (2015) France h: -0.63 
f: -0.86 
i: -0.37 
Long-term 2001 
Fadhuile et al. (2015) France h: -0.68 
f: -0.77 
i: -0.18 
Long-term 2006 
Femenia and Letort (2016) France/Meuse -0.17 (-0.24 to -0.10) Long-term 2007-2012 
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3.3 Results 
Table 3.1 lists the studies that are included in the meta-analysis and some 
selected variables. Note that the tables with the complete information col-
lected, as well as the codes for statistical analyses, are available in Appen-
dices 3.B to 3.C. Fig. 3.1 presents the elasticities across all studies by the 
publication year of the studies and type of pesticides considered. 
The median elasticity across all studies is -0.28. Using the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test, we can reject the null-hypotheses that the elasticity is 
equal or >0 at the 1% level. Fig. 3.1 shows that the vast majority of studies 
appeared in the 1990s, though more recent studies exist for Europe, which 
reflects the re-emerging policy relevance of the pesticide demand regula-
tion. Despite the fact that some studies report on particular types of pesti-
cides or even on individual products (e.g. Shumway and Chesser, 1994), the 
majority of studies present elasticities for pesticides in general so that no 
patterns can be observed. 
Fig. 3.2 presents the distribution of demand elasticities by continent. 
European studies (22 studies, 64 observations) dominate over North Ameri-
can studies (nine studies, 30 observations, only USA) in quantity. The me-
dian of demand elasticities is lower in the US (-0.20) than in Europe (-0.30). 
However, the variability within the US studies is larger, with an interquartile 
range of 0.51 compared to 0.30 for Europe. The null-hypothesis of no dif-
ferences across continents cannot be rejected. 
Fig. 3.3 presents the distribution of demand elasticities with respect to 
input flexibility and time horizon assumed in the studies. We find that the 
majority of studies analyse long-term effects, accounting for various possi-
bilities to adjust the production system and techniques. As expected, the 
longer-term perspectives result in more elastic pesticide demand estimates 
(median = -0.39) compared to short-term perspectives (median = -0.18). The 
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null-hypothesis of no differences across time horizons is rejected at the 1% 
level of significance. 
 
Fig. 3.1. Pesticide’s own-price elasticities of demand following the year of 
publication. 
Note: The lines between two observations refer to an interval because of different elasticity 
values for different levels of price changes. 
 
Fig. 3.2. Pesticide’s own-price elasticities of demand for Europe and the 
USA. 
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Fig. 3.3. Pesticide’s own-price elasticities of demand arranged by flexibility 
of production. 
Fig. 3.4 shows demand elasticity estimates by agricultural system inves-
tigated. We find that the demand for pesticides in special crops is less elastic 
(median = -0.19) than for arable and grassland production (median = -0.30) 
and pesticide use in aggregate (e.g. across the entire farm, median = -0.28). 
Comparing the demand elasticities in special crops with arable and grass-
land production, we reject the null-hypothesis of equal demand elasticities at 
the 5% level of significance. Moreover, a significant difference can also be 
found between the aggregate use and special crops (5% level), but not be-
tween aggregate use and arable production. 
Concerning the analysis of the methodologies underlying pesticide de-
mand elasticity estimation, we find 38 observations for econometric ap-
proaches (median = -0.30) and 39 observations for normative approaches 
(median = -0.21). There is a tendency towards lower elasticities in norma-
tive approaches with a significance level of 5%. Regarding the publication 
channel, we find that demand elasticities reported in peer-reviewed studies 
indicate on average a less elastic pesticide demand (33 observations, median 
= -0.21) compared to non-peer-reviewed publications (61 observations, me-
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dian = -0.29). However, this difference is not significant using a Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney test. 
 
Fig. 3.4. Subject of analysis in studies estimating pesticide’s own-price elas-
ticities of demand. 
Finally, we conducted the regression analysis including all of these fac-
tors. We find that the explanatory variables ‘middle year of the analysis pe-
riod’ and ‘peer-review’ are not independent of each other. More specifically, 
peer-reviewed studies are more often observed to be more recent studies 
with more recent middle years of the analysis. Thus, we present both models 
with either the middle year of analysis or a dummy for peer-review being 
included. In addition, the consideration of the methodology used (dummy 
Econometric analysis) results in several missing observations. As sensitivity 
analysis, we therefore estimate our models with and without the considera-
tion of this variable. Coefficient estimates of the four models are presented 
in Table 3.2. We find pesticide demand to be less elastic when published in 
peer-reviewed journals. Along these lines, we also find evidence that studies 
analysing more recent data obtain significantly inelastic demand. Note that 
the intercepts in Model 1 and 3 refer to the year 1900. Moreover, studies 
considering a long-term horizon result in more elastic demand elasticity 
estimates. We find the demand for pesticides in special crops to be less elas-
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tic compared to other agricultural sectors, and demand for herbicides is 
more elastic than for other pesticides. European studies tend to result in 
more elastic demand estimates, though significance tests are ambiguous. 
Even though econometric studies tend to result in less elastic demand elas-
ticity estimates, we do not find a significant effect of the methodology 
used.
12
 
Table 3.2. Parameter estimates of the regression models (marginal values) 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
β0 (intercept) –0.627 
(–11.016)*** 
–0.216  
(-5.068)*** 
–0.420  
(–2.381)** 
–0.201  
(–4.819)*** 
β1 (middle year of 
analysis) 
0.007  
(12.241)*** 
– 0.004  
(1.738)* 
– 
β2 (long-term) –0.173  
(-5.610)*** 
0.212  
(–7.232)*** 
–0.177  
(–5.198)*** 
–0.215  
(–7.743)*** 
β3 (special crops) 0.106  
(2.279)** 
0.119  
(3.316)*** 
0.086  
(1.789)* 
0.108 
(4.022)*** 
β4 (herbicides) –0.416  
(–7.555)*** 
–0.406  
(–5.906)*** 
-0.262 
(-1.955)* 
–0.308  
(–3.179)*** 
β5 (Europe) –0.207  
(–4.854)*** 
–0.044  
(–1.146) (n.s.) 
–0.200  
(–2.693)*** 
–0.058  
(–1.495) (n.s.) 
β6 (peer-review) – 0.184  
(6.908)*** 
– 0.194 
(5.029)*** 
β7 (econometric 
method) 
0.042  
(1.587) (n.s.) 
0.030  
(0.979) (n.s.) 
– – 
Degrees of free-
dom 
60 60 74 74 
Notes: Values in parentheses are z-values. n.s. denotes not significant. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, level, respectively. The package ‘MASS’ was used for 
MM-estimation. The package ‘multiwayvcov’ was used for the derivation of the cluster-
adjusted standard errors. The R-code for the regressions can be found in Appendix 3.D. 
Note that the few studies that report the uncertainty attached to pesti-
cide demand elasticity estimates (e.g. as standard deviation) often report 
                                                 
12
 As there might be a bias towards econometric analyses among peer-reviewed studies, we 
estimated the model without the dummy for either peer-review or econometric studies, but 
find no change in coefficient estimates or levels of significance. 
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large levels of variability of these estimates (see Appendix 3.C). Besides the 
considerable degree of across study-heterogeneity, there is also large within-
study heterogeneity. Thus, generalising from point estimates needs careful 
reflection and highlights the importance of analysing different pesticide 
types and products or different areas of application. 
3.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
Our meta-analysis reveals that own-price elasticities of demand for pesti-
cides are, with a median of -0.28, significantly smaller than zero, but also to 
be significantly larger than -1, i.e. are inelastic. Moreover, demand elasticity 
estimates are found to be highly heterogeneous across different studies, 
ranging from complete inelasticity to relatively high elasticity, reflecting the 
fact that various parameters affect pesticide application. Other develop-
ments, such as the development of new pesticides or the occurrence of new 
pests might even be more important than price developments. For example, 
Vijftigschild and Oskam (1994) show for the Netherlands that between 
1980/81 and 1991/92, despite pesticide prices increased up to 32.5%, the 
pesticide demand increased by 20%, which would indicate a simple and 
crude elasticity of +0.63. In a similar vein, pesticides taxes have not neces-
sarily led to sharp decreases in pesticide use, as observed in Sweden and 
Denmark under the former tax scheme, but, rather, to a substitution of prod-
ucts, as observed in Norway (Böcker and Finger, 2016). 
Nevertheless, our results show that demand elasticities are significantly 
smaller than zero so that, ceteris paribus, there will be a quantity reduction 
if pesticide prices are increased. This indicates that taxation of pesticides 
will have an effect of reducing pesticide use. However, the finding of inelas-
tic demand for pesticides also indicates that large levels of taxation are re-
quired to realise substantial quantity reductions. The meta-analysis also 
identifies specific agricultural production environments, where the elasticity 
of the demand for pesticides is almost zero (e.g. Skevas et al., 2012), and 
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where the effectiveness of taxation will be limited. This finding highlights 
the importance of country-specific ex-ante analyses of policy measures. Our 
meta-analysis reveals a large heterogeneity of the magnitude of these ef-
fects. More specifically, we find that price elasticities of demand are more 
inelastic in special crops (horticulture, fruit production and viticulture) 
compared to arable and grassland farming. This is especially relevant since 
special crops usually need the largest amount of pesticides per hectare – 
particularly more fungicide and insecticide but less herbicide. The lower 
elasticity can be explained due to the fact that (i) fruit production and viti-
culture are spatially less flexible in production than other crops, (ii) the har-
vest is more valuable and quality aspects are more important (e.g. Weston 
and Barth, 1997), (iii) pesticides are applied more often preventively, and 
(iv) fewer substitutes exist for those sectors. This finding also highlights that 
a pesticide tax could imply non-uniform income effects on farms, e.g. com-
paring farmers growing special crops and arable farmers. Our results show 
that herbicide demand is more elastic than fungicides and insecticides. Thus, 
taxation might be particularly suited to reducing herbicide use. Next to the 
heterogeneity across crops and pesticide type, also a considerable heteroge-
neity of demand elasticities across time was revealed in our analysis. In the 
short-run, the median demand elasticities are significantly less elastic than 
in the long-run, which is in line with Le Chatelier’s principle generalised by 
Samuelson (1983). We find that estimated demand elasticities significantly 
decreased over time (middle year of the analysis period) and with peer-
review. Even though it is not possible in our analysis to identify causalities 
and determinants for this development, the finding is in line with qualitative 
observations made in Skevas et al. (2012) and Fadhuile et al. (2016). Skevas 
et al. (2012) argue that demand elasticities are lower due to increasing im-
portance of pesticides in current agricultural production practices in compar-
ison to earlier decades. Fadhuile et al. (2016) argue that stricter policies re-
sult in smaller numbers of available pesticides, i.e. a decreasing number of 
substitutes, which leads to more inelastic demand. Thus, in these situations, 
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pesticide taxes may have a limited effectiveness. However, pesticide taxes 
may also promote changed behaviour towards more agronomical, biological 
or mechanical plant protection measures. 
Despite the fact that policy-makers often aim to reduce the use of toxic 
pesticides and not necessarily the quantity of all aggregated pesticides, little 
information about demand differences with respect to the toxicity of the 
pesticides was found in our research: only Skevas et al. (2012) show that the 
demand elasticity is smaller for more toxic pesticides (-0.0003 vs. -0.03 for 
less toxic ones). Future research should focus on this aspect, because for 
policy implications, it motivates a taxation approach that accounts for the 
toxicity of different pesticide products, as implemented in Norway, Den-
mark and France. 
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3.5 Appendix 
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of 
this article: https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-9552.12198.  
 
Appendix 3.A:  
Additional notes to the selection of studies 
More studies were found which simulate price increases on pesticides, but 
elasticities could not be derived, because the pre-tax costs are unknown (e.g. 
by a tax: Archer and Shogren (2001) simulate different tax systems). Dub-
berke and Schmitz (1993) report a price elasticity of -0.777, which however 
is not significant at the 10% level. Moreover, Zeddies et al. (1992) simulate 
for winter wheat in Germany that a relative price increase of 1.5 would lead 
to zero pesticide use. However, the results are criticised by themselves as 
not realistic in practice. During the literature analysis, also some studies 
outside the North America and Europe were found giving examples for pes-
ticide elasticities (e.g. the analyses of Antle and Pingali (1994) and of 
Tjornhom et al., 1998 for the Philippines). Those studies are not included. 
In comparison to other studies, we have not included the following pub-
lications: We were not able to find any (original) information about price 
elasticities of demand in Lichtenberg et al. (1988), Pettersson et al. (1989) 
and Carpentier (1994) and thus excluded them from the analysis. The stud-
ies of Hazilla and Kopp from 1986, Johnsson from 1991, and ECOTEC 
from 1997 were not found in the literature search. The preliminary study of 
the Dutch DHV and LUW from 1991 was replaced by Oskam et al. (1992). 
The latter is included in the analysis. 
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Appendix 3.B:  
Data collected from studies as CSV-file (Online) 
 
Appendix 3.C:  
Table with studies reporting a standard deviation of elasticity results 
Table A3.1. Studies reporting a standard deviation of elasticity results 
Author Elasticity SD SD/Elasticity 
Antle (1984) –0.194 0.354 –1.82 
Antle (1984) –0.254 0.204 –0.80 
McIntosh and Williams (1992) –0.112 0.034 –0.30 
Oskam et al. (1992) –0.210 0.150 –0.71 
Oskam et al. (1992) –0.220 0.150 –0.68 
Oskam et al. (1992) –0.220 0.150 –0.68 
Oskam et al. (1992) –0.250 0.190 –0.76 
Oskam et al. (1992) –0.260 0.190 –0.73 
Oskam et al. (1992) –0.290 0.190 –0.66 
Oude Lansink (1994) –0.120 0.080 –0.67 
Papanagiotou et al. (1994) –0.279 0.163 –0.58 
Papanagiotou et al. (1994) –0.276 0.157 –0.57 
Fadhuile et al. (2016) –0.629 0.027 –0.04 
Fadhuile et al. (2016) –0.856 0.009 –0.01 
Fadhuile et al. (2016) –0.374 0.025 –0.07 
Fadhuile et al. (2016) –0.681 0.029 –0.04 
Fadhuile et al. (2016) –0.769 0.009 –0.01 
Fadhuile et al. (2016) –0.182 0.033 –0.18 
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Appendix 3.D:  
R code for the regression analysis 
 
# Load file, but adjust filename and header names before 
elasticity <- read.csv("C:/filename.csv", header=T) 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
# REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
attach(elasticity) 
 
### Performing robust MM-regression: 
 
# load package ‘MASS’ 
library(MASS) 
elasticity$ESY <- (elasticity$EndY + elasticity$StartY)/2 
rfit <- rlm(Elas ~  ESY + Longterm + Special + Herbicides + EU + Journal + 
Econometric, data=elasticity, method="MM") 
summary(rfit) 
 
 
### Estimate cluster-adjusted variance-covariance matrices to derive:  
 
standard errors 
# Load packages ‘multiwayvcov’ and ‘lmtest’ 
library(multiwayvcov) 
library(lmtest)  
# rfit is the rlm element  
# Author is the ID, which is used for clustering 
m1.vcovCL<-cluster.vcov(rfit,Author) 
# Apply new z tests 
coeftest(rfit, m1.vcovCL) 
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Modelling the Effects of a Glyphosate Ban on Weed 
Management in Silage Maize Production
13
 
Abstract 
A bio-economic model is developed that allows a detailed representation of 
optimal weed control decisions. It implements an output damage control 
approach for German silage maize production, considering almost eighty 
mechanical and herbicide based weed control options against over thirty 
weeds, working with detailed data on weed abundance and yields for more 
than three hundred municipalities in the federal state of North-Rhine-
Westphalia. We apply the model to simulate economic optimal weed control 
over two growing periods under current environmental standards and under 
the scenario of a glyphosate ban as recently discussed after glyphosate was 
classified as probably carcinogenic to humans. Considering different levels 
of weed pressure, we find that adjustments in the intensity of mechanical 
pre-sowing strategies are an optimal response to a glyphosate ban, causing 
yield reductions of about 1%. In contrast, we find little evidence for a sub-
stitution towards selective herbicides post-sowing. On average, the aggre-
gated economic impacts of a glyphosate ban are small, i.e. at about € 1–
2/ha, but single farms may face higher losses at about € 10/ha. 
Keywords: Output damage control; pest management; herbicide; maize; 
glyphosate; Germany. 
 
                                                 
13
 This chapter was published in the journal Ecological Economics as: 
Böcker, T., Britz, W. and Finger, R. (2018). Modelling the Effects of a Glyphosate Ban on 
Weed Management in Silage Maize Production. Ecological Economics 145: 182-193. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Reducing risks caused by pesticide application is a crucial component of 
current agri-environmental policy debates in Europe. Different measures are 
proposed to control pesticide use and the connected risks for the environ-
ment and human health, resulting in more sustainable agricultural systems 
(Lefebvre et al., 2015). The proposed measures comprise banning specific 
pesticides (e.g. neonicotinoids and glyphosate; Gross, 2013; Schulte and 
Theuvsen, 2015) or introducing pesticide taxes (Böcker and Finger, 2016; 
Finger et al., 2017). Especially the renewed licensing or banning of the 
broad-spectrum herbicide glyphosate in the EU provoked heated discussions 
after the International Agency for Research on Cancer classified glyphosate 
as “probably carcinogenic to humans” (Guyton et al., 2015). Ex-ante infor-
mation on health and environmental risks reduction and on the impacts on 
farmer's income is needed to inform the debate on policy measures targeting 
pesticides (Falconer, 1998). As substitution effects with other herbicides are 
likely if specific products are targeted, potential changes in farm manage-
ment must be depicted in detail. In the debate on banning glyphosate, how-
ever, there is a large uncertainty about those effects (Schulte and Theuvsen, 
2015; see also the position paper of Steinmann et al., 2016). In this paper, 
we develop a tool for such detailed impact assessment of environmental 
standards or other policy measures affecting specific pesticides and apply it 
to assess a potential ban of glyphosate. 
In available assessments on pesticide application behaviour of farmers, 
mainly econometric and optimisation modelling approaches or combinations 
of both are applied (see Böcker and Finger, 2017). Econometric applications 
are usually based on historical data, for instance of pesticide applications, 
and are used to explain historical developments or to make recommenda-
tions on decision making. Optimisation and simulation models presume, for 
example, optimal decision making based on more or less detailed production 
function approaches combined with an economic objective such as profit 
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maximisation. They can hence be used for what-if-analyses even if observa-
tions are missing (Grovermann et al., 2017). Existing approaches of the lat-
ter group are, however, not detailed enough to assess measures addressing 
individual pesticides, such as glyphosate in our application. For example, 
Guan et al. (2005) work with a monetary aggregate over fungicides, herbi-
cides and other pesticides; but, higher total costs for pesticide applications 
do not necessarily lead to a better weed treatment and vice versa. Babcock 
et al. (1992) and Kuosmanen et al. (2006) use the total amount of active 
substances (AS) of fungicides respectively insecticides as an indicator for 
pesticide use in apple production respectively cotton, neglecting any differ-
ences in risk between different AS. Karagiannis and Tzouvelekas (2012) 
measure insecticide application in olive orchards based on litres of insecti-
cides, and Jacquet et al. (2011) model five different alternatives (intensive, 
recommended by extension services, 2× integrated practices and organic 
farming practices), both ignoring the diversity of existing AS. 
In this paper, we extend the literature studying policy effects on pest 
management by i) making use of the output damage function approach (e.g. 
Karagiannis and Tzouvelekas, 2012), and ii) differentiating in detail a larger 
set of pre-sowing and post-sowing weed control options with regard to their 
yield impact. Specifically, we consider for each strategy both costs and effi-
cacy of controlling individual weeds. Moreover, we develop a framework 
that is site-specific and allows investigating weed management over time 
and space. Our empirical analysis focusses on silage maize, one of the most 
relevant crops in Germany, where pest management mainly relies on herbi-
cide application (Julius Kühn-Institut, 2016). We apply the model to the 
Federal State of North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany, and account for 
the spatial heterogeneity of weed pressure and yield potential at municipali-
ty level. The model identifies economically optimal herbicide strategies in 
silage maize in each municipality at given pesticide and crop prices as well 
as specifications and regulations of pesticide use. We apply this model to 
study the impact of a ban of glyphosate on herbicide use and/or mechanical 
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weed control measures and related costs compared to the current situation. 
At the moment, there are no alternative chemical herbicides approved to 
replace glyphosate for pre-sowing application (Kehlenbeck et al., 20151). 
Thus, mechanical weed control is the only alternative which removes all 
potential risks from herbicides before sowing. However, as claimed in some 
discussions on the topic, selective herbicides could potentially be used at 
higher rates after sowing, even increasing the overall health and environ-
mental risks. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: section 2 presents 
the damage control approach, the production function and its parameterisa-
tion. The data used in the model is depicted in section 3. The following sec-
tion presents results, starting with some descriptive results before testing 
several hypotheses. Afterwards, both the model and the results are discussed 
and, finally, conclusions drawn. 
4.2 Methodology 
We develop a bio-economic weed control model for silage maize in m re-
gions, i.e. 377 silage maize producing municipalities in NRW. A two-year 
cropping period is considered where maize is grown in each of the two years 
t, a standard farming practise. The expected gross margin E(π) in year t for 
different pre- (index b) and post-sowing (index h) weed control strategies is 
defined as: 
E(πm,t,b,h) = [ym,t,b,h
∗ · E(P) − c(b) − cs(b) − c(h) − cf(y) − co], (4.1) 
where 𝑦𝑚,𝑡,𝑏,ℎ
∗  is the expected yield, E(P) is the expected price for maize, 
c(b) and c(h) are the pre- and post-sowing weed management (and tillage) 
costs for a certain strategy and cs(b) are variable costs for sowing depending 
on the pre-sowing strategy (the more expensive direct precision drill is 
needed for some types of conservation tillage). cf(y) are costs for fertiliser 
depending on the yield and co are other costs (e.g. proportionate costs for 
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rating and liming). Harvest costs are not included because maize is sold ex 
field such that the buyer performs the harvest, which is also reflected in 
lower output prices. 
4.2.1 The Damage Control Approach 
An output damage function is used to determine the expected yield y* (Fox 
and Weersink, 1995; Guan et al., 2006, 2005; Hall and Norgaard, 1973; 
Oude Lansink and Carpentier, 2001; Pannell, 1990; Talpaz and Borosh, 
1974). It depicts first the effect of the damage control input(s) on the popu-
lation of the damaging organism and from there the resulting yield reduction 
from surviving damaging organisms (Karagiannis and Tzouvelekas, 2012). 
We follow Guan et al. (2005) and distinct in the production function 
y=G(x,D(h)) between productive (x) and damage-controlling inputs (h) 
where D(h) is the multiplicative damage controlling effect on the interval 
[0,1]. h is, for example, the efficacy of a herbicide against a specific weed. 
If D(h) is equal to unity, no losses due to pests, diseases or weeds occur. 
Besides chemical inputs, also mechanical inputs such as hoeing or plough-
ing can be considered as damage-controlling, which somewhat challenges a 
clear distinction between h and x. Different proposals regarding the func-
tional form of D(h) have been made (see e.g. Carrasco-Tauber and Moffitt, 
1992; Fox and Weersink, 1995; Kuosmanen et al., 2006; Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman, 1986). We follow Guan et al. (2005) and use the exponential 
form because it is particularly suited to represent the underlying biological 
processes: 
D(h) = 1 − e−(β0+β1·z(h))² ,       β0, β1 ≥ 0. (4.2) 
This functional form implies decreasing marginal damage control in input 
use, a reasonable assumption as, e.g., additional efforts in weed control on 
an almost weed free field will not lead to much higher damage control. Pa-
rameters β0 and β1 quantify the effects of inputs on damage control; their 
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estimation is explained in the next sections. The decision variable in our 
model is z(h), the chosen level of damage control. 
4.2.2 Specification of the Damage Controlling Effect 
We consider the 32 most important weeds for the case study region in our 
analysis (see Table 4.1 in section 4.3). Each plant protection strategy is 
characterised by its weed specific damage control effect, i.e. a column vec-
tor h with j 1 x 32 entries ranging between 0 and 1, allowing to represent 
how specific herbicides and mechanical strategies differ in their impact on 
individual weeds. Often, an herbicide strategy comprises several herbicide 
products. The resulting control success is typically not additive since the 
comprised herbicides usually have a similar spectrum of action. More likely 
is the case that the maximum suppression effect of any herbicide is crucial 
for the success. Also, we add a multiplier ai to each weed wm,i to differenti-
ate yield depression effects by weed, depicted by the average abundance (ai) 
which measures the affected area share when that weed occurs (Table 4.1). 
Finally, in order to quantify the site-specific damage controlling effect of 
specific herbicides, a weed-row vector w with size i 32 x 1 depicts for each 
municipality m the probability that a weed occurs. The three vectors – prob-
ability of weed occurrence w, affected share a, and damage control for each 
weed h – define jointly the control success z for each herbicide strategy j in 
the different municipalities m:  
zm,j = ∑wm,i · ai · hj,i 
32
i
. (4.3) 
Eq. (4.3) presents the post-sowing weed controlling effects. Since we use 
probabilities for the determination of the damage controlling effect, the 
equation is dimensionless. In a similar manner, a vector vm,j can be con-
structed that accounts for pre-sowing weed management effects (denoted as 
bj,i):  
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vm,j = ∑wm,i · ai · bj,i .
32
i
     (4.4) 
4.2.3 Choice of Functional Form and Implementing the Damage 
Controlling Effect 
Inserting the damage control success expression from Eq. (4.3) in Eq. (4.2) 
yields the following specification: 
Dm,j = 1 − e
−(β0+β1·∑ wm,i·ai·hj,i 
32
i )
2
,       β0, β1 ≥ 0. (4.5) 
One of the remaining issues is to determine the form of the production 
function. We follow Bosnić and Swanton (1997), Swinton et al. (1994), 
Swinton and King (1994) as well as Kropff et al. (1992), and use the rectan-
gular hyperbolic approach of Cousens (1985) and Cousens et al. (1987), 
which allows accounting for biological effects such as time of emergence. 
Thus, the yield function in relation to weed control is defined as follows: 
𝑦𝑚,𝑡,𝑏,ℎ
∗ = 𝑦𝑚,𝑡
𝑎 · [1 − 𝐼 ·
𝐷𝑚.𝑗
100 · (𝑒𝐶·𝑇 + 𝐼 ·
𝐷𝑚,𝑗
𝐴 )
] . (4.6) 
In this function, ya is the attainable yield when no weeds are present, I is the 
percent yield loss as Dm,j approaches 0 (i.e. Dm,j is not yet 0)
14
, A is the per-
cent yield loss as Dm,j approaches infinity, T is the time of crop emergence 
and growth in relation to the weed emergence and growth, measured in 
growing degree days, which is the sum of the average temperature of each 
day and C is the rate at which the yield loss I increases as T becomes small-
er (i.e. weed pressure increases). Fungi and insects are of limited relevance 
in German maize production or can be controlled by seed dressing or re-
sistant varieties such that except for herbicides usually no other pesticides 
                                                 
14
 Originally, Cousens (1985) used average plants per m². We will use the abundance of a 
single weed for our purpose, in relation to Table 4.1. 
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are applied (JKI, 2016). Thus, the attainable yield y
a
 is defined as the poten-
tial water-limited yield under given climatic and soil conditions, i.e. under 
no nutrient stress. The shape of the function is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. Never-
theless, using solely the yield term (4.6) neglects pre-sowing weed control-
ling practices depicted by vm,j. Accounting for that, the expected yield y
*
 for 
a specific strategy becomes: 
𝑦𝑚,𝑡,𝑏,ℎ
∗ = (1 − 𝑒−(𝛼0+𝛼1·𝑣𝑚,𝑗)
2
) · 𝑦𝑚,𝑡
𝑎 ·
[
 
 
 
 
1 − 𝐼 ·
𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1·𝑧𝑚,𝑗)
2
100 · (𝑒𝐶·𝑇 + 𝐼 ·
𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1·𝑧𝑚,𝑗)
2
𝐴 )]
 
 
 
 
. 
                               
(4.7) 
 
Fig. 4.1. Shape of the rectangular hyperbolic yield function from Eq. (4.6) 
for different levels of T. 
  
Pre-sowing Post-sowing 
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4.2.4 Parameterisation and Pesticide Application Restrictions 
In order to calibrate the model and to parameterise the production function, 
we conducted expert interviews with the senior herbicide consultant and 
three regional herbicide consultants of the chamber of agriculture from 
NRW who identified strategies in regions of NRW differentiated by soil 
types.
15
 Furthermore, we collected data on the observed yield ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 in each 
municipality m which should reflect the current weed control practise (IT 
NRW, 2016). In order to estimate the parameters of interest (α0, α1, β0 and 
β1), we determine the parameter values which minimise the error term be-
tween the observed yields and the yields simulated with the most frequently 
used control strategies in selected municipalities where a clear assignment 
between expert knowledge on strategies used and weeds occurring could be 
made, i.e. municipalities which have homogeneous soil types but different 
potential yields:
16
 
minε =  ∑(ym,t∗,b∗,h∗ 
∗ − y̅m,t)
2
8
m
 (4.8) 
                                                 
15
 Regarding herbicide strategies, three major soil types can be distinguished in NRW: 
sandy soils where herbicides against Panicoideae-varieties are applied, clayey soils where 
strategies against Alopecurus myosuroides are preferred and good loamy soils where simple 
and cheap strategies are used. Eight municipalities were selected where current weed con-
trol strategies are known (4x sandy soils due to the relevance in maize production, 2x good 
loamy soils and 2x clayey soils). We decided against the alternative way of estimating 
different parameters for different soil types because municipalities where a mix of soil 
types is observed accordingly also apply a mix of strategies. Additionally, data on yields for 
different soil types would be required which are not available. Applying different produc-
tion functions per soil type would force us to decide for one specific function, although a 
mix of soil types is predominant.  
16
 Another possibility is to use expert knowledge for the parameter estimation as done by 
Femenia and Letort (2016). In a study by Deen et al. (1993), the parameter value is as-
sumed with respect to the efficacy of the herbicide. 
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As outlined in section 4.2.3, further restrictions are considered during 
the non-linear estimation process to identify the parameters. Once the pa-
rameters are identified and inserted into the production function, optimal 
strategies can be determined for each m and t according to Eq. (4.1), i.e. 
profits can be maximised for each municipality and year by choosing pre- 
(𝑆𝑏,𝑚,𝑡) and post-sowing (𝑆ℎ,𝑚,𝑡) shares for the control strategies: 
E(πm,t) = ∑ ∑ E(πm,t,b,h) · Sb,m,t · φb,glyphosate · Sh,m,t ,
55
h=1
24
b=1
Sb,m,t and Sh,m,t ∈ [0,1] 
(4.9) 
max π =  ∑ ∑E(πm,t)
2
t=1
377
m=1
. (4.10) 
φ is the information matrix whether glyphosate is allowed in the analysed 
scenarios. Sb,m,t and Sh,m,t are the shares of the selected control strategies of 
the farmers for pre- (b) and post-sowing (h) weed management and 
𝐸(𝜋𝑚,𝑡,𝑏,ℎ) is the profit for each strategy which reflects the expected yield, 
related fertiliser and other costs including the costs for weed control. 
Some further details need to be reflected during estimation and simula-
tion. Firstly, we assume that the strategy needs to be changed from year to 
year to avoid building up resistance against specific AS in the weed popula-
tion. More specifically, we classified the strategies based on the Herbicide 
Resistance Action Committee (HRAC, 2005) into groups and added a con-
straint, which prevents that strategies from the same groups are used in two 
consecutive years (Eq. (4.11). Second, special requirements for nicosulfu-
ron-containing strategies have to be included since this AS is only allowed 
to be applied every second year by law (code NG327 for the use of plant 
protection products; Eq. (4.12). Those restrictions can be implemented as: 
∑(∑(Sb,m,t · ηb,HRAC) + ∑(Sh,m,t · ηh,HRAC)
55
h=1
24
b=1
)
2
t=1
 ≤
|t|
2
  ∀ m ∧ HRAC  (4.11) 
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∑Sh,m,t · φh,nicosulfuron
2
t=1
≤
|t|
2
   ∀ m , (4.12) 
where φ and η are information matrices of whether post-sowing strategy j 
contains nicosulfuron and is classified as a certain HRAC [0,1]. 
The model is written in General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) 
code (Appendix 4.A). We simulate optimal herbicide strategies under a 
baseline where glyphosate can be applied throughout the two periods and a 
counterfactual where glyphosate is banned. We conduct sensitivity analyses 
with regard to the attainable yield (the attainable yield is increased by 10% 
in t1 and 15% in t2), the green maize price ex field P (€ 2.80/dt, € 3.30/dt 
and € 3.80/dt, dt = deciton) and the difference between weed and crop oc-
currence T (40 to -90), so that effects of higher or lower prices and higher or 
lower weed pressure can be seen. The latter is depicted by earlier or later 
maize emergence compared to weeds, e.g. T=0 means that maize and weeds 
emerge at the same time, T=-50 means that weeds have an advantage in 
emergence of, on average, five days with an average temperature of 10°. Of 
course, farmers try to keep the level of T large (i.e. close to zero or even 
positive) to increase the competitiveness of maize, and pre-sowing weed 
management is therefore done close to sowing. Based on model results de-
rived across different municipalities and scenarios, we test the following 
five hypotheses: H1) average post-sowing strategies change in case of a 
glyphosate ban, H2) costs for weed management increase in case of a 
glyphosate ban, H3) working force demand increases in case of a glyphosate 
ban, H4) the gross margin decreases in case of a glyphosate ban, and H5) 
yields significantly decrease in case of a glyphosate ban.
17
 To this end, t-
tests and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are used.   
                                                 
17
 For the hypotheses, we use the average of the periods t1 and t2. 
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4.3 Data 
We focus on the most important weeds in maize cultivation for our case 
study region (defined as more than 10% degree of presence, following the 
samples of Mehrtens et al. (2005) and Mol et al. (2015). Additionally, Digi-
taria ischaemum and Mercurialis annua were included; weeds which are of 
importance in specific regions of NRW as they are also listed in the agricul-
tural recommendations (see resulting list in Table 4.1). Information on the 
occurrence of weeds is taken from the 2.88x2.75km distribution raster of 
Germany’s pteridophytes and flowering plants (NetPhyD and BfN, 2013; 
see also www.floraweb.de), and mapped via GIS operations to municipality 
areas. We included only the 377 municipalities of NRW which reported 
maize cultivation in recent years. Each municipality receives weed specific 
occurrence probabilities which reflect the area weighted average of raster 
cells where each weed was observed (see data for Alopecurus myosuroides, 
Digitaria ischaemum, Setaria viridis and Chenopodium spp. in Fig. 4.2). 
Information on the average abundance, i.e. the share of affected area when a 
weed is observed and not controlled, is used from long-term field trials 
(Table 4.1).  
We consider those herbicides (combinations) that are recommended by 
the Chamber of Agriculture of North Rhine Westphalia (LWK NRW, 
2015a) and the Bavarian State Research Centre for Agriculture (LfL, 2016). 
These recommendations are widely used in agricultural extension and also 
published in agricultural magazines. Because of lack of data on how differ-
ent doses affect weed control, we use the recommended dose in each strate-
gy instead of trying to also solve for an optimal rate (Pannell, 1990). How-
ever, these doses may vary between strategies comprising the same AS. In 
total, 55 different post-sowing herbicide strategies were defined, where one 
reflects zero control, 6 are mechanical only and the remaining 48 apply 
herbicides once or twice (see Appendix 4.B). For each of those 55 strate-
gies, data by the LfL (2016) and the LWK NRW (2015a) define the sup-
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pressing efficiency against each of the 32 weeds in the interval [0,1]. A val-
ue of 1 characterises total eradication, a value of zero indicates no impact on 
the weed, and a value between zero and one was assigned if part of the pop-
ulation is removed. To cope with gaps in this database, we use manufacturer 
information (obtained from product brochures) to specify herbicide efficacy. 
Thereby, in general three categories are displayed: well or very well control-
lable, sufficiently controllable and not sufficiently controllable. For the first 
category, we assume an efficacy of 0.90, for the second category 0.33 and 
for the third category null efficacy.  
Table 4.1. Maize grass-weeds and weeds implemented in the output damage 
function approach 
Name 
Average abun-
dance (%) 
Name 
Average abun-
dance (%) 
Grass-weeds:  Fumaria officinalis 2.0 
Alopecurus myosuroides 21.3
+
 Galinsoga parviflora 12.0 
Digitaria ischaemum 21.3
+
 Galium aparine 7.0 
Echinochloa crus-galli 22.0 Geranium pusillum 6.0 
Elymus repens 21.3
+
 Lamium spp. 6.0 
Poa annua, P. trivialis 2.0 Matricaria spp. 13.0 
Setaria viridis 40.0 Mercurialis annua 6.8
+
 
Broad-leaved weeds:  Persicaria lapathifolia 11.0 
Amaranthus retroflexus 13.0 Persicaria maculosa 3.0 
Atriplex patula 1.0 Polygonum aviculare agg. 3.0 
Brassica napus 18.0 Rumex obtusifolius 4.0 
Capsella bursa-pastoris 5.0 Solanum nigrum 3.0 
Chenopodium spp. 20.0 Sonchus spp. 2.0 
Cirsium arvense 4.0 Stellaria media agg. 6.0 
Convolvulus arvensis 2.0 Thlaspi arvense 3.0 
Equisetum arvense, E. 
palustre) 
6.8
+
 Veronica spp. 2.0 
Fallopia convolvulus 12.0 Viola arvensis 5.0 
Note: Abundance-values marked with a 
+
 are estimates according to mean values of grass 
weeds or broad-leaved weeds. Data on year to year variation of the abundance were not 
found. Brassica napus was included for potential extension of the model by other crops 
(crop rotation). Source: Meinlschmidt et al. (2008). 
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Fig. 4.2. Spread, measured as probability of occurrence, of four selected 
weeds in NRW.  
Reference: NetPhyD and BfN (2013), raster data converted to municipality borders. 
To quantify the efficacy of the mechanical strategies, we combine in-
formation from extensive or organic farming systems with expert 
knowledge (Jacquet et al., 2011; Oskam, 1997). Data on mechanical post-
sowing techniques could be found in Kees (1984, unpub., cit. from Hoff-
mann, 1990). Additionally, we consulted the organic farming expert of the 
Chamber of Agriculture from Lower Saxony for information on the me-
chanical harrowing and hoeing frequency, and their effect on specific 
weeds.
18
 There are 24 different pre-sowing plant protection strategies in our 
                                                 
18
 On average, an effective mechanical weed management in maize is reached with three 
runs of harrowing and two runs of hoeing. If maize emerges early, fewer runs are neces-
sary, and more if maize emerges late. In general, root weeds are more troublesome to con-
trol than other ones. However, blind harrowing can also be effective against root weeds. 
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model, consisting of mouldboard ploughing, different chisel ploughing and 
harrowing combinations and of glyphosate combinations.
19
 Except for 
glyphosate, no other herbicides are allowed before sowing (Kehlenbeck et 
al., 2015). We could not find unambiguous data about the yield increasing 
or decreasing effect of different tillage systems. Therefore, with respect to 
the weed controlling capacity of conventional and conservation tillage, both 
strategies have almost the same yield potential. Conventional tillage has 
only slight advantages in weed control. 
Data about actual yields are available at county-level (53 counties in 
NRW; IT NRW, 2016), and ?̅? is the five year average of the actually ob-
served yield from 2011 and 2015 (Fig. 4.3). A 5% increase of the expected 
yield is assumed for the second year t2. Oerke (2006) estimated a 5% yield 
loss from weeds in Western European maize production with usual weed 
control strategies (y
a
 = 1.05 ?̅?). For information about maximum losses un-
der zero control (scalar A in Eq. (4.7), we draw on field trials by Söchting 
and Zwerger (2012). Maize yields with herbicide treatment were up to 
63.8% higher compared to the untreated control group (A = 63.8%). For I 
and C in Eq. (4.7), we rely on Bosnić and Swanton (1997), who estimated I 
= -0.3% and C = 0.017. Further restrictions of the estimation model are that 
the no-till pre-sowing strategy with no herbicide application has to achieve a 
yield level between 86% and 90% and that the ploughing strategy has to be 
larger than 95% (Gehring et al., 2012). The zero control post-sowing strate-
gy is fixed at 86% for normal weed emergence (in relation to the field trials 
of Söchting and Zwerger, 2012). Based on this data, the estimates from Eq. 
(4.8) are as follows: ε has a value of 0.8–4.0% of E(y) depending on the 
municipality in the parameterisation. The best fit parameter values are 
α0=1.304, α1=0.770, β0=0.724 and β1=0.244 (estimated at T=0). 
Herbicide’s costs are based on 2015 recommended retail prices from a 
German agricultural trader (Roth Agrarhandel, 2015; see Appendix 4.B). 
                                                 
19
 As glyphosate containing product, we chose Roundup® PowerFlex. 
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For labour costs, € 17.5/h are assumed. In our study region, organic fertiliser 
is no limiting production factor (see Gömann et al., 2010 for details) so that 
we assume that slurry is for free. The most relevant cost parameters are pre-
sented in Table 4.2. 
 
Fig. 4.3. Silage maize yields in different counties of NRW (five-year aver-
age of 2011–2015). 
Reference: IT NRW (2016). 
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Table 4.2. Machinery costs and other inputs related to maize growing 
Activity Sub-
activity 
Work hours 
(h/ha) 
(wage: 
€ 17.5/h) 
Fix and variable 
machinery costs 
(€/ha) 
Other in-
puts 
Weed control-related activities: 
Chisel plough/Cultivator 
(4.5m) 
 0.44 24.17  
Mouldboard plough and 
packer (1.4m) 
 1.73 66.97  
Pesticide sprayer (24m)  0.17 6.90  
Harrow (9m)  0.17 11.09  
Hoe (6m)  0.72 30.03  
Other activities: 
Inspection (share, every 
5
th
 year) 
 0.04 0.26  - 
Manure application (25 
m³/ha)  
 0.74 50.23 - 
 Manure 
cost 
- - € 0.00/ha 
Precision drill (6m-
width) 
 0.53 41.72 - 
Direct precision drill 
(59% increase to normal 
precision drill, 20% 
discount on light soils) 
 0.53 66.31  
Seed   € 233.20/ha 
Mounted fertiliser 
spreader (amount de-
pends on E(y)) 
 0.00–0.29  0.00–6.14   
Liming (share, every 3
rd
 
year)  
 0.19 12.47  
 N   € 1.10/kg 
 P2O5   € 0.87/kg  
 K   € 0.77/kg 
 Ca   € 0.05/kg 
No harvest cost, sell ex 
field 
 - - - 
Note: Diesel consumption for mouldboard ploughing is assumed to be 30% higher/lower on 
heavy/light soils (for chisel ploughing 20% higher/lower). References: Achilles et al. 
(2016), fertiliser prices from LfL (2016), weight-shares from LWK NRW (2015b). 
4.4 Results 
The results are presented in two sections. In the first section, the results 
from the different simulations and scenarios are shown and described. The 
second one addresses the hypotheses testing.
20
  
                                                 
20
 The results of the sensitivity analysis with regard to water limited potential yields are 
available as Appendix 4.C, the most important findings are discussed in the following 
where appropriate.  
108  Modelling a Glyphosate Ban 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive Results 
Fig. 4.4 presents for three price levels
21
 the chosen pre-sowing strategies as 
a share of municipalities where they are applied, on average of the two years 
t. The application of glyphosate in a strategy is found to be on average op-
timal in about 5% to 25% of the municipalities (depending on prices and 
weed pressure expressed as T). In the other municipalities, conservation 
tillage with mechanical strategies consisting of one or two chisel ploughings 
and/or one to three harrowing passes is the most profitable. Glyphosate con-
taining strategies are more profitable when applied closer to maize emer-
gence, i.e. close before sowing or even close after sowing. The later maize 
emerges compared to weeds, the less glyphosate is applied. In case of a ban, 
the above mentioned mechanical strategies are used throughout, but mould-
board ploughing is not used in any year. As conservative mechanical control 
suppresses weeds not as effectively as non-selective herbicides, glyphosate 
use is higher in t2 where the attainable yield is assumed higher. Only me-
chanical control is observed under a ban since no alternative herbicides are 
licensed for pre-sowing application. 
                                                 
21
 We use the price levels of € 2.80/dt, € 3.30/dt and € 3.80/dt. For the region of NRW, the 
price levels of € 3.30/dt or even € 3.80/dt are under current conditions more realistic than 
the lower price of € 2.80/dt. 
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Fig. 4.4. Shares of used pre-sowing strategies (average of t1 and t2 of each 
municipality). 
Note: A scenario in which glyphosate is licensed is compared to a scenario with a glypho-
sate ban. The figure shows the results for the three analysed price levels at different weed 
pressure levels (expressed as T). 
Regarding selective herbicide use after sowing, we observe that with a 
later emergence of silage maize compared to weeds, i.e. a higher weed pres-
sure reflected by a more negative T, more expensive herbicide strategies get 
more profitable. This implies that the share of mechanical strategies de-
creases (Fig. 4.5). Higher silage maize prices reinforce this. Comparing the 
change in T from +40 to -90, for example, implies an increase in weed con-
trol costs from € 78/ha up to € 115/ha at P=€ 3.80/dt, compared to an in-
crease from € 66/ha to € 95/ha at P=€ 2.80/dt (Appendix 4.C). The composi-
tion of the chosen strategies as a function of T, i.e. maize relative to weed 
emergence, is summarised in Fig. 4.6 for the glyphosate licensed-scenario 
and an output price of € 3.80/dt. In both scenarios, i.e. for glyphosate being 
licensed and banned, the most profitable AS shift from nicosulfuron, prosul-
furon and S-metolachlor to terbuthylazine, mesotrione, pethoxamid, flufe-
nacet, foramsulfuron, iodosulfuron and thiencarbazone. 
Assuming higher potential water limited yields let the model simulate 
higher shares of glyphosate usage (up to 21% at P = € 3.30/dt and 26% at P 
= € 3.80/dt) and also to faster changes in the use of the different AS (i.e. 
higher shares of terbuthylazine, flufenacet, foramsulfuron, iodosulfuron and 
110  Modelling a Glyphosate Ban 
 
thiencarbazone can be observed) (Appendix 4.C). Additionally, spending for 
weed management increase (averagely at a price of € 3.80/dt an increase 
from € 88/ha at T=-30 to € 122/ha at T=-90). 
 
Fig. 4.5. Shares of post-sowing strategies as average of t1 and t2 (scenario 
with glyphosate licensed). 
Note: The figure shows the categorisation of the post-sowing strategies in Herbicide, Me-
chanical and Nothing. Three price levels and different weed pressure levels (expressed as 
T) are analysed. 
 
Fig. 4.6. Shares active substances in of post-sowing strategies (glyphosate 
licensed, P = € 3.80/dt, average of t1 and t2). 
Note: The figure shows how often an active substance is used on average over the munici-
palities. For example, a level of 60% for terbuthylazine means that this substance is con-
tained in the weed management strategy, on average of the two years, in 226 of the 377 
municipalities each year. 
Chapter 4  111 
4.4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Table 4.3 shows the results of the hypotheses testing for the price levels of 
€ 2.80/dt and € 3.80/dt. Differences of mean values over all municipalities 
are given for different levels of T and for prices of € 2.80/dt and € 3.80/dt. 
H1 states changes in post-sowing AS use after a ban. However, the compo-
sition of the different AS changes only in few municipalities, but those 
changes are overall not significant. 
We cannot reject H2 that weed control becomes more expensive under 
a ban. We find that in municipalities where glyphosate was used in the 
benchmark, a significantly different amount is spent on weed management 
under a ban (plus € 4–6/ha. The effect decreases with the higher price of 
€ 3.80/dt due to the higher intensity of pre-sowing weed management in the 
benchmark scenario at the higher price level. The cost increase stems from 
substituting glyphosate mostly with one or two passes of chisel ploughing. 
Note that sowing is assumed to be cheaper after two passes compared to 
only a single pass of chisel ploughing (and also cheaper compared to 
glyphosate application only). The application of mechanical strategies leads 
to a significant increase in labour demand (H3). That effect, however, de-
creases if T is lower, i.e. the weed pressure after sowing is high. In the latter 
case, more expensive post-sowing strategies with selected herbicides are 
used instead. 
Generally, expected gross margins vary highly across municipalities re-
flecting yield differences. Furthermore, the later maize emerges compared to 
weeds, the lower the gross margin will be. A glyphosate ban causes in our 
simulation, on average over all glyphosate-using municipalities, decreases 
of the gross margins (already accounting for higher costs for labour) of 
about € 1–2/ha, with maximal reductions of € 9/ha (for P=€ 2.80/dt) and 
€ 13/ha (for P=€ 3.80/dt) over the two year growing period. In single years, 
however, costs can be higher if our assumptions on resistance management 
are neglected. Thus, the loss of gross margin due to the ban of glyphosate is 
112  Modelling a Glyphosate Ban 
 
moderate and the null hypothesis of no change cannot be rejected (see Table 
4.3, row H4). The reasons for the moderate gross margin reduction although 
overall costs increase are again due to the cost savings in precision drilling 
when glyphosate is substituted by two passes of chisel ploughing. Fig. 4.7 
presents the distribution of those losses over the federal state of NRW for 
different levels of T and at P=€ 3.80/dt. First, the differences between the 
regions are due to the differences in attainable yield levels (Fig. 4.3). Se-
cond, differences are dependent on soil types: losses are higher on clayey 
soils due to relatively high cultivation costs and they are higher on sandy 
soils due to cost saving when applying direct precision drilling (or strip till). 
Third, we find that the overall weed pressure ( ∑ 𝑤𝑚,𝑖 · 𝑎𝑖
32
𝑖  ; e.g. by spread 
of Panicoideae-varieties or Alopecurus myosuroides, see also Fig. 4.2) is 
higher in municipalities with lower gross margin losses under a glyphosate 
ban. This is at first glance a somewhat counterintuitive observation. The 
reason behind this is that our model simulates already under the benchmark 
in the light of a high pressure from different weeds a lower pre-sowing weed 
control intensity, as the gross margin is higher when some yield losses are 
accepted instead of controlling with high costs multiple weeds. Under a ban 
of the non-selective herbicide, the shift to mechanical pre-sowing strategies 
is then also not accompanied by expensive post-sowing use of selective 
herbicides while the overall already higher weed pressure and thus the at-
tained yield is not much affected.  
The reduced plant protection intensity under a ban is reflected in signif-
icantly decreased yields by about 0.5–1% (H5), which turns out as more 
profitable than maintaining the control effort with more expensive strategies 
(difference is significant at higher levels of T and the two presented prices in 
Table 4.3). 
The results of the hypothesis testing do not change much when a higher 
potential water limited yield is assumed. The most important change is some 
additional cost increase in weed control.  
 Table 4.3. Differences between glyphosate-ban-scenario and glyphosate-licensed-scenario (mean across the glyphosate using 
municipalities) and results of hypotheses testing 
Maize emergence T=30 T=10 T=-10 T=-30 T=-50 T=-70 T=-90 
Price (€/dt) 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 
H
1
: 
sh
a
re
 o
f 
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
es
 (
%
) 
No Herbicide  1.9 4.0 2.0 1.7 6.5 2.9 7.9 - - - - - - - 
Mechanic - - - 1.7 - 2.9 2.6 - - - - - - - 
Nothing 1.9 4.0 2.0 - 6.5 - 5.3 - - - - - - - 
Herbicide -1.9 -4.0 -2.0 -1.7 -6.5 -2.9 -7.9 - - - - - - - 
Dicamba - - 2.0 - - -1.8 - -0.6 - - - 0.7 - - 
Flufenacet - - - - - - - - - - - -0.7 - 0.8 
Foramsulfuron - - - - - - - - - - - -0.7 - 0.8 
Iodosulfuron - - - - - - - - - - - -0.7 - 0.8 
Mesotrione - - - 1.2  1.8 -2.6 2.4 - -2.5 - 1.5 - 1.6 
Nicosulfuron -1.9 -4.0 -3.9 -2.9 -6.5 -2.9 -5.3 -1.8 - 2.5 - -1.5 - -2.4 
Pethoxamid - - - - - - - - - -0.6 - 2.2 - 0.8 
Prosulfuron -1.9 -4.0 -3.9 -2.9 -6.5 -2.9 -5.3 -1.8 - 2.5 - -1.5 - -2.4 
Pyridate - - - 1.2 - -1.2 - 2.4 - -1.9 - -0.7 - 0.8 
S-Metolachlor - - - - - 2.9 -2.6 - - 0.6 - - - - 
Terbuthylazine - - - 1.2 - 1.8 -2.6 2.4 - -2.5 - 0.7 - 2.4 
Thiencarbazone - - - - - - - - - - - -0.7 - 0.8 
Tritosulfuron - - 2.0 - - -1.8 - -0.6 - - - 0.7 - - 
H
2
: 
€
/h
a
 
Weed management costs 
6.19 
*** 
5.48 
*** 
5.83 
** 
5.24 
*** 
5.88 
** 
4.89 
*** 
4.31 
 
4.80 
*** 
4.02 
 
4.38 
*** 
2.17 
 
4.25 
*** 
8.09 
 
3.76 
** 
 
C
h
a
p
ter 4
 
1
1
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Table 4.3. (continued)  
Maize emergence T=30 T=10 T=-10 T=-30 T=-50 T=-70 T=-90 
Price (€/dt) 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 
H
3
: 
h
/h
a
 
Weed management 
labour demand 
0.34 
*** 
0.34 
*** 
0.34 
*** 
0.34 
*** 
0.34 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
0.31 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
0.27 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
0.27 
*** 
0.31 
*** 
H
4
: 
€
/h
a
 
Gross margin per ha 
-1.12 
 
-1.99 
 
-1.11 
 
-1.87 
 
-1.09 
 
-1.83 
 
-0.87 
 
-1.68 
 
-0.94 
 
-1.58 
 
-0.73 
 
-1.51 
 
-0.37 
 
-1.28 
 
H
5
: 
(%
) 
 
Yield difference (model 
yield minus real yield) 
-0.7 
*** 
-0.4 
** 
-0.7 
** 
-0.4 
 
-0.7 
* 
-0.4 
 
-0.9 
** 
-0.4 
 
-0.8 
 
-0.4 
 
-0.8 
 
-0.4 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.4 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance levels using a t-test. No mark means that no significant difference occurred. Note that for tests on 
hypothesis H1, a Bonferroni correction was used.  
We also tested the hypotheses using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, which led overall to similar results. Only for H5, we get more significance values for the 
lower levels of T and also higher levels of significance.  
T = growing degree days, which is the sum of the average temperature of each day. T = 30: maize emerges early compared to weeds. T = -90: maize emerges 
lately compared to weeds. 
Hypotheses: H1: average post-sowing strategies change in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2), 
 H2: costs for weed management increase in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2), 
 H3: working force demand increases in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2), 
 H4: the gross margin decreases in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2), 
 H5: yields decrease in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2). 
1
1
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Fig. 4.7. Distribution of the simulated gross margin losses due to a glyphosate ban 
in NRW, Germany, over a two year maize growing period (for selected levels of T 
and a price of P = € 3.80/dt). 
4.5 Discussion 
Our model focusses on potential changes in weed management within a sin-
gle crop. Thus, our results present potential rather short-term effects in herb-
icide demand for weed control in silage maize production and thus can be 
used to quantify intensive margin effects of agri-environmental policies tar-
geting single herbicides. Our normative model simulates limited yield losses 
with some extra costs for farmers under a glyphosate ban, matching the rela-
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tively low yield increasing effect of glyphosate reported in literature 
(Gehring et al., 2012). In our model, this leads to a relatively high efficiency 
and widespread use of alternative (i.e. non-glyphosate based) conservation 
tillage strategies already under the benchmark. Under a glyphosate ban and 
profit maximising behaviour, overall control intensity and thus the expected 
maize yield would be somewhat reduced as maintaining the same level of 
weed suppression and the expected yield is too costly given the available 
alternative control strategies.  
Especially due to the subsidy induced boom in biogas production from 
silage maize in Germany (Gömann et al., 2011; LWK NRW, 2016), silage 
maize is currently in shortage, being regionally traded at relatively high 
prices in years with moderate yields. Reducing yields under a glyphosate 
ban would most probably drive prices further up, such that more costly 
weed control strategies could become profitable. Farmers might anticipate 
these impacts and intensify weed control beyond the current profit optimal 
point to avoid acting as buyers in the short maize markets. If we restrict the 
model such that a certain yield has to be achieved (a safety threshold to 
avoid large maize purchases), also more intensive plant protection intensi-
ties are used (with costs > € 120/ha) (not shown). 
Compared to other studies being based on expert interviews (Kehlen-
beck et al., 2015; Schulte et al., 2016), our results suggest lower additional 
costs for maize production; though at an overall lower intensity of herbicide 
use, which decreases somewhat the yields and thus the gross margin. How-
ever, our results are in line with findings of Schmitz and Garvert (2012), 
who estimated also quite limited economic losses due to a glyphosate ban 
for different crops for northwest Germany of up to 3% of the respective 
gross margins. In addition, Kehlenbeck et al. (2015) estimated that a 75% 
increase of the glyphosate price would be necessary to reach equivalence of 
cost between pure mechanical weed management by tillage and weed man-
agement including glyphosate use. Even a higher price increase would be 
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necessary in our model to reach equivalence of costs, but alternative me-
chanical strategies have to be considered as well. A sensitivity analysis with 
our model shows already under a 10% price increase some reductions in 
glyphosate use while, under a 30% increase, glyphosate was substituted by 
mechanical strategies in every municipality (for T=-20 and P=€ 3.80/dt). 
We presume that these differences to Kehlenbeck et al. (2015) reflect more 
detail in weed control in our model, which additionally considers adjusting 
yields. More elastic demand for herbicides as found in our analysis is also 
confirmed by a recent literature review (Böcker and Finger, 2017).  
The observed treatment frequency in German maize production, which 
measures the number of herbicide applications on a field, varied between 
1.31–1.47 in 2011–2015, including pre-emergence treatments with glypho-
sate (JKI, 2016). Our model simulated lower average treatment frequencies 
over the two years, which are, for instance between 0.57–1.15 at a level of 
T=0 and between 0.95–1.21 at T=-50. Indeed, pesticide intensities beyond 
the profit maximising intensity were also found by other authors (Jacquet et 
al., 2011, for France; Skevas et al., 2014, for the Netherlands) which could 
be explained by the risk-reducing effect of herbicides (Skevas et al., 2014). 
This is not reflected in the profit maximising approach used in this paper, 
but should be addressed in future research (e.g. Lehmann et al., 2013).  
Despite the fact that regional differences in yields and weed pressure 
prevent an upscaling of our results to silage maize production in Germany at 
large, some comparison can be made. For example, the JKI also reports the 
average share of the surveyed German farms which use a specific AS in 
maize production (JKI, 2016). For example in 2015, 33% of all surveyed 
farms used an herbicide strategy containing glyphosate, 91% used a strategy 
containing terbuthylazine, 50% used a strategy containing bromoxynil, etc. 
Our simulated shares over different levels of T differ partly from those val-
ues. For example, bromoxynil was not selected at all, but these differences 
could also root in our regional focus. Still, for selected AS, and depending 
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on T and P, quite similar shares were calculated, e.g. for nicosulfuron, 
mesotrione, pethoxamid and partly for glyphosate, terbuthylazine, flufe-
nacet, foramsulfuron and iodosulfuron. The survey of Wiese et al. (2018) 
finds with 22% of the farmers applying glyphosate in 2013/14 a similar val-
ue compared to our simulated ones.  
Herbicide strategies considered in our model were aggregated to some 
extent, for instance by defining a two-time post-sowing herbicide-
application-strategy as one. Future approaches could further refine the strat-
egies such as depicting each single application according to its characteris-
tics and time of application. This would, however, require improved data 
availability such as research on weed specific impacts on yields. Additional 
data could also allow including more generally the control impact depend-
ing on doses of specific pesticides in the model. So far, reduced doses are 
only considered in some strategies which use doses below the manufactur-
ers’ recommendation. Also, we decided to neglect potential dynamic control 
impacts, for instance that a conservation tillage strategy might lead to higher 
weed abundance in the long-term (Ball, 1992; Buhler, 1992; Schwarz and 
Pallutt, 2014)
22
 or that effective control might depress future weed infesta-
tion (Pandey, 1989; Swinton and King, 1994), as it is hard to properly ac-
count for external weed seed import in a single plot. Here, Hanzlik and 
Gerowitt (2011) but also Lundkvist et al. (2008) find that geographical posi-
tion and soil conditions have a higher influence on weed species com-
position compared to previous weed management.  
Future research could apply the presented approach to other field crops 
and implement it into a whole farm context. Other aspects to be covered in 
future extensions are effects of fertilisation, of preceding or catch crops and 
of weed control measures in autumn. 
                                                 
22
 Using a chisel plough instead of a mouldboard plough led in field trials to an increase in 
soil’s weed seed bank. Here, a ban of glyphosate could lead to an increase in weed seed 
banks in the long-term and make more intense pre- and post-sowing strategies necessary.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
We develop a highly detailed, spatially explicit bio-economic model for 
weed control in silage maize production drawing on an output damage con-
trol approach. Here, the raster data of NetPhyD and BfN (2013) on weed 
occurrence are a key input to analyse weed spread in Germany. Combining 
this data with expert information on current weed control strategies and 
comprehensive yield observation data allows us to develop and parameterise 
our model for mechanical and herbicide based weed control use in silage 
maize production for 377 municipalities in the state of North-Rhine-
Westphalia. Glyphosate as a non-selective herbicide is simulated in about 5 
to 25% of the cases as the profit maximal strategy which combines rela-
tively low control cost with high yields. Simulating optimal control strate-
gies under a glyphosate ban, we find that i) economic losses of a ban are 
limited for farmers currently applying glyphosate, ii) costs slightly increase 
under a glyphosate ban as mechanical strategies for conservation tillage are 
used pre-sowing and accepting some yield loss, while switches to more ex-
pensive selective herbicides in post-sowing strategies are simulated only in 
few cases. Therefore, potential risks linked to increased selective herbicide 
use are for now limited. iii) Rather, somewhat lower yields reflecting de-
creased weed control intensity turn out as profitable, which, however, could 
lead to higher regional maize prices. Finally, iv) demand of labour increases 
due to higher shares of mechanical strategies.  
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4.7 Appendix 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.08.027. 
 
Appendix 4.A:  
Weed control strategies included in the model and related parameters 
(amount/ha, costs, efficacy)  
(Excel file, online) 
 
Appendix 4.B:  
Average weed management costs (mechanical and chemical) and aver-
age gross margins 
Table A4.1. Average gross margin (average of t1 and t2, all municipalities, 
also those without glyphosate use) 
T 
Gross margin 
(glyphosate 
licensed,  
P = € 2.80/dt) 
Gross margin 
(glyphosate 
banned,  
P = € 2.80/dt) 
Gross margin 
(glyphosate 
licensed,  
P = € 3.80/dt) 
Gross margin 
(glyphosate 
banned,  
P = € 3.80/dt) 
40 630.93 630.76 1107.89 1106.96 
30 621.90 621.74 1095.22 1094.29 
20 612.03 611.87 1081.60 1080.70 
10 601.20 601.05 1067.09 1066.23 
0 589.21 589.07 1051.24 1050.41 
-10 576.31 576.18 1033.46 1032.63 
-20 562.43 562.31 1013.62 1012.83 
-30 547.77 547.68 991.58 990.85 
-40 532.02 531.93 967.40 966.71 
-50 514.90 514.83 940.82 940.16 
-60 496.64 496.58 912.16 911.57 
-70 476.97 476.93 881.58 881.03 
-80 456.14 456.09 849.23 848.74 
-90 434.40 434.38 815.40 814.98 
Chapter 4  121 
 
Fig. A4.1. Average gross margin (average of t1 and t2, all municipalities, 
also those without glyphosate use). 
Table A4.2. Average costs for weed management (average of t1 and t2, all 
municipalities, also those without glyphosate use)
a
 
T 
Weed manage-
ment costs 
(glyphosate 
licensed,  
P = € 2.80/dt) 
Weed manage-
ment costs 
(glyphosate 
banned,  
P = € 2.80/dt) 
Weed manage-
ment costs 
(glyphosate 
licensed,  
P = € 3.80/dt) 
Weed manage-
ment costs 
(glyphosate 
banned,  
P = € 3.80/dt) 
40 65.86 66.71 77.76 80.16 
30 68.47 69.35 82.73 85.29 
20 69.86 70.70 89.33 91.76 
10 71.59 72.38 96.27 98.66 
0 74.87 75.62 99.11 101.42 
-10 80.16 80.88 100.46 102.66 
-20 85.14 85.97 101.77 103.90 
-30 90.19 90.62 102.58 104.69 
-40 92.77 93.38 103.35 105.25 
-50 94.65 94.96 105.41 107.24 
-60 94.11 94.47 107.32 108.80 
-70 94.66 94.79 110.20 111.76 
-80 93.71 93.86 113.45 114.77 
-90 93.71 94.08 115.47 116.76 
a
 Maximum values are underlined. 
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Fig. A4.2. Average costs for weed management (average of t1 and t2, all 
municipalities, also those without glyphosate use). 
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Appendix 4.C:  
Sensitivity analysis with respect to the attainable yield (the attainable 
yield is increased by 10% in t1 and 15% in t2) 
 
Fig. A4.3. Shares of used pre-sowing strategies (average of t1 and t2 of each 
municipality).  
Note: A scenario in which glyphosate is licensed is compared to a scenario with a glypho-
sate ban. The figure shows the results for the three analysed price levels at different weed 
pressure levels (expressed as T). 
 
 
Fig. A4.4. Shares of post-sowing strategies as average of t1 and t2 (scenario 
with glyphosate licensed). 
Note: The figure shows the categorisation of the post-sowing strategies in Herbicide, Me-
chanical and Nothing. Three price levels and different weed pressure levels (expressed as 
T) are analysed. 
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Fig. A4.5. Shares active substances in of post-sowing strategies (glyphosate 
licensed, P = € 3.80/dt, average of t1 and t2). 
Note: The figure shows how often an active substance is used on average over the munici-
palities. For example, a level of 60% for terbuthylazine means that this substance is con-
tained in the weed management strategy, on average of the two years, in 226 of the 377 
municipalities each year. 
 
 Table A4.3. Differences between glyphosate-ban-scenario and glyphosate-licensed-scenario (mean across the glyphosate using 
municipalities) and results of hypotheses testing 
Maize emergence T=30 T=10 T=-10 T=-30 T=-50 T=-70 T=-90 
Price (€/dt) 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 
H
1
: 
sh
a
re
 o
f 
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
es
 (
%
) 
No Herbicide  1.3 - 1.4 1.6 13.4 - 6.9 - 6.3 - - - - - 
Mechanic - - - 1.6 - - 5.2 - 6.3 - - - -3.4 - 
Nothing 1.3 - 1.4 - 13.4 - 1.7 - -6.3 - - - 3.4 - 
Herbicide -1.3 - -1.4 -1.6 -13.4 - -6.9 - - - - - - - 
Dicamba - - - - -4.5 -1.2 1.7 - - - - - - - 
Flufenacet - - - - - - - - - - - -0.6 - -1.9 
Foramsulfuron - - - - - - - - - - - -0.6 - -1.9 
Iodosulfuron - - - - - - - - - - - -0.6 - -1.9 
Mesotrione - - - -  0.6 - -0.6 - -1.1 - - 3.4 0.6 
Nicosulfuron -1.3 - -1.4 -1.6 -9.0 0.6 -8.6 0.6 -6.2 1.2 - 0.6 -3.4 1.3 
Pethoxamid - - - - - - - - - -0.6 - - - - 
Prosulfuron -1.3 - -1.4 -1.6 -9.0 0.6 -8.6 0.6 -6.2 1.2 - 0.6 -3.4 1.3 
Pyridate - - - - - 0.6 - -0.6 - - - - - 0.6 
S-Metolachlor - - - - - - - - - -0.6 - - 3.4 - 
Terbuthylazine - - - - - 0.6 - -0.6 - -1.1 - -0.6 3.4 -1.3 
Thiencarbazone - - - - - - - - - - - -0.6 - -1.9 
Tritosulfuron - - - - -4.5 -1.2 1.7 - - - - - - - 
H
2
: 
€
/h
a
 
Weed management costs 
4.49 
** 
7.01 
*** 
4.23 
* 
6.62 
*** 
5.60 
*** 
6.36 
*** 
5.74 
*** 
5.72 
*** 
6.42 
** 
5.10 
*** 
4.64 
 
4.65 
*** 
0.61 
 
4.09 
*** 
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Table A4.3. (continued)  
Maize emergence T=30 T=10 T=-10 T=-30 T=-50 T=-70 T=-90 
Price (€/dt) 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 2.80 3.80 
H
3
: 
h
/h
a
 
Weed management 
labour demand 
0.33 
*** 
0.36 
*** 
0.32 
*** 
0.36 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
0.35 
*** 
0.34*** 
0.34 
*** 
0.35 
*** 
0.34 
*** 
0.32 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
0.26 
*** 
0.33 
*** 
H
4
: 
€
/h
a
 
Gross margin per ha 
-1.22 
 
-2.13 
 
-1.19 
 
-2.12 
 
-1.16 
 
-2.08 
 
-1.16 
 
-2.00 
 
-1.11 
 
-1.85 
 
-0.82 
 
-1.68 
 
-0.73 
 
-1.51 
 
H
5
: 
(%
) 
 
Yield difference (model 
yield minus real yield) 
-0.8 
** 
-0.3 
* 
-0.8 
** 
-0.3 
 
-0.7 
* 
-0.3 
 
-0.7 
 
-0.4 
 
-0.7 
 
-0.4 
 
-0.8 
 
-0.4 
 
-1.0 
 
-0.4 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance levels using a t-test. No mark means that no significant difference occurred. Note that for tests on 
hypothesis H1, a Bonferroni correction was used.  
We also tested the hypotheses using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, which led overall to similar results. Only for H5, we get more significance values for the 
lower levels of T and also higher levels of significance.  
T = growing degree days, which is the sum of the average temperature of each day. T = 30: maize emerges early compared to weeds. T = -90: maize emerges 
lately compared to weeds. 
Hypotheses: H1: average post-sowing strategies change in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2), 
 H2: costs for weed management increase in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2), 
 H3: working force demand increases in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2), 
 H4: the gross margin decreases in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2), 
 H5: yields decrease in case of a glyphosate ban (average of t1 and t2). 
1
2
6
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  Chapter 5
An Economic and Environmental Assessment of a 
Glyphosate Ban for the Example of Maize Produc-
tion
23
 
Abstract 
Economic and environmental impacts of a glyphosate ban on silage maize 
cultivation are simulated using a spatially explicit bio-economic model for 
377 municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany). For each munici-
pality, a utility maximising mix from 74 pre- and post-sowing weed control 
strategies is chosen, stage-contingent on stochastic pressure of 32 weeds. 
The resulting damage control drives the distribution of yield levels. The 
glyphosate ban is found to slightly reduce gross margins and has only minor 
effects on maize yields. It leads to significant reductions of the toxicity of 
pesticide use, but increases tillage intensity, resulting in higher energy con-
sumption. 
Keywords: herbicide; glyphosate; maize; output damage control; risk. 
5.1 Introduction 
The relicensing of glyphosate in European agriculture received massive so-
cietal and political attention in the years 2016 and 2017. Those advocating a 
ban used as arguments potential social costs in the form of human health 
risks (e.g. Guyton et al., 2015) and of environmental effects, for instance on 
biodiversity with regard to a decline in fodder plants for butterflies or with 
                                                 
23
 This chapter is under review in the European Review of Agricultural Economics as: 
Böcker, T., Britz, W., Möhring, N. and Finger, R. (2018). An Economic and Environmental 
Assessment of a Glyphosate Ban for the Example of Maize Production. 
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regard to accumulation of metabolites (e.g. Brower et al., 2012; Helander et 
al., 2012; see Tarazona et al., 2017, for an overview of the ongoing debate). 
In contrast, arguments for the continued use of glyphosate mainly relate to 
its private and social economic benefits, such as lower production costs and 
consequently lower food prices, and potential trade-offs in the environmen-
tal and human health dimension if glyphosate is substituted with other forms 
of weed control, such as more intensive selective herbicide application or 
increased tillage intensity (see e.g. Williams et al., 2000; Duke and Powles, 
2008). Despite the fact that glyphosate was relicensed by the European 
Commission for five additional years in the end of 2017, the debate will 
continue. Additionally, we observe that private actors take action and de-
mand glyphosate-free products from suppliers.
24
 However, scientific infor-
mation on trade-offs between environmental, human health and economic 
implications of not using glyphosate are limited (cf. Finger, 2018). 
We contribute to a more informed debate by focusing on key agronomic 
and economic aspects of a glyphosate ban in a state-wide case study for a 
major crop based on a highly detailed bio-economic simulation model. More 
specifically, we test for the following potential consequences of a glypho-
sate ban: i) yield losses, ii) a higher tillage intensity and consequently 
changes in diesel consumption and thus energy efficiency, and iii) increased 
use of post-emergence herbicides with higher toxicity, and thus stronger 
adverse effects on the environment than glyphosate. Our paper fills a gap in 
literature as so far only limited scientific evidence on the consequences of a 
possible glyphosate ban is available (cf. Schulte and Theuvsen, 2015; Böck-
er et al., 2018).  
                                                 
24
 For example, some German and Austrian dairies decided that producers are not allowed 
to apply glyphosate anymore, and in Switzerland, the integrated production organisation IP-
Suisse, representing about one third of all Swiss farms, announced an internal ban of 
glyphosate on crops marketed under their label (e.g. Böcker and Finger, 2018). 
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As real world observations of weed control under a glyphosate ban are 
not available, we employ a normative modelling approach based on damage 
abatement functions (Karagiannis and Tzouvelekas, 2012). The methodolo-
gy presented in this article contributes to the literature by combining state-
contingent decisions on pesticide application depending on weed pressure 
with an expected utility framework using a highly detailed and spatial ex-
plicit representation of weeds, weed control strategies and their economic 
and environmental implications. More specifically, we quantify optimal 
alternative weed control strategies (including mechanical and chemical pre- 
and post-sowing strategies) under a glyphosate ban, considering production 
risk and farmers’ risk preferences. To this end, we extend the model and 
analysis by Böcker et al. (2018) in two important directions. First, we ac-
count for different sources of risk by incorporating uncertainty with respect 
to attainable yield levels and weed pressure. Attainable yield levels are un-
known in the time of pesticide application, so that the production system 
contains a high level of uncertainty. For example, in a dry year with low 
yield levels the benefit of a more intense weed control strategy is rather low 
because the yield reduction stems from water scarcity and not from weed 
competition for light or nutrients. By incorporating such risks and farmers’ 
risk preferences in our model we therefore account for a major determinant 
of pesticide use decisions (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993). Second, we 
assess the environmental implications of the chosen weed control strategies 
with different environmental indicators. Environmental consequences of a 
glyphosate ban are core arguments in the political debate, and should be 
considered. A pesticide risk indicator is used to evaluate adverse effects of 
pesticide application on human health and on the ecosystem. Here, we 
choose the very detailed Pesticide Load Indicator which has been developed 
and applied in Denmark (Kudsk et al., 2018). Furthermore, we quantify the 
process energy demand of weed control strategies and thus account for all 
physical material flows. This allows to also assess the environmental effects 
of potential increased machinery use in response to a glyphosate ban. In 
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summary, our approach allows to conduct a holistic assessment of potential 
effects of a glyphosate ban, integrating potential economic as well as the 
most important environmental effects. Revealing and quantifying possible 
trade-offs between different goal functions is crucial for a well-informed 
policy debate on glyphosate. The here developed model may further serve 
as an important building stone for assessments concerning future debates on 
pesticides. 
The model is applied to silage maize cultivation in the federal state of 
North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany (Fig. 5.1). Maize is one of the 
major crops in Germany, grown on 21% of the arable land and 15% of the 
agricultural area (2.5 million hectares [1 ha = 10,000 m
2
] in 2017; Statis-
tisches Bundesamt, 2017). In our case study region NRW, maize is even the 
dominant crop with a share of almost 30% of the arable land, mainly used 
for cattle feeding and for biogas production, either as silage maize or as 
grain maize or corn-cob-mix (Information und Technik Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 2016). Glyphosate is mainly applied before sowing in cultivation 
of maize (Fig. 5.2).
25
 Between 22% and 35% of the maize growing farmers 
have been found to apply glyphosate, either in combination with mechanical 
strategies, such as chisel ploughing, or with direct sowing of maize (Julius 
Kühn-Institut, 2017; Wiese et al., 2018). The remaining farmers use me-
chanical strategies without herbicide application before sowing, for example 
mouldboard ploughing or one or two passes of chisel ploughing and/or rota-
ry harrowing. Direct sowing in combination with a glyphosate application is 
especially relevant on light soils where reduced traction need leads to lower 
costs of sowing (direct sowing is usually more expensive than conventional 
                                                 
25
 Note that genetically modified crops (i.e. also herbicide tolerant crops) are not cultivated 
in Germany and glyphosate is thus used only as pre-sowing strategy. Due to the overall 
lower intensity of glyphosate use, for example compared to the USA, resistances of weeds 
against glyphosate (also called superweeds) are not reported on a large-scale. Yet, re-
sistances to other herbicides are relevant and considered in our modelling approach (see 
section 5.2.2). 
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sowing). It is also found on heavy soils where direct sowing can have a cost 
advantage because of high traction needs for mechanical tillage strategies.
26
 
After sowing, a large share of farmers applies selective herbicides. Mechan-
ical strategies such as hoeing are poorly established.  
Our paper is structured as follows: we first present the modelling ap-
proach based on an output damage function approach combined with ex-
pected utility maximisation. Moreover, we give some detail on the PLI and 
the energy process analysis and present the data used. Finally, we present 
and discuss results and conclude. 
 
Fig. 5.1. Location of the case study region NRW in Germany and borders of 
the geographical units (municipality borders). 
  
                                                 
26
 On heavy soils, mouldboard ploughing is frequently done in autumn. The purpose is less 
for weed control but rather for achieving a soil with a coarse surface broken up by the frost 
in winter. 
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Fig. 5.2. Overview of the methodology. The probability that a certain attainable 
yield occurs depends on a distribution of yield levels over 13 years per geograph-
ical unit. The time of weed emergence compared to maize (Ψ) is estimated for each 
regional unit m and each year t. 
5.2 Methodology 
The spatially explicit optimisation approach applied in this article draws on 
Böcker et al. (2018)
27 
where model construction and application are based 
on two major steps. First, the maize yield is estimated as a function of weed 
pressure and weed control. Gross margins for each weed control strategy are 
calculated accounting for output prices and costs, which are also dependent 
                                                 
27
 A detailed model documentation along with the GAMS code related to the model of 
Böcker et al. (2018) is provided online in Böcker et al. (2017). 
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on weed pressure. Second, the optimal pre- and post-sowing weed control 
strategies are selected. However, the approach of Böcker et al. (2018) is 
deterministic: it is assumed that farmers know for certain both the weed 
pressure and the realised yield. We expand the approach by accounting for 
the uncertainty associated with attainable yield distributions and weed pres-
sure, which allows introducing a detailed stochastic production function and 
accounting for risk preferences of farmers. We differentiate weed pressure 
and weed control across space to analyse environmental, ecological and 
economic effects. This output damage control approach is applied to each of 
the 377 silage maize-producing regional units of NRW, m = 1, …, M (Fig. 
5.1 and Fig. 5.2). 
5.2.1 Modelling Structure 
The objective function of the model is to maximise farmers’ private ex-
pected utility based on the distribution of gross margins (gm) from silage 
maize production. Accounting for different pre- (index g) and post-sowing 
(index h) weed control strategies, the distribution of the gross margin for a 
ha of maize 𝑔?̃? is defined as:  
gm̃ = [ỹ · P − c(g) − cs(g) − c(h) −cc(ỹ) − co], (5.1) 
where ?̃? is the distribution of the yield, P is the silage maize price, c(g) and 
c(h) the pre- and post-sowing weed control (and tillage) costs. cs(g) are costs 
for sowing (that depend also on the pre-sowing weed control strategy
28
), 
cc(y) are yield-dependent costs for fertiliser, harvest, transport and ensiling, 
and co are other cost. The expected yield E(y) depends on an output damage 
control approach where weed control strategies decrease damage compared 
to a yield distribution without weed pressure (Hall and Norgaard, 1973; 
                                                 
28
 For example, higher costs for sowing arise in strategies without seedbed preparation (so 
called no-till or direct sowing strategies). Lower costs arise if the soil is crumbled and lev-
elled and death plant material is mixed with it.  
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Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1986). The production function focussed on the 
yield effects of weed control is defined as follows: 
?̃?𝑚,𝑡,χ,𝑔,ℎ = (1 − 𝑒
−(𝛼0+𝛼1·𝑣𝑚,𝑗)
2
)  ·  ?̃?𝑚,χ
𝑎  ·  
[
 
 
 
 
1 − 𝐼 ·
𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1·𝑧𝑚,𝑗)
2
100 · (𝑒𝐶·?̃?𝑚,𝑡 + 𝐼 ·
𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1·𝑧𝑚,𝑗)
2
𝐴 )]
 
 
 
 
  
  
                          
(5.2) 
The production function consists of three parts. The first part accounts 
for the pre-sowing weed control activities. Secondly, ?̃?𝑚,χ
𝑎  is the attainable 
yield distribution for a regional unit m in year χ. The third part accounts for 
the post-sowing weed control. In the latter, 𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1·𝑧𝑚,𝑗)
2
 is the yield loss 
based on different control strategies (denoted further as D), I is the percent 
yield loss as D approaches 0, A is the percent yield loss as D approaches 
infinity, ?̃? is the distribution of the time of maize emergence in relation to 
weed emergence (in growing degree days; this measure can be seen as an 
expression for the overall weed pressure in a certain year t) and C is the rate 
at which the yield loss I decreases as Ψ becomes larger.  
Farmers face several uncertainties when deciding upon an optimal weed 
control strategy (e.g. Auld et al., 1987): i) the level of weed infestation, ii) 
the effectiveness of the weed control strategy, iii) prices, yield improvement 
and quality effects, and iv) reinvasion, spill-overs on own crop and time-
interval effects from delays of receiving benefits. We here focus on i) the 
level of weed infestation because differing yearly growing conditions, main-
ly climatic ones, lead to varying weed pressure. In contrast, other aspects are 
either not important for maize production in our case study (e.g. quality ef-
fects) or assumed to be less relevant because of the high level of information 
provided to farmers (e.g. effectiveness of weed control strategies; see also 
section 5.2.2.). Moreover, v) there is uncertainty regarding the attainable 
yield level, which is of high importance for our application on silage maize. 
Post-sowing Pre-sowing Attainable yield 
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Weed control usually occurs relatively early in the growing season of maize 
and accordingly, the same weed control can lead to different yield out-
comes. To reflect this uncertainty, the attainable yield 𝑦𝑚,χ
𝑎  is introduced as 
a random variable in our model (see Fig. 5.2). We do not account for price 
risks because silage maize output prices are not characterised by high vola-
tility because the biogas boom in Germany has stimulated the widespread 
use of long-time supply contracts (Reise et al., 2012; Britz and Delzeit, 
2013). 
Thus, we introduce risk in our model by accounting for the stochasticity 
of weed pressure and attainable yield. The attainable yield in each year χ is 
assumed to be stochastic, e.g. due to stochastic weather conditions that are 
independent of weed pressure and weed control (e.g. Tembo et al., 2008). 
This yield variability is captured by an empirical yield distribution quanti-
fied for each regional unit m. Concerning weed pressure, farmers face un-
certainty with respect to the time of weed emergence Ψ relative to maize, 
which is a key indicator of weed induced potential yield losses. Herbicide 
strategies are chosen and applied early in the growing season of maize based 
on the observed weed pressure. If maize has a growth advantage over weeds 
in a certain year, cheaper or no herbicide strategies might be favoured. In 
contrast, strategies with higher efficacy that are often also more complex 
and expensive might be more promising if weeds have larger growth ad-
vantages over maize. An overview of the methodology is also given in Fig. 
5.2.  
The further parameters in the production function are vm,j and zm,j, the 
pre- and post-sowing weed control effects, i.e.: 
vm,j = ∑wm,i · ai · gj,i 
I
i
 
zm,j = ∑wm,i · ai · hj,i 
I
i
 
(5.3) 
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where wm,i is the probability that a weed i occurs in regional unit m. ai is the 
average abundance if a weed is not controlled and acts as a measure for its 
yield reducing effect, while g = 1, …, G and h = 1, …, H are the efficacies 
of the different weed control strategies j against each weed i [0,1]. 
The shares of the pre- and post-sowing weed control strategies, i.e. Sg,m,t 
and Sh,m,t (Eq. (5.4), are the decisions variables. Additionally, a vector 
φg,glyphosate contains either 0 or 1 reflecting scenarios whether glyphosate is 
licensed or not: 
gmm,t,χ = ∑ ∑ gmm,t,χ,g,h
H
h=1
G
g=1
· Sg,m,t · φg,glyphosate · Sh,m,t  ,
Sg,m,t, Sh,m,t, φg,glyphosate ∈ ℝ = [0,1] 
(5.4) 
5.2.2 Goal Function 
We use an expected utility (EU) framework to represent production risks, 
farmers’ risk preferences and risk dependent behaviour in our programming 
model (see e.g. Hardaker et al., 1991; Lehmann et al., 2013), based on a 
power utility function: 
U(gm̃m,t,χ) =
1
1 − ra
· gm̃m,t,χ
1−ra   , (5.5) 
where ra represents the partial risk aversion coefficient (Hardaker et al., 
2015: 91). A utility function is suited to weigh the variability in yield in a 
farmer’s objective function according to his or her risk preferences. The 
chosen functional form allows flexible representation of risk preferences 
and exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion so that downside risk aver-
sion as a salient pattern of farmers’ behaviour can be represented consistent-
Chapter 5  143 
ly (Chavas and Holt, 1996).
29
 This reflects that risk averse farmers aim to 
avoid low profit events.  
We calculate for a strategy and the observed weed pressure Ψ in each 
year t the distribution of the gross margins, deriving the distribution of the 
realised yield by correcting the empirical distribution of the attainable yield 
based on the controlled damage. The distribution of the attainable yield is 
based on water-limited yields simulated with a crop growth model over 13 
years at a 1x1 km raster. The distribution of the gross margin for each strat-
egy is next used to derive expected utility levels and finally, weed control 
strategies are chosen to maximise EU for each regional unit m: 
maxEU(gm̃m) = ∑EU(gm̃m,t)
T
t=1
 (5.6) 
Considering simultaneously the years t for which observations on weed 
pressure are available allows to reflect that farmers aim to avoid resistances 
of weeds against herbicides. Specifically, it is assumed that farmers need to 
change the used active substances. More precisely, the strategies were clas-
sified into groups according to the Herbicide Resistance Action Committee 
and a constraint was added to prevent that strategies from the same group 
are used in two consecutive years. Furthermore, strategies containing the 
active substance nicosulfuron are only allowed to be applied every second 
year. 
To address the research questions, we compare a baseline scenario, in 
which glyphosate is licensed, to a counterfactual scenario, in which glypho-
sate is banned. We report in the main body of the paper results for slightly 
risk averse behaviour with ra = 0.5, reflecting recent empirical evidence for 
                                                 
29
 The constant relative risk aversion property of the power utility function enables the here 
used normalisation of gross margins. Normalisation of expected gross margins in a regional 
unit m in year t (πm,t,χ) with the maximum income over the range of years (max πm) is supe-
rior to the use of absolute values that differ largely across regions.  
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German farmers (Maart-Noelck and Mußhoff, 2014; Meraner and Finger, 
2017). We conduct additional sensitivity analyses with respect to the partial 
risk aversion coefficient, considering values of -2.0, 0.0, and 0.8 which re-
flect risk loving, risk neutral and more risk averse preferences (results pre-
sented in the appendix). This is relevant as farmers are found to be on aver-
age slightly risk averse, but at the same time a large heterogeneity in the 
population exists (ibid.). Furthermore, we assume expected output prices for 
silage maize of € 4.00, 4.60 and 5.20/dt (dt denotes deciton, i.e. 100 kg), 
reflecting the range of currently observed silage maize prices. It is assumed 
that harvesting and ensiling are done by the selling farmer. In addition to the 
four levels of risk aversion, we also include sensitivity analysis with regard 
to the expected attainable yield by considering a 10% higher attainable yield 
level because yield expectations may increase in the future due to new va-
rieties and/or better fertilisation (the results of this analysis can be found in 
the appendix). In total, we consider therefore 4 (risk aversion) x 3 (maize 
price) x 2 (attainable yield) = 24 different scenarios. For each scenario, we 
check for significant differences in gross margins and environmental im-
pacts, using the municipalities as the observation sample as discussed be-
low. 
5.2.3 Pesticide Load Analysis 
In order to assess potential adverse effects of herbicide use on the environ-
ment and human health, we employ the product specific Pesticide Load In-
dicator which complies with European pesticide regulations. Developed for 
the Danish Ministry of Environment, it serves as the basis for the Danish 
pesticide policy goals and pesticide taxation. Pesticide load values are com-
puted individually for each active substance (AS) and are then aggregated to 
marketed products which can combine different AS. The PLI considers sub-
indicators for Human Health Λheal, Environmental Fate and Behaviour Λfate 
and Environmental Toxicity Λtoxy which in sum define the total load Λtotal: 
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Λtotal = Λheal + Λfate + Λtoxy (5.7) 
Values for each sub-indicator are computed from a broad range of po-
tential effects on the environment and human health. More specifically, Λtoxy 
assesses short-term effects on eight different families of animals and plants 
(birds, mammals, fish, earthworms, bees, daphnia, aquatic plants and algae). 
Additional long-term effects are taken into account for fish, earthworms and 
daphnia. Λfate considers biodegradability, bioaccumulation and mobility in 
soil. Λheal is calculated based on Hazard- and Risk Statements with regard to 
human health of the specific substances as well as product formulation. For 
a specific pesticide product, the load per kilogram or litre is calculated based 
on the load of each single AS and its concentration in the product. For de-
tails, see Kudsk et al. (2018). PLI values for the used products are presented 
in detail in the data section. 
5.2.4 Energy Process Analysis 
In order to assess the energy use related to a specific weed control strategy, 
we use the methodology and definitions of Jones (1989) and of Hülsbergen 
et al. (2001) (for a recent application see Jankowski et al., 2015). The aim 
of that approach is to “trace all the energy inputs into an agricultural system, 
based on physical material flows” (Hülsbergen et al. (2001: 306f.), exclud-
ing energy flows from human labour and solar energy (Uhlin, 1999). Direct 
energy input (Ed) refers in our case study to the consumption of diesel 
whereas indirect energy inputs Ei quantifies the energy needed to produce 
the different inputs: seed, mineral fertilisers (we treat manure as waste from 
livestock production, i.e. assigning zero energy content), pesticides and ma-
chinery. The overall energy input E is equal to Ed + Ei. The energy output 
EO is equal to the energy content of the harvested maize minus the inherent 
energy in seed (which is lower than the energy needed to produce the seed). 
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The net energy output NEO is equal to EO – E. All energy values are given 
in calorific values [MJ/ha].
30
 
5.2.5 Hypothesis Testing 
With respect to the applied herbicides in case of a glyphosate ban, we test 
for differences in i) weed control costs, ii) yields and iii) the expected gross 
margin. Furthermore, potential pesticide load decreases are tested according 
to iv) toxicity, v) environmental fate, vi) human health, and vii) overall pes-
ticide load (sum of all load indicators, see data section). In the energy pro-
cess analysis, we test the hypotheses that viii) the energy output EO de-
creases (i.e. the yield decreases), ix) the net energy output NEO decreases, 
x) more direct energy is used (Ed increases), xi) more indirect energy is used 
(Ei increases), xii) more energy is used in general (E increases), and finally 
xiii) the energy efficiency decreases (EO/E). Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests 
are used to test our hypotheses on differences between regional unit averag-
es of results over all years t.  
5.3 Data 
The first part of the data section gives an overview of the most important 
data sources of the above presented bio-economic model. The focus lies on 
weed control strategies, weed spread and yield data. The subsequent two 
sections present the data underlying the application of the PLI and the ener-
gy balance.  
  
                                                 
30
 We opted against the focus on CO2-equivalents due to the large uncertainties in assessing 
CO2-equivalent emissions from energy production. Especially for commodity production 
and related demand of electricity, it depends largely on where factories are located since 
most countries have a mix of electricity resources and different environmental standards. 
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5.3.1 Weed Data, Weed Control Strategies and Yield Data 
The model consists of m = 1, …, 377 regional units, which represent the 
maize-producing municipalities of NRW (Fig. 5.1). The complete data 
sources on weed spread, weed abundance, yield losses and herbicide effica-
cy are documented in Böcker et al. (2018). We account spatially explicitly 
for i = 1, …, 32 (grass-)weeds in the model that influence the yield depend-
ing on the specific weed. Each regional unit has a certain probability that a 
specific weed occurs. This data is taken from the FloraWeb database, an 
open GIS-based platform (NetPhyD and BfN, 2013). In our model, we ac-
count for the heterogeneity of weed pressure across space and time. Howev-
er, we do not account for inter-annual or -regional dynamics of weed abun-
dance because geographical position and soil conditions have been found as 
more important for the composition of weed species than management fac-
tors (Hanzlik and Gerowitt, 2011; Lundkvist et al., 2008). In NRW, small to 
medium size fields are present. Weed seed import is therefore likely, for 
instance, by wind, unsprayed field edges or machinery, which further moti-
vates to refrain from modelling explicitly weed dynamics which would re-
quire besides maize the consideration of all crops in which any of the 32 
considered weeds could occur.  
For pre-sowing weed control, g = 1, …, 19 strategies are considered and 
for post-sowing h = 1, …, 55 (see online Appendix 5.B). This selection in-
cludes both the currently dominating strategies and strategies that are cur-
rently not yet economically viable but might become relevant under a 
glyphosate ban. Pre-sowing strategies consist of different combinations of 
glyphosate application, mouldboard ploughing and non-inverting strategies 
such as chisel ploughing/rotary harrowing. Post-sowing strategies consist of 
selective herbicide application (once or twice) and/or mechanical strategies 
such as harrowing or hoeing. The costs for herbicide application and for 
machinery are treated as deterministic in the model because farmers know 
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input prices in the moment the weed control decisions are made (see Table 
A5.2, Appendix 5.C for details).  
Whereas Böcker et al. (2018) conducted a sensitivity analysis on weed 
pressure, we now incorporate a distribution of weed pressure in the model, 
focusing on the distribution of the value describing the difference between 
the emergence of maize and weeds in a specific year and regional unit, i.e. 
we consider if and to what degree weeds have a growth advantage over 
maize. Ψ can be positive or negative, depending on the time of maize and 
weed emergence (see also Fig. 5.2). Here, we consider the period t = 2006 
to 2015 with yearly, changing values of Ψ depending on the regional unit m. 
In order to determine this distribution, we make use of the growing degree-
day (GDD) concept (McMaster and Wilhelm, 1997) and use spatially and 
temporally specific information on weather (temperature) and phenology 
(starting dates of sowing and emergence) data of silage maize
31
 for our 
study region. The weather data is provided by the German Weather Service 
(Deutscher Wetterdienst) from six weather stations in NRW and we as-
signed each regional unit to the closest weather station.
32
 The detailed as-
sessment of the Ψ-values can be found in Appendix 5.A. 
                                                 
31
 Unfortunately, no daily phenological data is available for the different types of weeds. 
Thus, we suppose emergence at the first of a certain month of a weed’s growing period. If a 
farmer applies successful pre-sowing weed control, the natural emergence patterns of 
weeds are disrupted. More specifically, we assume that the last weed control measure is 
done three days before the sowing date, so that the summation of GDD for weeds begins 
three days before sowing. Of course, if no weed control is done before sowing, also no 
interruption of weed growth takes place. After weeds are suppressed by pre-sowing 
measures, they re-emerge after a while. Hence, the summation of GDD starts at that date of 
re-emergence. Combining GDD models with phenology data were found to be a practical 
way for describing growing conditions (e.g. Dalhaus et al., 2018). 
32
 If no maize is grown at the weather station directly, as in the case of Düsseldorf, or if 
phenological data is not available for the municipality of the weather station, information 
on the phenology from surrounding municipalities was taken. 
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With regard to the expected attainable yield level, we make use of raster 
data (1 x 1 km) on water-limited potential yields of silage maize from 
χ = 1999, …, 2011 that were gratefully provided by Ganga Ram Maharjan 
and Thomas Gaiser from the Crop Science Group of University of Bonn. 
The raster data was created by a crop model that is presented and document-
ed in Hoffmann et al. (2015) and Zhao et al. (2015). This raster data was 
aggregated to municipality levels.
 33
 Water-limited yields are chosen as irri-
gation is basically irrelevant in silage maize production in the region. 
The parameters C and I in Eq. (5.2) are taken from Bosnic and Swanton 
(1997). A is defined as 63.8% which was found to be the maximum potential 
yield loss in field trials (Böcker et al., 2018). The key parameters of the 
production function in (5.2), α0, α1, β0 and β1, are estimated by determining 
those parameter values that minimise the error term between the observed 
yields and the yields simulated with the control strategies used in current 
silage maize production (more details can be found in Böcker et al., 2018: 
184ff., 2017). Expert knowledge from the Chamber of Agriculture of NRW 
was used in order to get information about the currently used practices of 
maize cultivation (ibid.). In addition, recent Ψ-values were included for the 
time period 2013 to 2015. The finally estimated parameter values are 
α0 = 1.266, α1 = 0.683, β0 = 0.747 and β1 = 0.543. 
5.3.2 Pesticide Load 
Information about ASs to calculate the PLI is taken from the Pesticide Prop-
erties DataBase (Lewis et al., 2016) which draws on publicly available 
sources, such as pesticide admission and regulation procedures. In addition, 
we obtain complementary information about ASs per product as well as 
their specific concentration from product specification sheets of the herbi-
cide manufacturers and from herbicide recommendations, such as from the 
                                                 
33
 Böcker et al. (2018) instead used average realised yields at the level of 53 regional units, 
which were used for the municipalities found in one of these units. 
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Chamber of Agriculture NRW (Landwirtschaftskammer Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 2015) and the Bavarian State Research Centre for Agriculture 
(Bayerische Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft, 2016). The overall load and 
the load in the three sub-categories can be found in Table 5.1 for all herbi-
cide products included in our analysis. Note that the selection and weights 
of the indicators and the indices underlying the calculation of the load val-
ues in the PLI reflect the focus on environmental problems and preferences 
in Denmark (see Appendix 5.D for further details). The PLI covers a broad 
range of environmental and health effects, it is aligned with European pesti-
cide regulations, is already implemented and has been scientifically tested as 
a pesticide risk indicator in Denmark for several years (Kudsk et al., 2018). 
Thus, its application to the German study region seems reasonable, especial-
ly as no comparable indicator is available for Germany. 
  
Chapter 5  151 
Table 5.1. Values of the Pesticide Load Indicator
a
 for the herbicide products 
included in the model  
Herbicide name Λtoxy Λfate Λheal Λtotal 
Activus 0.109 1.207 0.100 1.416 
Arigo 0.215 0.255 0.000 0.471 
Arrat 0.064 0.585 0.267 0.916 
Aspect 0.199 0.267 0.500 0.966 
B 235 0.225 0.003 1.200 1.427 
Buctril 0.217 0.002 1.200 1.419 
Calaris 0.105 0.220 0.000 0.325 
Callisto 0.035 0.041 0.000 0.076 
Dash 0.073 0.058 0.675 0.807 
Dual Gold 0.116 0.198 0.100 0.414 
Elumis 0.048 0.053 0.000 0.101 
Gardo Gold 0.086 0.179 0.100 0.366 
Laudis 0.014 0.013 0.000 0.027 
Lido SC 0.084 0.169 0.150 0.403 
MaisTer 0.068 0.014 0.000 0.081 
Motivell forte 0.040 0.039 0.000 0.079 
Peak 0.707 6.067 0.033 6.808 
Roundup PowerFlex 0.024 0.052 0.350 0.426
b
 
Spectrum 0.162 0.183 0.000 0.346 
Stomp Aqua 0.115 1.269 0.067 1.451 
Successor T 0.109 0.129 0.100 0.339 
Sulcogan 0.023 0.260 0.800 1.083 
Tacco 0.049 0.012 0.000 0.061 
a
 The unit is Load per standard treatment. The load values need to be weighted with the 
application rate and the standard area dose in order to get per hectare values. 
b
 The PLI is based on currently available assessments of the environmental and human 
health effects of pesticides. Thus, glyphosate has modest environmental and health effects 
among the here listed herbicides (see e.g. Gardner and Nelson, 2008). 
5.3.3 Energy Balance 
Process analysis based on energy balances is a widespread method in agri-
cultural sciences (e.g. Deike et al., 2008; Jayasundara et al., 2014), typically 
drawing on literature providing general information on energy use in agri-
cultural and industrial processes (e.g. Audsley et al., 2009; Green, 1987; 
Hülsbergen et al., 2001). For indirect energy consumption of producing and 
maintaining machinery, Aguilera et al. (2017: 341) report for the year 2010 
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values of Etr = 156 MJ/kg of machinery for tractors, Ehr = 102 MJ/kg for 
harvesters, Etm = 72 MJ/kg for tillage machinery, and Eom = 62 MJ/kg for 
other machinery. The gross calorific values of the different production in-
puts and steps are presented in Table A5.3 (direct energy Ed) and  A5.4, 
Appendix 5.C (material use for indirect energy Ei). 
With respect to the energy requirements of herbicide production, we re-
ly on Audsley et al. (2009) who, based on data of Green (1987), find that 
the energy requirements for pesticide production is related to the year of 
discovery. They fitted the following regression line between the energy re-
quirement of a certain AS (EAS, measured in [MJ/kg]) and the year of dis-
covery as an herbicide (ADAs), i.e. early developed herbicides require less 
energy in production: 
EAS = −399 + 10.8(AD𝐴𝑆 − 1900). (5.8) 
Following Jayasundara et al. (2014: 83; citing Nagy, 1999), we add 6% 
to the estimated production requirements to account for formulation, pack-
aging and delivery requirements. The assumed energy requirements used in 
our analysis are presented in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2. Herbicide active substances
a
 in the model and energy require-
ments for production  
Active substance Year of dis-
covery (Tom-
lin, 2006; 
MacBean, 
2012) 
Estimated 
production 
energy in 
relation to 
Eq. (5.8) 
[MJ/kg] 
Production energy 
plus 23 [MJ/kg] for 
formulation, pack-
aging and delivery 
(Hülsbergen et al., 
2001) [MJ/kg] 
Bromoxynil  1963 281 304 
Dicamba 1961 260 283 
Dimethenamid-P 2000 681 704 
Flufenacet 1995 627 650 
Foramsulfuron 1995 627 650 
Glyphosate 1971 368 391 
Iodosulfuron-methyl-sodium 1999 670 693 
Mesotrione 1998 659 682 
Metosulam 1993 605 628 
Nicosulfuron 1990 573 596 
Pendimethalin 1974 400 423 
Pethoxamid 2001 692 715 
Prosulfuron 1993 605 628 
Pyridate 1976 422 445 
Rimsulfuron 1989 562
 
585 
S-Metolachlor 1996 638 661 
Sulcotrione 1991 584 607 
Tembotrione (Edenfield and 
Allen, 2005) 
2005 735 758 
Terbuthylazine 1966 314 337 
Thiencarbazone (Philbrook and 
Santel, 2007) 
2007 757 780 
Topramezone 2006 746 769 
Tritosulfuron (Schönhammer et 
al., 2002) 
2002 703 726 
a
 Please notice the difference between ‘herbicide product’ (Table 5.1) and ‘herbicide active 
substance’. Herbicide products consist of one or several herbicide active substances plus 
solvents and adjuvants. 
The energy requirements are estimates based on a regression function of Audsley et al. 
(2009) who use values of Green (1987). Thus, these values are only approximations. 
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5.4 Results 
Results are presented as averages over the range of simulation years T and 
over the regional units/municipalities M. In the main text, we consider the 
scenario with moderate risk aversion (ra = 0.5) and the three output price 
levels of € 4.00, 4.60 and 5.20/dt. The sensitivity analyses with respect to 
different levels of the the partial risk aversion coefficient and a potential 
increase of the attainable yield level by 10% are presented in Appendix 5.E. 
This section first illustrates descriptive results on the weed control strategies 
used. Following, we present the main results on the trade-offs between eco-
nomic (yield, gross margin) and environmental consequences (herbicide 
load and energy process analysis) of a glyphosate ban. 
5.4.1 Descriptive Results 
Three characteristics mainly influence the choice of pre- and post-sowing 
weed control strategies in our model: i) the distribution of the gross margin 
(determined by the output price and depending on the distribution of the 
attainable yield), ii) the weed occurrence and pressure in a certain region 
and year, and iii) the soil type influencing the weed control costs. These 
mechanisms will be described in detail below.  
In the base scenario without policy intervention, we find that applying 
glyphosate is the utility maximising strategy in about 28.5% to 38% of the 
regional units, depending on the output price (Fig. A5.2, Appendix 5.E). 
This number is in line with surveys on how many farmers apply glyphosate 
in Germany (see introduction). A higher price of silage maize, ceteris pari-
bus, increases glyphosate application. The major alternative to pre-sowing 
weed control using glyphosate is mechanical weed control based on two 
passes of chisel ploughing (or similar machines). Other strategies, such as 
one pass of chisel ploughing, chisel ploughing in combination with harrow-
ing or conventional tillage with ploughing are less frequent; mouldboard 
ploughing is not found to be optimal in any scenario. The level of risk aver-
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sion only has a minor and insignificant impact on the choice of the pre-
sowing and post-sowing weed control strategies.
34
 This does not mean that 
the incorporation of risk effects in our model is obsolete, as the considera-
tion of stochastic weed pressure and attainable yield levels have effects on 
the optimal decision making of farmers compared to a deterministic ap-
proach. 
The average number of applied AS/ha per year excluding glyphosate is 
presented in Table 5.3 and in Fig. A5.4 and Fig. A5.5 in Appendix 5.E. At 
the low output price level of € 4.00/dt 2.6 AS/ha and year are applied. At the 
higher output price level of € 5.20/dt, the number increases to 3.0 to 3.1 
AS/ha and year on average. At the low price level, nicosulfuron, profulfuron 
and pyridate have a relatively high share of the applied AS. Terbuthylazine, 
S-metolachlor, flufenacet, iodosulfuron, foramsulfuron and thiencarbazone 
gain in importance at higher expected revenues. The model results show that 
the most frequently applied AS is terbuthylazine, which is in line with ob-
servations on farm practices in the case study region (Julius Kühn-Institut, 
2017). The use of different ASs is relatively constant over the four different 
risk aversion levels, with slightly but not significantly lower shares of ASs if 
a risk affine decision maker is assumed (ra = -2.0). In case of a glyphosate 
ban, the composition of the ASs does not change significantly (Table 5.3). 
  
                                                 
34
 See Fig. 5.3, Fig. A5.2 to Fig. A5.5, Appendix E, for more details.  
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Table 5.3. Average applied active substances over m and t [AS/ha and year] 
post-sowing for both the glyphosate licensed and glyphosate banned scenar-
io (ra = 0.5) 
ra = 0.5 Glyphosate licensed scenarios Glyphosate ban scenarios 
Active Sub-
stance: 
€ 4.00/dt € 4.60/dt € 5.20/dt € 4.00/dt € 4.60/dt € 5.20/dt 
Flufenacet   0.123 0.176 0.211 0.122 0.174 0.211 
Foramsulfuron 0.127 0.178 0.212 0.126 0.176 0.211 
Iodosulfuron 0.127 0.178 0.212 0.126 0.176 0.211 
Mesotrione   0.411 0.452 0.474 0.410 0.452 0.473 
Nicosulfuron 0.371 0.322 0.288 0.372 0.323 0.288 
Pethoxamid   0.030 0.062 0.080 0.031 0.062 0.080 
Prosulfuron  0.371 0.322 0.288 0.372 0.323 0.288 
Pyridate 0.245 0.222 0.206 0.244 0.222 0.207 
S-Metolachlor 0.136 0.169 0.187 0.136 0.168 0.187 
Terbuthylazine 0.534 0.628 0.685 0.533 0.626 0.684 
Thiencarbazone 0.127 0.178 0.212 0.126 0.176 0.211 
Others
*
 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
Sum 2.607 2.887 3.054 2.602 2.880 3.052 
*
 Other active substances that are applied in the model are dicamba, tembotrione and trito-
sulfuron. 
5.4.2 Economic Consequences 
We find that expected revenues (i.e. expected output price levels and the 
expected attainable yield level) are the main drivers of weed control expend-
itures and the applied AS (Fig. 5.3, Table 5.3, Fig. A5.2–Fig. A5.5, Appen-
dix 5.E). More specifically, the average costs of the optimal weed control 
strategies increase with higher expected revenues. For example, at lower 
levels of expected revenues, cheap mechanical weed control which has a 
low damage control is more frequently used compared to glyphosate even in 
the baseline scenario without a ban. This is due to lower sowing costs after 
two passes of chisel ploughing compared to glyphosate application and di-
rect sowing. If glyphosate would be banned, costs for herbicides and herbi-
cide’s application decrease significantly at all three output price levels, but 
we observe a significant but relatively small increase in total weed control 
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costs regardless of the output price. Note that this mainly results from higher 
costs for mechanical weed control (significant at the 0.01-level), which is 
the main substitute for glyphosate. The enforced change in weed control 
also affects the yield level, it would therefore be possible that both revenues 
and costs increase, but clearly not their difference because such a choice 
would be an optimum in the reference scenario. In most geographical units, 
we find a reduction of the yield and consequently of the turnover. This yield 
reduction is described in the energy output EO in section 5.4.4 in detail. The 
average expected gross margin varies between € 555/ha € 981/ha depending 
on the output price (without direct payments). On average, this is reduced 
by € 2 – 3/ha, but in single regional units also higher losses occur of about 
€ 10/ha. The reduction is not only small, but also not statistically significant 
(Fig. 5.4). 
 
Fig. 5.3. Average costs for pre- and post-sowing weed control (ra = 0.5; all 
regional units). 
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Fig. 5.4. Frequency distributions of the reduction of the gross margin per ha 
if glyphosate is banned (ra = 0.5). 
5.4.3 Pesticide Load Analysis 
The frequency distribution of the average pesticide load indicator values for 
the optimal strategies in the different geographical units is illustrated in Fig. 
5.5 under moderate risk aversion (ra = 0.5) and the glyphosate licensed-
scenario. Pesticide load values differ strongly between the regional units and 
range from about 0.5 to 3.8 Load/ha. Differences are especially large for the 
environmental fate load, which is due to high Load values of herbicides con-
taining prosulfuron (e.g. contained in the product “Peak”). Load values in-
crease in output prices and expected attainable yield levels. The levels are 
higher than the average herbicide load for a hectare of maize in Denmark 
(where the PLI is used in policy analysis and documented), which could be 
due to higher taxation of products with high load values (Böcker and Finger, 
2016).
35
 
The analysis of the four different hypotheses regarding the pesticide 
load is presented in Table 5.4 for ra = 0.5 and Table A5.5, Appendix 5.E, for 
                                                 
35
 For example, the PLI was 0.31 in 2014 (Ørum and Hossy, 2015: 57) and 0.38 in 2015 
(Ørum and Sommer Holtze, 2017: 54) (values excluding glyphosate application).  
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all risk aversion coefficients. We find significant load reductions under a 
glyphosate ban in all scenarios because chemical weed control is substituted 
by mechanical control. This holds for the total load indicator, as well as all 
sub-indicators (i.e. environmental toxicity, fate and human health). The de-
crease is strongest with respect to the human health load. The sub-indicators 
for environmental fate and toxicity show lower reductions, reflecting the 
low environmental load of glyphosate-based products (Table 5.3).  
 
Fig. 5.5. Frequency distribution of pesticide loads w.r.t. total (Λtotal), envi-
ronmental toxicity (Λtoxy) and fate (Λfate) as well as human health (Λheal) 
(over all herbicides) as average over the period 2006-2015 (ra = 0.5; glypho-
sate licensed scenario). 
The spatial distribution of the total potential load reductions in case of a 
glyphosate ban is presented in Fig. 5.6 (see Fig. A5.6, Appendix 5.E, for the 
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energy consumption plotted against the pesticide load). The load reduction 
is highest in two types of regions, in which glyphosate is more likely to be 
used. These are firstly regions with heavy soils (i.e. high shares of clay) 
where mechanical alternatives to glyphosate require higher traction power 
and thus are more expensive. Here, glyphosate application is under current 
conditions often the optimal weed control strategy. Secondly, high load re-
ductions are found in regions dominated by high shares of sandy soils where 
direct tillage or strip-till practices in combination with glyphosate applica-
tion is relatively cheap. In contrast, on medium soils (i.e. with balanced 
mixtures of clay, silt and sand), glyphosate is applied less frequently in our 
model. Changes in the expected output price level have small and insignifi-
cant impacts on the pesticide load reduction per hectare. However, since we 
find a glyphosate application optimal in more regional units at higher maize 
price levels, higher prices would also imply more widespread load reduc-
tions under a ban. 
Table 5.4. Average absolute change Δ in Load/ha by a glyphosate ban in 
silage maize production (standard deviation in brackets, relative changes in 
italics)
a,b
  
Load: ΔΛtoxy ΔΛfate ΔΛheal ΔΛtotal 
P [€/dt]: 
4.00 
-0.011 (0.006) 
*** 
-3.9% 
-0.019 (0.061) 
*** 
-1.4% 
-0.170 (0.023) 
*** 
-62.5% 
-0.200 (0.069) 
*** 
-9.3% 
4.60 
-0.011 (0.008) 
*** 
-4.1% 
-0.011 (0.091) 
*** 
-1.3% 
-0.175 (0.015) 
*** 
-58.5% 
-0.196 (0.092) 
*** 
-11.1% 
5.20 
-0.012 (0.004) 
*** 
-4.6% 
-0.025 (0.043) 
*** 
-3.3% 
-0.174 (0.011) 
*** 
-56.0% 
-0.211 (0.045) 
*** 
-12.9% 
a
 Difference of Load/ha for the glyphosate licensed scenarios minus the glyphosate banned 
scenarios. Only municipalities are included in which glyphosate is used in the model under 
the licensed scenario (ra = 0.5). 
b 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level respectively based on 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-tests. 
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Fig. 5.6. Potential reductions of the total pesticide load for the analysed mu-
nicipalities under a ban of glyphosate (ra = 0.5). 
5.4.4 Energy Process Analysis 
The frequency distribution and the mean values of the energy output and 
input are presented in Fig. 5.7 for the risk aversion coefficient of 0.5 in the 
glyphosate licensed-scenario. The expected energy output EO across the 
regional units ranges from 141 GJ/ha to 278 GJ/ha, the energy input ranges 
from 2.7 to 12.2 GJ/ha. We find higher output prices to increase energy out-
puts because of increased weed control and consequently higher energy in-
puts, but also due to the fact that higher maize prices incentivise the use of 
other yield increasing inputs such as fertiliser. Reflecting slightly decreasing 
marginal returns, the energy efficiency is highest in the low price-scenario 
with a ratio of 26.2 compared to 25.3 in the high price-scenario (Fig. 5.7). 
Similar trends can be observed under other risk aversion coefficients and 
higher expected attainable yield (not shown). 
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Fig. 5.7. Distribution of energy output, energy input and energy efficiency 
as average over the period 2006-2015 (ra = 0.5, glyphosate licensed-
scenario). Dashed lines show mean values. 
Table 5.5 presents results differences for the energy indicators between 
the glyphosate licensed and the glyphosate banned-scenarios for the three 
output price levels. Regarding the energy output EO, we observe in most 
scenarios only a small reduction by about 0.65 – 85 GJ due to lower yields 
(around -1 dt/ha). However, this difference in EO is overall not significant. 
Similar results are found for net energy output NEO. Direct energy use Ed 
increases significantly by about 300 MJ/ha due to a glyphosate ban. Indirect 
energy consumption Ei tends to decrease, but differences are not significant. 
The change in the total energy use (ΔE) is positive, ranging from +91 to 
+167 MJ/ha. Finally, we find that a glyphosate ban decreases energy effi-
ciency (ΔEO/E), reflecting that mostly mechanical weed control is used as a 
substitute. This decrease is small and insignificant for the low output price 
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level of € 4.00/dt, but larger and highly significant for the higher price levels 
of € 4.60/dt and € 5.20/dt. 
Table 5.5. Absolute average change Δ in energy output and input per hectare by a 
glyphosate ban in silage maize production (standard deviation in brackets, relative 
changes in italics)
a,b 
Energy: ΔEOc 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔNEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEd 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEi 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔE 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEO/E 
P 
[€/dt]: 
 
4.00 
-716 (667) 
 
-0.3% 
-783 (695) 
 
-0.4% 
+277 (51) 
*** 
+28.7% 
-181 (59) 
 
-2.8% 
+91 (64) 
 
+1.1% 
-0.272 (0.282) 
‘ 
-1.0% 
4.60 
-849 (436) 
 
-0.4% 
-981 (399) 
 
-0.4% 
+300 (40) 
*** 
+29.9% 
-159 (58) 
 
-2.2% 
+137 (70) 
 
+1.6% 
-0.523 (0.282) 
*** 
-1.9% 
5.20 
-648 (364) 
 
-0.3% 
-814 (327) 
 
-0.4% 
+311 (31) 
*** 
+30.4% 
-140 (45) 
 
-1.8% 
+167 (65) 
‘ 
+2.0% 
-0.564 (0.320) 
*** 
-2.1% 
a
 Difference of process analysis for the glyphosate licensed scenarios minus the glyphosate 
banned scenarios: energy output (EO), net energy output (NEO), direct energy use (Ed), 
indirect energy use (Ei), total energy use (E) and energy efficiency (EO/E). Only municipal-
ities are included in which glyphosate is used in the model under the licensed scenario (ra = 
0.5). 
b
 ‘, *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% level respectively, 
based on Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-tests. 
c
 One deciton of silage maize has an energy content of 671.4 MJ in the model. 
Fig. 5.8 includes maps of the increase in direct energy consumption (Ed) 
and the reduction in energy efficiency (EO/E) (see Fig. A5.6, Appendix 5.E, 
for the scatterplot). The emerging picture resembles the one for the PLI. We 
find relatively strong increases on heavy soils where mechanical strategies 
require high energy input, but also increases on light soils due to current 
application of no till or strip-till practices in combination with glyphosate. 
The trends of changes are similar in most of the regional units. Energy effi-
ciency gains can only be observed in very few locations. 
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Fig. 5.8. Spatial distribution of increase in direct energy consumption (Ed) 
and of reduction in energy efficiency (EO/E) over the state of NRW at a 
potential ban of glyphosate (ra = 0.5). 
5.5 Discussion 
We find that a glyphosate ban would lead to a significant, but relatively 
small increase in weed control costs, independently of expected output pric-
es, stemming mostly from increases in more expensive mechanical weed 
control measures, which outweigh lower herbicide expenditures. Further-
more, we find reduced yields such that a glyphosate ban leads to lower gross 
margins, on average by € 2 – 3/ha and in some cases by up to € 10/ha. The 
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small change also reflects cost savings in sowing when switching from di-
rect sowing – used mainly in combination in glyphosate – to mulch sowing. 
This income loss is lower than what was found in other studies. For exam-
ple, Kehlenbeck et al. (2015) found potential losses of € -88 to +22/ha, de-
pending on the scenario, but they also included unprofitable strategies in 
their calculations. Of course, results depend strongly on cost assumptions, 
which reflect the assumed machinery and plot size. Larger machinery and 
plot sizes reduce the per-hectare-costs of weed control and tend to increase 
the attractiveness of mechanical weed control compared to chemical one. 
Moreover, reduced herbicide prices decrease the usage of mechanical strate-
gies. Nevertheless, the fact that under current conditions only one third of 
the farmers apply glyphosate in silage maize production in Germany (Julius 
Kühn-Institut, 2017), a share close fitting to what is simulated by our model 
on average over the municipalities under current conditions, supports the 
result of our analysis that mechanical strategies are a feasible alternative to 
glyphosate application. 
Our results thus indicate no large economic implications of a glyphosate 
ban in silage maize production in North Rhine-Westphalia. However, our 
findings point to a trade-off between reducing adverse effects of pesticides 
on human health and the environment, and on energy consumption as a 
driver of climate change. 
In our case study, we find an average increase of total energy consump-
tion of up to 170 MJ/ha and year, but the change depends strongly on ex-
pected output prices. If glyphosate is assumed to be used on 66,500 ha of 
silage maize in NRW (~190.000 ha silage maize according to Information 
und Technik Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2016, and 35% of farmers applying 
glyphosate; Julius Kühn-Institut, 2017), our analysis indicates that the ener-
gy demand of silage maize cultivation would increase by 11 TJ in case of a 
glyphosate ban. Relative to the total final energy consumption of agriculture 
in the state of NRW (IWR, 2018), this would indicate an increase in energy 
166 Economic & Environmental Assessment of a Glyphosate Ban 
 
demand of 0.03% (assuming that 2.2% of the total final energy consumption 
is consumed by agriculture; Eurostat, 2018). The climate change impact of 
this additional energy consumption depends on energy sourcing and produc-
tion. Indirect energy, i.e. for factor production, is consumed for the most 
part in form of electricity; direct energy relates to diesel use. The model also 
simulates a loss in energy efficiency if glyphosate would be banned, also 
due to somewhat lower yields. This means that more silage maize will have 
to be cultivated in case of a glyphosate ban to meet the demand. 
We find a significant decrease in the overall toxicity expressed in Pesti-
cide Load Indicator units of, on average, 0.2 Load units (11%) per hectare. 
Yet, pesticide load levels (per ha) in maize production before and after the 
ban are low compared with load levels in other crops such as potatoes or 
vegetables.
36
 
The level of risk aversion has only a small influence on the choice of 
weed control strategies. Note that this does not imply that the introduction 
of risks in our model was not important for outcomes. It rather reflects the 
importance of observing the level of weed infestation on the field. Farmers 
are thus able to apply stage-contingent weed control. This finding is also in 
line with the ambiguous findings on the risk effects of pesticides in the liter-
ature (e.g. Möhring et al., 2017). A major source of uncertainty is the level 
of the attainable yield, which leads to a stochastic marginal value product of 
weed control. This can even create incentives for risk averse decision mak-
ers to use less than profit maximising levels of herbicides (e.g. Horowitz 
and Lichtenberg, 1993). Alternatives to the EU framework used by us could 
provide additional insights. For example, Carpentier (2017) recently applied 
                                                 
36
 For example, the PLI in potato production in Denmark was over all types of pesticides 
2.48 Load/ha in 2014 and 6.75 Load/ha in 2015 (Ørum and Hossy, 2015; Ørum and Som-
mer Holtze, 2017). Vegetables even had higher Load/ha of 6.54 in 2014 and 8.27 in 2015 
(Ørum and Hossy, 2015; Ørum and Sommer Holtze, 2017). 
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prospect theory to pesticide application, to explicitly consider farmer’s ref-
erence situation to the protected or the unprotected crop. 
Our results relate to short- to mid-term, and not long-term changes in 
weed control strategies in silage maize cultivation under a glyphosate ban. 
Furthermore, extensive margin and farm effects such as changes in crop 
rotation or other adjustments at farm level were not included so far, but 
could be addressed in future research. However, extensive margin and farm 
effects of a glyphosate ban in cultivation of maize in our study area are like-
ly to be quite limited for three major reasons. Firstly, the simulated changes 
in gross margins are quite small and glyphosate use in other important crops 
is even lower than in maize, rendering significant adjustments in cropping 
patterns under a ban unlikely. Secondly, conservation tillage, i.e. non-
inverting tillage, without applying glyphosate is feasible in silage maize 
production. Due to high investment cost for specialised machinery, a prob-
lem in increased conservation agriculture without glyphosate could arise, if 
the necessary machinery is neither already owned by the farmer nor contrac-
tors can be found. In our case study region, however, the density of contrac-
tors is quite high, so that the problem should not be applicable. Thirdly, total 
maize production is unlikely to change much as policy measures that pro-
mote biogas production from silage maize generate a stable and high de-
mand (Information und Technik Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2017). The slight 
yield reduction on areas that currently apply glyphosate would decrease 
feedstock availability for the existing biogas plants facing large sunk cost 
and thus further intensify the recently observed price increases for silage 
maize. That would act against the incentive to reduce the maize acreage in 
response to the slightly decreased gross margin under the ban. Although the 
short-term economic consequences would be rather small, further research 
should address possible unwanted ecological and socio-economic side-
effects (e.g. via changes in land use or trade-patterns) occur in case of bans 
if pesticides. Stricter regulatory measures or economic incentives to reduce 
glyphosate application (e.g. Finger et al., 2017) are for this reason more 
168 Economic & Environmental Assessment of a Glyphosate Ban 
 
suitable than bans. Our results show clear trade-offs and provide a quantita-
tive basis for political debates on glyphosate and reveal the need for flexible 
and tailor-made agri-environmental policy solutions. This could for example 
comprise solutions such as pesticide taxation (Finger et al., 2017). Pesticide 
taxation incentivises those farmers to reduce glyphosate use, which are able 
to substitute glyphosate with little gross margin reduction, while still ena-
bling glyphosate use for those facing higher reductions. Similarly, farmers, 
which need large amounts of energy to substitute glyphosate use, should be 
able to further apply glyphosate, while those, which face lower increases in 
energy use, should be incentivised to reduce glyphosate applications. 
Regarding the weed control implementation in the model, additional 
temporal dimensions could be introduced. More specifically, temporal in-
terdependencies of applied weed control strategies could be considered, e.g. 
if weed pressure spills over different periods. For example, if only conserva-
tion tillage strategies without glyphosate application are chosen, the size of 
the weed seed bank growths (Bàrberi et al., 1998). In addition, it could be 
interesting to include a behavioural algorithm relating to the choice of weed 
control strategies (cf. Hüllermeier, 2005) and farmers experiences. Further-
more, other environmental dimensions could be included in the model. For 
example, no till practices – possibly economically viable only if glyphosate 
is licensed – reduce soil erosion especially on hilly grounds (Montgomery, 
2007). Moreover, we do not take into account that a change to mechanical 
weed control maybe has negative effects on ecological soil conditions. 
Along these lines, problems with nitrogen surpluses might increase due to 
slightly lower yield levels if glyphosate is banned and manure application is 
not adjusted. New technologies could be a game changer for the future role 
of pesticides in agriculture (e.g. Finger, 2018). For example, autonomous 
weeding robots might allow to reduce pesticide use dramatically without 
facing trade-offs of high emissions or soil compaction (e.g. Walter et al., 
2017). Thus, future modelling attempts shall also incorporate new techno-
logical options. 
Chapter 5  169 
5.6 Conclusions 
We develop and employ a detailed bio-economic model focusing on weed 
damage control in order to analyse the potential effects of a glyphosate ban. 
The model simulates the optimal choice from a larger set of pre- and post-
sowing weed control strategies in a case study for silage maize production 
of 377 municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. We consider 
production risks and farmers’ risk preferences in an expected utility frame-
work based on a damage control approach for weed occurrence in cultiva-
tion of silage maize. The main finding from our analysis is that a glyphosate 
ban would cause a shift towards more mechanical weed control measures, 
but not to more pronounced use of selective herbicides. Economic impacts 
on maize yields and gross margins are small. The weed control strategy set 
chosen in response to a glyphosate ban is less toxic as expressed with the 
Pesticide Load Indicator, but more energy intensive based on a detailed en-
ergy process analysis. The magnitude of these effects is found to be critical-
ly dependent on output price levels and yield expectations. Thirteen differ-
ent hypotheses are tested with regard to a glyphosate ban (see Table 5.6 for 
summary results). Our analysis thus quantifies in detail trade-offs between 
different policy goals and can inform policy debates, as well as regional and 
private initiatives for alternatives to glyphosate use. Furthermore, the here 
developed modelling approach could be an important starting point for the 
assessment of economic and environmental trade-offs in future debates on 
restrictions of pesticide use.  
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Table 5.6. Summary of the thirteen tested hypotheses related to a glypho-
sate ban 
Analysis Hypothesis Direction/ 
prefix of 
results 
Significance 
Economic 
change 
1) Weed control costs increase Increase (+) Significant 
2) The yield decreases Decrease (–) Not significant 
3) The gross margin decreases Decrease (–) Not significant 
Pesticide 
load  
4) The toxicity load decreases (Λtoxy) Decrease (–) Significant 
5) The environmental fate load 
decreases (Λfate) 
Decrease (–) Significant 
6) The human health load decreases 
(Λheal) 
Decrease (–) Significant 
7) The load of applied herbicides 
decreases (Λtotal) 
Decrease (–) Significant 
Energy 
balance 
8) The energy output EO decreases Decrease (–) Not significant 
9) The net energy output NEO de-
creases 
Decrease (–) Not significant 
10) More direct energy is used (Ed 
increases) 
Increase (+) Significant 
11) More indirect energy is used (Ei 
increases) 
Decrease (–) Not significant 
12) More energy is used in general (E 
increases) 
Increase (+) 
Mostly not signifi-
cant 
13) The energy efficiency decreases 
(EO/E) 
Decrease (–) Significant 
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5.7 Appendix 
 
Appendix 5.A 
In addition to the phenology data of maize, we use information on the time 
of emergence for each weed i. However, information on this emergence data 
is not available on a daily but only monthly resolution (Mehrtens, 2006; 
Otte, 1990; see Fig. A5.1 and Table A5.1). Thus, we suppose emergence at 
the first of the indicated month. If a farmer applies successful pre-sowing 
weed control, the natural emergence pattern of weeds is disrupted. More 
specifically, we assume that the last weed control measure is done three 
days before the sowing date, so that the summation of growing-degree days 
(GDD) for weeds begins three days before sowing. Of course, if no weed 
control is done before sowing, also no interruption of weed growth takes 
place. After weeds are suppressed by pre-sowing measures, they re-emerge 
after a while. Hence, the summation of growing degree-days starts at that 
date of re-emergence. 
To estimate the date of re-emergence, we use data by Vleeshouwers 
(1997, see Table A5.1). First, we calculate a GDD-value for each weather 
station ws and for each weed i that emerges earlier than silage maize: 
GDDws,i,t = {
0                                ∀ (τ̅ws,t − TBi) < 0
∑ (τ̅ws,t − TBi)
m.em
d=1
  ∀ (τ̅ws,t − TBi) ≥ 0
 (A5.1) 
𝜏?̅?𝑠,𝑡 is in this case the average daily temperature per weather station in year 
t and 𝑇𝐵𝑖 is the base temperature for each weed (the temperature at which 
seeds germinate). The summation of GDD starts at the first day of the re-
ported month and ends at the time of maize emergence m.em. If weeds 
emerge later than maize, i.e. cases in which maize has a growth advantage, 
Eq. (A5.1) becomes:  
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GDDws,i,t
∗ =
{
 
 
0                                             ∀ (τ̅ws,t − TBmaize) < 0
∑ (τ̅ws,t − TBmaize)
i.em
d=m.em
  ∀ (τ̅ws,t − TBmaize) ≥ 0
 (A5.2) 
In this case, 𝑇𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑒  is the base temperature of maize (we use a value of 
6° C; Lewandowski and Böhmel, 2009: 132) and the summation starts at the 
day of maize emergence m.em and ends at the day of weed emergence i.em. 
In a second step, the GDDs of weeds interrupted in growth by pre-sowing 
weed control are summed again under the condition that 𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 𝜃𝑖, 
where 𝜃𝑖 symbolises the necessary GDD sum until re-emergence (see Table 
A5.1): 
GDD⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ws,i,t = {
0                                  ∀ GDDws,i,t < θi
∑ (τ̅ws,t − TBi)
m.em
d=1
  ∀ GDDws,i,t ≥ θi
 (A5.3) 
Here, 𝐺𝐷𝐷⃑⃑⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 symbolises the modified sum of the GDD. Of course, maize 
can also get an advantage in emergence compared to weeds (Fig. A5.1). In 
this case, the base temperature of the weeds turns to the base temperature of 
maize 𝑇𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑒  and the GDD sums up until the weeds emerge (w.em), i.e. the 
necessary GDD sum until re-emergence (𝜃𝑖) is reached: 
GDD⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ws,i,t
∗ = {
0                                         ∀ GDDws,i,t < θi
∑ (τ̅ws,t − TBmaize)
w.  em
d=1
  ∀ GDDws,i,t ≥ θi
 (A5.4) 
After assigning the values of 𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡, 𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
∗ , 𝐺𝐷𝐷⃑⃑⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝐺𝐷𝐷⃑⃑⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑𝑤𝑠,𝑖,𝑡
∗  to the different geographical units m depending on the weather 
stations ws (the index ws becomes m), we calculate in a third step one Ψ-
value for each geographical unit and year t. We use the weighted potential 
damage of each weed i in each geographical unit m for this:  
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Ψm,t = ∑((
wm,i ∙ ai
∑ (wm,i ∙ ai)
32
i=1
) ∙ GDDm,i,t)
32
i=1
 (A5.5) 
𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 is in this case the dedicated GDD-value from Eq. (A5.1) to (A5.5) 
(see also Fig. A5.1). 
  
Table A5.1. Starting days of emergence, base temperature TB and growing degree-days (GDD) to re-emerge after weed control for 
different weeds varieties in the model 
Weed variety i 
Starting day 
of emergence 
(1
st
 of …)a 
GDD to re-
emergence after 
pre-sowing weed 
control
b
 
Base tem-
perature TB 
Reference of TB 
Grass-weeds:     
Alopecurus myosuroides April 88.2 2.5 Storkey (2004) 
Digitaria ischaemum June 45.0 12.0 Fidanza et al. (1996) 
Echinochloa crus-galli May 46.3 11.7 Martinkova et al. (2006) 
Elymus repens/Elytrigia repens April 85.9 3.0 Bay. Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft (2017) 
Poa annua, P. trivialis April 92.8 1.5 Storkey (2004) 
Setaria viridis June 67.7 7.0 Lauer (1953) 
Broad-leaved weeds:     
Amaranthus retroflexus May 49.5 11.0 Benvenuti and Macchia (1993) 
Atriplex patula May 99.6 0.0 Nurse et al. (2008) 
Brassica napus March 95.9 0.8 (0.4–1.2) Vigil et al. (1996) 
Capsella bursa-pastoris March 95.0 1.0 Storkey (2004) 
Chenopodium spp. March 101.5 1.0 Storkey (2004) 
Cirsium arvense April 81.4 4.0 Liew et al. (2012) 
Convolvulus arvensis April 76.8 5.0 Bay. Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft (2017) 
Equisetum arvense, E. palustre April 83.7 3.5 Assumption (no data found) based on Bay. Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft (2017) 
Fallopia convolvulus April 81.4 4.0 Storkey (2004) 
Fumaria officinalis April 83.7 3.5 (2.0–5.0) Lauer (1953) 
Galinsoga parviflora May 67.7 7.0 Lauer (1953) 
Galium aparine March 83.7 3.5 Storkey (2004) 
1
7
4
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic &
 E
n
viro
n
m
en
ta
l A
ssessm
en
t o
f a
 G
lyp
h
o
sa
te B
a
n
 
 Table A5.1. (continued)  
Weed variety i 
Starting day 
of emergence 
(1
st
 of …)a 
GDD to re-
emergence after 
pre-sowing weed 
control
b
 
Base tem-
perature TB 
Reference of TB 
Geranium pusillum April 76.8 5.0 Lauer (1953); Gehring and Thyssen (2011) 
Lamium spp. April 90.5 2.0 Bay. Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft (2017) 
Matricaria spp. March 90.5 2.0 Storkey (2004) 
Mercurialis annua May 67.7 7.0 Lauer (1953) 
Persicaria lapathifolia May 78.1 3.5 (2.0–5.0) Lauer (1953) 
Persicaria maculosa May 85.0 3.2 Vleeshouwers and Kropff (2000) 
Polygonum aviculare agg. April 97.3 0.5 Storkey (2004) 
Rumex obtusifolius May 61.8 8.3 Benvenuti et al. (2001) 
Solanum nigrum May 61.3 8.4 Benvenuti and Macchia (1993) 
Sonchus spp. May 81.4 4.0 Liew et al. (2012) 
Stellaria media agg. April 81.4 4.0 Storkey (2004) 
Thlaspi arvense April 95.0 1.0 Wehsarg (1918) cited from Lauer (1953) 
Veronica spp. March 85.9 3.0 Lauer (1953); Storkey (2004) 
Viola arvensis March 76.8 5.0 Lauer (1953); Gehring and Thyssen (2011) 
a
 Exact data for emergence dates are not available. We estimate the dates according to Mehrtens (2006) and Otte (1990).  
b
 The values are estimates based on data of Vleeshouwers (1997), who calculated the growing degree-days for three weeds until emergence after the day of 
cultivation, dependent on the base temperature of each weed. With this information, we derive a linear function of the form θ = 4.553 · TB+99.589, where θ 
symbolises the sum until re-emergence and TB is the base temperature of the weeds.  
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Fig. A5.1. Schematic representa-
tion of the calculation of the time 
of maize emergence compared to 
weeds (Ψ-values in the production 
function). Maize emerges on dif-
ferent dates, depending on the 
weather station’s information and 
the year, and also weeds emerge in 
different months. Depending on the 
dates, either weeds or maize has a 
growth advantage. If weeds already 
emerged before maize and a weed 
control activity is done, the growth 
and the advantage is interrupted. 
But, weeds re-emerge after a while 
depending on the necessary grow-
ing degree-days and the base tem-
perature to emerge. 
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Appendix 5.B 
Weed control strategies included in the model and related parameters 
(amount/ha, costs, efficacy)  
Excel file, will be available online, see also Böcker et al. (2017, 2018) 
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Appendix 5.C 
Table A5.2. Machinery costs and other inputs related to maize growing 
Activity Sub-
activity 
Work hours 
(h/ha) 
(wage: 
€ 17.5/h) 
Fix and variable 
machinery costs 
(€/ha) 
Other in-
puts 
Weed control-related activities: 
Chisel plough/Cultivator 
(4.5m) 
 0.44 24.17  
Mouldboard plough and 
packer (1.4m) 
 1.73 66.97  
Pesticide sprayer (24m)  0.17 6.90  
Harrow (9m)  0.17 11.09  
Hoe (6m)  0.72 30.03  
Other activities: 
Inspection (share, every 
5
th
 year) 
 0.04 0.26  - 
Manure application (25 
m³/ha)  
 0.74 50.23 - 
 Manure 
cost 
- - € 0.00/ha 
Precision drill (6m-
width) 
 0.53 41.72 - 
Direct precision drill 
(59% increase to normal 
precision drill, 20% 
discount on light soils) 
 0.53 66.31  
Seed   € 233.20/ha 
Mounted fertiliser 
spreader (amount de-
pends on y) 
 0.00–0.29  0.00–6.14   
Liming (share, every 3
rd
 
year)  
 0.19 12.47  
 N   € 1.10/kg 
 P2O5   € 0.87/kg  
 K   € 0.77/kg 
 Ca   € 0.05/kg 
Forage harvester (7.5m, 
dependent on y) 
 = 0.4325 + 0.00003𝑦 = 119 + 0.02038𝑦  
Forage transport (de-
pendent on y) 
 = 0.7425 + 0.00308𝑦 = 13 + 0.13873𝑦  
Telehandler + weight 
(dependent on y) 
 = 0.2225 +  0.00218𝑦 = 0.0487𝑦  
Note: Diesel consumption for mouldboard ploughing is assumed to be 30% higher/lower on 
heavy/light soils (for chisel ploughing 20% higher/lower).  
Only the yield-dependent fertilisation costs are included in our calculations. If a higher 
yield is achieved, higher fertilisation costs arise. Other fertilisation costs are excluded, 
because we do not know the soil nutrient content and we do not know the type of fertilisa-
tion (artificial or organic fertiliser). The calculated gross margins are therefore slightly 
higher than in reality. 
Reference: Böcker et al. (2018) 
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Table A5.3. Calculation of material use in [kg/ha] for machines used in 
maize production 
Machine 
Empty 
weight 
[kg] 
(Source: 
machinery 
producers) 
Operating 
potential 
(Source: 
Achilles et 
al., 2016) 
Material use per ha
a
 
[kg/ha] 
Multi-
plier for 
energy 
use 
Tractor (133 kW) 
(add to other 
processes) 
7,790 10,000h =
7,790[kg]
10,000[h]
∗ tΩ [
h
ha
] Etr 
Plough (4 mould-
boards) 
907 2,000ha =
907[kg]
2,000[ha]
 Etm 
Packer (1.4m) 758 2,550ha =
758[kg]
2,550[ha]
 Etm 
Chisel cultivator 
(4.5m) 
2,125 2,250ha =
2,125[kg]
2,250[ha]
 Etm 
Sprayer (1,500 l) 615 2,400m³ = 615[kg] ∗ (
2,400[m3]
0.3 [
m3
ha ]
)
−1
 Eom 
>>Boom (24m) 835 9,600ha =
835[kg]
9,600[ha]
 Eom 
Precision drill 
(6m) 
2,300 1,500ha =
2,300[kg]
1,500[ha]
 Eom 
Direct precision 
drill (6m) 
3,100 1,500ha =
3,100[kg]
1,500[ha]
 Eom 
Harrow (9m) 1,520 4,500ha =
1,520[kg]
4,500[ha]
 Etm 
Hoe (6m) 1,900 3,200ha =
1,900[kg]
3,200[ha]
 Etm 
Slurry tanker 
(20m³) 
5,800 200,000m³ = 5,800[kg] ∗ (
200,000[m3]
25 [
m3
ha ]
)
−1
 Eom 
>>Line spreading 
boom (18m) 
1,620 210,000m³ = 1,620[kg] ∗ (
210,000[m3]
25 [
m3
ha ]
)
−1
 Eom 
Mounted fertiliser 
spreader (24m, 
1.5m³) 
332 5,000t = 332[kg] ∗ (
5,000[t]
mf [
t
ha]
)
−1
 Eom 
Trailed fertiliser 
spreader (average 
annual value based 
on application 
every 3 years) 
2,500 17,500t = 2,500[kg] ∗ (
17,500[t]
mf [
t
ha]
)
−1
 Eom 
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Table A5.3. (continued) 
Machine 
Empty 
weight 
[kg] 
(Source: 
machinery 
producers) 
Operating 
potential 
(Source: 
Achilles et 
al., 2016) 
Material use per ha
a
 
[kg/ha] 
Multi-
plier for 
energy 
use 
Forage harvester 14,350 3,000h =
14,350[kg]
10,000[h]
∗ tΩ [
h
ha
] Ehr 
>>Header (7.5m) 3,250 3,100ha =
3,250[kg]
3,100[ha]
 Ehr 
Forage transport 
wagon 
8,000 121,000t = 8,000[kg] ∗ (
121,000[t]
y [
t
ha]
)
−1
 Eom 
Telehandler + 
weight 
13,500 10,000h =
13,500[kg]
10,000[h]
∗ tΩ [
h
ha
] Etr 
a
 tΩ depicts the time needed for a certain field work, y is the achieved yield in a certain year 
and mf is the amount of fertiliser applied. 
 
 Table A5.4. Direct energy inputs and outputs in silage maize production 
Activity Direct energy input via diesel use 
[l/ha] ≙ [kg/ha] 
(ρ = 0.84 kg/l) 
Indirect energy input energy 
equivalent GE [MJ/kg] 
(Hs = 45.4 MJ/kg + 10.5 MJ/kg for 
upstream energy use, 
Jayasundara et al. (2014: 81)) 
Reference 
Outputs:    
Silage maize (fresh matter, contains 
34.8% dry matter) 
NA 
Ym,t [dt/ha] · 100 [kg/dt] 
· {23.9 [MJ/kg] · 2.7% XP 
+ 39.8 [MJ/kg] · 1.2% XL 
+ 20.1 [MJ/kg] · 6.7% XF 
+ 17.5 [MJ/kg] · 24.2% NfE} 
LUFA Nord-West (n.d.); Kirchgeßner 
(1995) 
Inputs:    
Weed control-related activities:    
Chisel plough/Cultivator (4.5m) 7.50a ≙ 6.30 352.17 Achilles et al. (2016) 
Mouldboard plough and packer (1.4m) 25.55a ≙ 21.46 1199.73 Ibid. 
Pesticide sprayer (24m) 0.95 ≙ 0.80 44.61 Ibid. 
Harrow (9m) 2.25 ≙ 1.89 105.65 Ibid. 
Hoe (6m) 3.95 ≙ 3.32 185.48 Ibid. 
Other activities:    
Rating (average annual value based on 
application every 5 years) 
0.03/5 ≙ 0.03/5 1.41/5 Ibid. 
Manure application (25 m³/ha)  10.40 ≙ 8.74 488.34 Ibid. 
Manure By-product 0.00 E.g. Jayasundara et al. (2014: 82) 
Precision drill (6m-width) 2.55 ≙ 2.14 119.74 Achilles et al. (2016) 
Direct precision drill (6m width) 2.55·(1+0.59) ≙ 3.41 190.38 
Assumption based on Achilles et al. (2016: 
184)  
Seed  NA  35.75 [kg/ha] * 10.38 [MJ/kg] Graboski (2002: 28)b 
Mounted fertiliser spreader (amount 
depends on E(y) and xf = necessary 
fertiliser) 
𝑉𝑓 = {
0, 𝑥𝑓 ≤ 0
0.543 + 0.001𝑥𝑓 , 𝑥𝑓 > 0
  
≙ {
0, 𝑥𝑓 ≤ 0
0.456 + 0.001𝑥𝑓 , 𝑥𝑓 > 0
 
𝐸𝑓 = {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
𝑉𝑓𝐻𝑠,  𝑦 > 0
 
Functions according to data of Achilles et al. 
(2016) 
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Fig. A5.4. (continued)  
Activity Direct energy input via diesel use 
[l/ha] ≙ [kg/ha] 
Indirect energy input energy 
equivalent GE [MJ/kg] 
Reference 
Inputs:    
Liming (average annual value based on 
application every 3 years)  
2.25/3 ≙ 1.89/3 105.65/3 Achilles et al. (2016) 
N NA 47.10 
Biskupek et al. (1997: 214) 
P2O5 NA 15.80 
K2O NA 9.28 
CaO NA 2.12 
Harvest: field work 
𝑉𝑓𝑤 = {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
10.300 + 0.028𝑦,  𝑦 > 0
≙ {
0, 𝑦 ≤ 0
8.652 + 0.023𝑦,  𝑦 > 0
 
𝐸𝑓𝑤 = {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
𝑉𝑓𝑤𝐻𝑠,  𝑦 > 0
 
Functions according to data of Achilles et al. 
(2016: 216) 
Harvest: transport 
𝑉𝑡𝑟 = {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
7.675 + 0.029𝑦,  𝑦 > 0
≙ {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
6.447 + 0.024𝑦,  𝑦 > 0
 
𝐸𝑡𝑟 = {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
𝑉𝑡𝑟𝐻𝑠,  𝑦 > 0
 
Harvest: compactionc 𝑉𝑐𝑝 = {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
0.012𝑦,  𝑦 > 0
≙ {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
0.010𝑦,  𝑦 > 0
 𝐸𝑐𝑝 = {
0,  𝑦 ≤ 0
𝑉𝑐𝑝𝐻𝑠,  𝑦 > 0
 
a
 Diesel use for mouldboard ploughing is, in relation to Kalk and Hülsbergen (1999) and Jayasundara et al. (2014: 82), assumed to be 30% higher/lower on 
heavy/light soils. Diesel use for chisel ploughing is assumed to be 20% higher/lower on heavy/light soils. 
b
 Graboski (2002) reports a value of 241,554 BTU/Bushel at 12.5% moisture. To convert the value, a weight conversion for corn of 54.08 Pound/Bushel as well 
as factors of 0.454 Kg/Pound and 0.0011 MJ/BTU are assumed (Murphy, 1993).  
c
 Silo material and silage tarps were not included in the energy balance. 
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Appendix 5.D 
Detailed explanation weighing scheme Pesticide Load Indicator 
In the following, the calculation of the Pesticide Load Indicator (PLI) is 
described in detail. Additionally, the specific weights and focus points of the 
PLI are discussed briefly. 
The PLI has the unit Load per kg pesticide product and is calculated in 
two steps: 
a) Computation of the sub-indicators of the Pesticide Load per kg ac-
tive substance (AS) 
i. Computation of the Environmental Fate Load 
ii. Computation of the Environmental Toxicity Load 
b) Computation of the Pesticide Load per product/kg from the sub-
indicators in a) and the Health Load 
The detailed steps in the computation are as follows: 
a) Computation of the sub-indicators of the Pesticide Load per kg AS 
(Miljøministeriet, 2012: 17) 
i. Computation of the Environmental Fate Load 
Fate Load AS 
= Degradation in soil + Bioaccumulation potential + Mobility in soil 
= 
Soil DT50
354
∗ 2.5 + (
BCF
5100
) ∗ 2.5 + (
SCI − Grow
12.5
) ∗ 20 
(A5.6) 
The Fate Load is computed from the soil half-time (Soil DT50), the po-
tential accumulation in the soil (bio-concentration factor, BCF) and the soil 
mobility (SCI-GROW Index). The three values are divided by the respective 
maximum values in the sample, creating a factor ∈ [0,1] respectively. For 
maximum values (factor of 1) 2.5, 2.5 and 20 Load units are then allocated. 
ii. Computation of the Environmental Toxicity Load 
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Toxicity Load = 
Short term effects (
Birds (1),Mammals(1), Fish(30), Daphnia(30), Algae(3),
Aquatic plants(3), Earthworms(2), Bees(100)
)
+ Long term effects (Fish(3), Daphnia(3), Earthworms(2))   
(A5.7) 
The Environmental Toxicity Load is computed from long- and short-
term effects of the respective AS on different families of animals and plants. 
Short-term effects are measured with LD50/EC50 values and are again divid-
ed by the respective maximum value in the entire sample and then multi-
plied with the values in parentheses in the above formula. Long-term effects 
are measured with No Observed Effect Concentration (NOEC)-values and 
are normalised by the same approach as used for short-term values and then 
multiplied by the respective values in parentheses (Miljøministeriet, 2012: 
47f.).  
a) Computation of the Pesticide Load per kg of product from the sub-
indicators in a) and the Health Load 
First, the Health Load is calculated on a product level and Fate and 
Toxicity Load are transformed from AS to product aggregation level: 
Health Load Product = Formulation ∗ 
∑ Risk Scorei
n
i=1
max.sum risk scores (350)
  ,   (A5.8) 
where the index i denotes single risk (R)- and hazard (H)- statements. Poten-
tial effects on human health are measured with a ‘risk-score’ attributed to 
each R- and H-statement (Miljøministeriet, 2012: 17, for the list of ‘risk 
scores’). Here, H- and R-statements of the respective product are relevant. 
All risk scores of the R- and H-statements are the summed up per product 
and divided by the maximum value of all products in the sample. Finally, 
the Health Load for products that have a higher risk of exposition (powder 
or liquids that have to be mixed) is multiplied by 1.5.  
Fate Load und Toxicity Load per product are computed as the weighted 
sums of the Loads of their AS. Weighting is done by the respective concen-
tration of AS per product: 
Chapter 5  185 
Fate Load Product = ∑Fate Load ASi ∗
kg  ASi
kg Product
n
i=1
 
Toxicity Load Product = ∑Toxicity Load ASi ∗
kg  ASi
kg Product
n
i=1
  ,  
(A5.9) 
where the index i indicates single AS per product and the concentration of 
all AS per product in the range of [0,1]. The PLI in Load per kg product is 
then computed as the sum of the three sub-indicators:  
Pesticide Load Product  
= Fate Load Product + Toxicity Load Product + Health Load Product  
(A5.10) 
The detailed explanations underline that the PLI covers a broad range of 
indicators and indices in the three categories environmental toxicity, envi-
ronmental fate and human health. At the same time, note that specific indi-
cators or indices are weighted stronger than others representing on the one 
hand a calibration of the indicator to the values appearing in the sample, and 
on the other hand valuation and priorities. Moreover, the selection of criteria 
for the sub-indicators already reflects a valuation of most important animal 
and plant families to be protected. Aligned with European pesticide regula-
tions, the indicator reflects priorities, indicators and indices used in the Eu-
ropean registration procedures for pesticides.  
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Appendix 5.E 
 
Fig. A5.2. Applied pre-sowing weed control strategies in the model for 
three price levels (P) and four risk aversion coefficients (ra) (glyphosate 
licensed-scenarios). 
 
Fig. A5.3. Applied pre-sowing weed control strategies in the model for 
three price levels (P), four risk aversion coefficients (ra) and the increased 
attainable yield level by 10% (glyphosate licensed-scenarios). 
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Fig. A5.4. Average applied active substances [AS/ha and year] in the post-
sowing weed control strategies for three price levels (P) and four risk aver-
sion coefficients (ra). 
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Fig. A5.5. Average applied active substances [AS/ha and year] in the post-
sowing weed control strategies for three price levels (P), four risk aversion 
coefficients (ra) and the attainable yield with a 10% increase. 
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Fig. A5.6. Reduction of pesticide load (x-axis) plotted against the increase 
in energy consumption E (y-axis). 
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Table A5.5. Change (Δ) in Load/ha by a glyphosate ban in silage maize 
production (SD in brackets)
a,b
 
Att. Yield: Given att. yield Att. yield + 10% 
P [€/dt]: 
Load: ΔΛtoxy ΔΛfate ΔΛheal ΔΛtotal ΔΛtoxy ΔΛfate ΔΛheal ΔΛtotal 
ra: 
4.00 
0.8 
-0.011 -0.02 -0.17 -0.201 -0.011 -0.012 -0.173 -0.197 
(0.004) (0.037) (0.024) (0.047) (0.007) (0.077
) 
(0.016) (0.080) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
0.5 
-0.011 -0.019 -0.17 -0.2 -0.011 -0.013 -0.173 -0.197 
(0.006) (0.061) (0.023) (0.069) (0.006) (0.076
) 
(0.015) (0.077) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
0.0 
-0.011 -0.013 -0.171 -0.194 -0.011 -0.016 -0.172 -0.199 
(0.008) (0.087) (0.025) (0.094) (0.006) (0.075
) 
(0.017) (0.077) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
-2.0 
-0.009 -0.011 -0.154 -0.173 -0.010 -0.006 -0.170 -0.186 
(0.023) (0.263) (0.058) (0.275) (0.020) (0.233
) 
(0.034) (0.237) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
4.60 
0.8 
-0.011 -0.011 -0.174 -0.197 -0.012 -0.019 -0.174 -0.205 
(0.008) (0.089) (0.016) (0.091) (0.005) (0.055
) 
(0.011) (0.057) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
0.5 
-0.011 -0.011 -0.175 -0.196 -0.011 -0.018 -0.174 -0.202 
(0.008) (0.091) (0.015) (0.092) (0.005) (0.057
) 
(0.014) (0.060) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
0.0 
-0.011 -0.019 -0.173 -0.204 -0.011 -0.013 -0.174 -0.198 
(0.005) (0.062) (0.016) (0.064) (0.009) (0.098
) 
(0.017) (0.100) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
-2.0 
-0.011 -0.026 -0.161 -0.197 -0.012 -0.030 -0.165 -0.207 
(0.028) (0.322) (0.052) (0.328) (0.019) (0.223
) 
(0.043) (0.226) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
5.20 
0.8 
-0.012 -0.025 -0.174 -0.211 -0.011 -0.018 -0.174 -0.204 
(0.005) (0.054) (0.012) (0.056) (0.006) (0.072
) 
(0.012) (0.073) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
0.5 
-0.012 -0.025 -0.174 -0.211 -0.011 -0.018 -0.175 -0.204 
(0.004) (0.043) (0.011) (0.045) (0.007) (0.080
) 
(0.012) (0.081) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
0.0 
-0.012 -0.02 -0.174 -0.206 -0.011 -0.016 -0.174 -0.202 
(0.007) (0.076) (0.015) (0.079) (0.008) (0.089
) 
(0.015) (0.090) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
-2.0 
-0.011 -0.017 -0.17 -0.198 -0.012 -0.026 -0.166 -0.205 
(0.021) (0.244) (0.036) (0.249) (0.016) (0.178
) 
(0.039) (0.184) 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
a
 Difference of Load units for the glyphosate licensed scenarios minus the glyphosate 
banned scenarios. Only municipalities are included in which glyphosate is used in the mod-
el under the licensed scenario. 
b
 ‘, *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% level respectively. A 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is used for the hypotheses testing. Applying t-tests leads to 
different results, ΔΛtoxy and ΔΛfate are not significant and ΔΛtotal is significant at the 5% level. 
 
 Table A5.6. Change (Δ) in energy output and input per hectare by a glyphosate ban in silage maize production (SD in brackets)a,b 
Att. yield: Given att. yield Att. yield + 10% 
P: 
[€/dt] 
Energy: ΔEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔNEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEd 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEi 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔE 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEO/E ΔEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔNEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEd 
 [MJ/ha] 
ΔEi 
 [MJ/ha] 
ΔE 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEO/E 
ra: 
4.00 
0.8 
-1101 -1187 273 -176 87 -0.42 -1105 -1201 290 -178 103 -0.37 
(509) (503) (60) (64) (64) (0.25) (519) (495) (36) (64) (72) (0.21) 
  ***   *   ***   ** 
0.5 
-716 -783 277 -181 91 -0.27 -1107 -1211 290 -177 105 -0.38 
(667) (695) (51) (59) (64) (0.28) (506) (475) (40) (61) (69) (0.20) 
  ***   '   ***   ** 
0.0 
-1208 -1294 278 -193 86 -0.44 -1132 -1243 291 -179 111 -0.40 
(452) (413) (48) (65) (73) (0.29) (464) (416) (39) (52) (68) (0.20) 
  ***   *   ***   ** 
-2.0 
-940 -1026 271 -148 85 -0.42 -1076 -1186 286 -174 110 -0.39 
(773) (704) (69) (144) (142) (0.53) (885) (757) (56) (142) (148) (0.37) 
  ***   *   ***   ** 
4.60 
0.8 
-841 -972 300 -160 134 -0.50 -815 -959 305 -153 147 -0.43 
(445) (415) (37) (60) (70) (0.28) (445) (408) (35) (52) (68) (0.23) 
  ***   ***   ***   *** 
0.5 
-849 -981 300 -159 137 -0.52 -799 -944 305 -151 148 -0.44 
(436) (399) (40) (58) (70) (0.28) (450) (414) (38) (51) (68) (0.24) 
  ***   ***   ***   *** 
0.0 
-843 -990 302 -155 147 -0.56 -836 -986 306 -155 150 -0.45 
(419) (367) (34) (51) (65) (0.27) (440) (381) (36) (55) (72) (0.23) 
  ***   ***   ***   *** 
-2.0 
-717 -851 297 -134 134 -0.51 -730 -879 302 -136 149 -0.44 
(868) (744) (53) (162) (170) (0.51) (647) (566) (50) (119) (125) (0.33) 
  ***   ***   ***   *** 
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Table A5.6. (continued)
a,b
 
Att. yield: Given att. yield Att. yield + 10% 
P: 
[€/dt] 
Energy: ΔEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔNEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEd 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEi 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔE 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEO/E ΔEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔNEO 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEd 
 [MJ/ha] 
ΔEi 
 [MJ/ha] 
ΔE 
[MJ/ha] 
ΔEO/E 
ra: 
5.20 
0.8 
-652 -811 310 -139 166 -0.57 -675 -845 314 -143 171 -0.47 
(359) (328) (36) (47) (66) (0.32) (372) (314) (32) (48) (69) (0.23) 
  ***  ' ***   ***   *** 
0.5 
-648 -814 311 -140 167 -0.56 -652 -823 313 -140 172 -0.46 
(364) (327) (31) (45) (65) (0.32) (376) (323) (36) (51) (72) (0.24) 
  ***   ***   ***   *** 
0.0 
-677 -844 310 -144 166 -0.58 -667 -839 314 -141 172 -0.47 
(360) (302) (35) (52) (70) (0.32) (370) (309) (35) (52) (71) (0.23) 
  ***   ***   ***   *** 
-2.0 
-632 -794 309 -134 162 -0.57 -594 -766 310 -128 172 -0.47 
(537) (448) (41) (117) (127) (0.44) (527) (449) (49) (99) (112) (0.30) 
  ***   ***   ***   *** 
a
 Difference of process analysis for the glyphosate licensed scenarios minus the glyphosate banned scenarios: energy output (EO), net energy output (NEO), 
direct energy use (Ed), indirect energy use (Ei), total energy use (E) and energy efficiency (EO/E). Only municipalities are included in which glyphosate is used 
in the model under the licensed scenario. 
b
 ‘, *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% level respectively. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is used for the hypotheses testing. Ap-
plying t-tests leads to lower significance levels for the energy efficiency (ΔEO/E) at the price levels € 4.00/dt and € 4.60/dt (not significant and significant at the 
1% level). 
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Appendix of Thesis 
Revisiting Pesticide Taxation Schemes 
This comment summarises the project on pesticide taxes funded by the 
Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture. It was published in the journal Eco-
logical Economics as: 
Finger, R., Möhring, N., Dalhaus, T and Böcker, T. (2017). Revisiting Pes-
ticide Taxation Schemes. Ecological Economics 134: 263-266. 
Abstract 
The risks caused by pesticide use for human health and nature are one of the 
major challenges for agricultural policies. Despite their high potential to 
contribute to better policies, economic instruments such as pesticide taxes 
are rarely used in the current policy mix. In this essay, we combine current 
discussion on pesticide policies in European countries with new insights 
from recent economic research to provide an outline for better pesticide pol-
icies to policy makers and stakeholders. We show that differentiated taxa-
tion schemes have a high potential to reduce risks caused by pesticide use 
and that the targeted re-distribution of tax revenues in the agricultural sector 
is crucial to create leverage effects on pesticide use and to increase the ac-
ceptability of pesticide taxes. 
Keywords: Pesticide, Tax, Incentive, Environment, Regulation. 
A.1 Introduction 
Plant protection is essential for the provision of high quality food in ade-
quate quantities (e.g. Oerke, 2006). However, especially the use of pesti-
cides often induces possible negative effects for the environment and human 
health (e.g. Gilden et al., 2010; Pimentel, 2009; Travisi and Nijkamp, 2008). 
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The risks for human health and nature caused by pesticide use are one of the 
major challenges for agricultural policies and have caught large attention in 
recent public debates, such as on the potential ban of glyphosate in Europe. 
In response to these challenges, various European countries have introduced 
National Action Plans on pesticide use (e.g. due to the Directive 
2009/128/EC). Economic instruments such as pesticide taxes can be effi-
cient components of an optimal pesticide policy (Skevas et al., 2013). Yet, 
these instruments are rarely used. For example, pesticide taxation schemes 
are established only in four European countries, i.e. in France, Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway - an introduction, however, is discussed in various 
other countries (e.g. Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany) 
(see Böcker and Finger, 2016, for an overview).1 Despite the higher alloca-
tive efficiency than other policy instruments that are frequently used, such 
as bans or regulation, little progress has been made to overcome stakehold-
ers' preconceptions and concerns with respect to pesticide taxes (e.g. Zil-
berman and Millock, 1997). In a similar vein, current policies and policy 
proposals are often not aligned with the current state of research. This essay 
aims to contribute to bridge new insights from recent economic research and 
from current discussions on pesticide taxation in different European coun-
tries to provide an outline for better pesticide policies to policy makers and 
stakeholders. 
A.2 Goals and Effectiveness of Policies 
A.2.1 Definition of Goals of a Pesticide Tax 
In order evaluate pesticide policy measures, crucial criteria are i) the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the measures, ii) the polluter pays principle and 
iii) the acceptability of the measure among stakeholders including the ef-
fects of policy measures on farmers' income (see e.g. Falconer, 1998). We 
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will use these criteria as guiding principles to combine recent policy discus-
sion and scientific evidence. 
Important for the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
measures such as a pesticide tax is the specification of policy targets, which 
varies substantially across countries. Reductions of physical quantities of 
pesticides used dominate public and policy debates, especially because these 
are easy to communicate and easy to measure. For example, the French pol-
icy defines a 50% reduction target for the total quantity of pesticides used 
from 2015 to 2025 (MAAF and MEDDE, 2015). However, such policy tar-
gets not necessarily internalize external effects. Pesticides differ strongly 
with regard to their properties, i.e. average quantities applied, intensity of 
application, risks of applied products for human health and the environment. 
A reduction of applied pesticide quantities could for example be easily 
achieved by the substitution of oils, normally used in great quantities but 
with low risks for human health and the environment, through smaller quan-
tities of pesticides with potentially high risks (e.g. Böcker and Finger, 
2016). Thus, risk-based indicators (e.g. based on H-phrases or R-phrases or 
impact assessment systems) should preferably be used to formulate policy 
targets as these better reflect external effects. For example, the Danish gov-
ernment planned to achieve a risk reduction of 40% between 2013 and 2015 
(MIM and FVM, 2013), and the current proposal for a national action plan 
on pesticides in Switzerland postulates a reduction of risks caused by pesti-
cide use by 50% (FOA, 2016). 
The definition of risk-based policy targets has implications for the op-
timal design of pesticide taxes, which should internalize external costs of 
pesticide use to contribute to welfare increases. In order to reflect social 
marginal costs, taxes should not be uniform across pesticides in terms of ad-
valorem or per unit taxes. In contrast, the potential mismatch between quan-
tities of pesticide used and associated risks outlined above motivates differ-
entiated pesticide taxes, so that more risky pesticides are taxed at higher 
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rates. This creates incentives to substitute towards less toxic pesticides and 
non-chemical plant protection strategies. Along these lines, evidence from 
European taxation schemes shows that despite the fact that taxes have not 
reduced total quantities of pesticide use, they have led to the targeted reduc-
tions of risks caused by pesticide use (Böcker and Finger, 2016). In contrast, 
non-differentiated taxation schemes might create unintended consequences. 
For instance, quantity reductions can be caused by the substitution towards 
more toxic products resulting in higher risks for humans and the environ-
ment. Moreover, taxing only specific products at high levels keeps the aver-
age tax burden for pesticides low. If the high taxation of specific products, 
however, causes plant protection gaps, a dynamic fiscal scheme, as pro-
posed by Martin (2015), should be adopted. 
A.2.2 The Effectiveness of Pesticide Taxes 
An important requirement for effectiveness and efficiency of pesticide taxes 
is that the demand for pesticides is price sensitive. The inelastic demand 
structure for pesticides was claimed in policy debates as a major reason for 
not introducing a pesticide tax (e.g. Hof et al., 2013, for the Netherlands). It 
is also used as a key argument in the policy debate such as by the German 
farmers' union in response to a recent proposal for a pesticide tax to be in-
troduced in Germany (DBV, 2015). A recent meta-analysis shows that the 
median of pesticide demand elasticities reported in studies in North America 
and Europe is − 0.28 (Böcker and Finger, 2017). Thus, there is – on average 
– a significant change in pesticide use due to the introduction of a tax to be 
expected. However, this response is inelastic. Elasticity levels reported by 
individual studies differ remarkably. Skevas et al. (2012), for instance, re-
port elasticities between − 0.03 and − 0.0003 for pesticides in Dutch crop 
production. In contrast, Chen et al. (1994) report elasticities of − 2.42 for 
mixed farms in Alabama (USA). The specific structure of demand elastici-
ties has important implications for pesticide taxation schemes. In that re-
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spect, three observations from the study by Böcker and Finger (2017) are 
especially important. First, elasticities differ largely across agricultural sys-
tems. For example, special crops show less elastic demand structures. Thus, 
also pesticide use reductions and tax burdens will differ across agricultural 
systems. Second, the demand for pesticides is in the short-run substantially 
less elastic than in the long-run. In the long-run, crop rotations and produc-
tion technologies can be adjusted. Thus, pesticide taxes should be evaluated 
only in the longer run. This is further emphasized by the observation that 
before the introduction or increase of a pesticide tax, hoarding activities 
were observed regularly in Sweden, France, Denmark and Norway (Böcker 
and Finger, 2016). Thus, a clear communication of the non-short term time 
horizon of targeted effects is indispensable. Third, elasticities differ across 
types of pesticides. More specifically, herbicides are found to be more elas-
tic, also because mechanical alternatives are available. Thus, lower tax rates 
are required to reduce herbicide use. 
A.3 Pesticide Taxes as Part of a Coherent Set of Policies 
A.3.1 The Use of Tax Revenues Is Crucial 
Increasing pesticide prices due to a tax could, especially in the short run, 
result in lower farm incomes. However, some recent studies suggest that 
income reduction due to reduced pesticide applications could be small. For 
example, Pedersen et al. (2012) show for a sample of 1164 Danish farms 
that one third of these farms is not operating cost-oriented but rather apply 
pesticides to maximize yields. In a similar vein, Nielsen (2005) argues that 
massive reductions in pesticide use have been achieved in Denmark without 
observing losses in aggregate agricultural incomes or production levels. For 
Dutch arable farms, Skevas et al. (2014) show that – if comparing with prof-
it maximizing levels – 100% of the farms overuse herbicides, 86% overuse 
fungicides and 67% overuse insecticides. Jacquet et al. (2011) show that a 
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30% reduction of pesticide use would be possible without income losses for 
French arable farming systems. 
However, potential income reductions for farmers and use of the tax 
revenues remain an important aspect of policy debates (see e.g. Bahrs and 
Back, 2016, for Germany). In addition, revenues of the pesticide tax in 
Sweden and Norway are not specifically used for agricultural or related pur-
poses. In France, part of the tax revenues is used to internalize external ef-
fects of pesticide use, i.e. is used to clean water from pesticide residues (Art. 
L213-10-8 Code de l'environnement). The remaining revenues are allocated 
to the general budget. Earlier research has argued to support research activi-
ties with proceeds of pesticide taxes (e.g. Zilberman and Millock, 1997). 
Despite the fact that these solutions fulfil the polluter pays principle, the 
income reduction in the agricultural sector caused by a tax is one of the key 
hurdles for acceptance of such measure. Moreover, by not re-distributing tax 
revenues opportunities to create leverage effects are missed. We argue that a 
complete re-distribution of tax revenues to the sector shall be envisaged. 
Transaction costs of existing taxation schemes are very small, so that large 
parts of tax revenues are available for such re-distribution. For instance, in 
the Norwegian system transaction costs represent only about 1% of the tax 
revenues, with only about 10% of these costs incurring at the public admin-
istration level (Vatn et al., 2002). Tax revenues should be used to finance 
measures that create leverage effects with respect to reductions of risks 
caused by pesticide use. Those might comprise measures such as i) support 
of extensification (switch to organic or low pesticide production tech-
niques), ii) support of new spraying material and new equipment related to 
pesticide use, iii) support of independent extension and advisory services, 
iv) support of biological plant protection strategies. 
First, subsidizing organic production can lead to overall decreases in 
pesticide use. However, reduced production increases concerns of effective-
ness if measuring environmental effects per unit of output and reduced do-
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mestic production causes problems of leakage. Other alternatives are subsi-
dies to production systems that explicitly exclude specific pesticides from 
the production. For example, in Switzerland the production of cereals, rape-
seed, sunflowers and beans not using all types of pesticides but herbicides 
and seed treatment is supported with an ecological direct payment (Finger 
and El Benni, 2013). Similar programs also exist in other countries (e.g. 
Baylis et al., 2008). Despite the higher intensity of these systems if com-
pared to organic agriculture, smaller output levels are observed compared to 
intensive agricultural systems. Second, improved equipment and spraying 
technology can reduce emissions from pesticide use. For example, Aubert 
and Enjolras (2014) show in an analysis for French wine producer that the 
age of the equipment is significantly increasing the likelihood of over-
application of pesticides. Investment in better technologies remains an im-
portant policy measure even in developed countries. Precision agriculture 
and the development of smart farming systems will offer new potentials in 
this field for the future. Support of these measures can compensate for tax 
burdens and does not lead to negative production effects. Third, independent 
management advice and extension service with particular focus on plant 
protection can contribute to the reduction of risks caused by pesticide use. 
Wiebers et al. (2002) show that support by advisors resulted in a higher pes-
ticide use of farmers, which they argue stems from the profit maximization 
rationale of advisors who also sell pesticides to farmers. Thus, better and 
independent advisory and extension services might reduce pesticide use and 
increase farmers' income. Fourth, the support of biological prevention and 
control strategies contributes to reduce pesticide use and to maintain pro-
duction levels (Cullen et al., 2008). These measures may comprise the crea-
tion of habitats for natural enemies or the use of biological crop protection 
agents. 
Providing and supporting a wide set of targeted measures and strategies 
to reduce the risk caused by pesticide use is necessary to account for the 
large diversity of agricultural systems, environmental and human health 
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impacts of pesticide use and finally also the large diversity of farm and 
farmers' characteristics. The revenues of a pesticide taxation scheme can 
provide the financial means required to realize these measures. More gen-
eral, pesticide taxes are not efficient if used as stand-alone measure, but 
should be used in a coherent set of policies and measures aiming to reduce 
risks of pesticide use. 
A.3.2 Aligning Agricultural Policies 
Pesticide policies and pesticide taxes need to be aligned with other policy 
instruments. Four aspects are highlighted here that are overlooked in current 
policy designs. First, land use (i.e. extensive margin) effects of agricultural 
policies are potentially more relevant than policies at the intensive margin. 
The quantity of pesticide use as well as the resulting risks for the environ-
ment and humans differs substantially across crops. For instance, German 
promotion of biogas has created land use effects towards higher acreage 
under maize (Britz and Delzeit, 2013). Thus, a coherent framework is re-
quired that accounts also for extensive margin effects of pesticide taxes and 
other policies. Second, policies on fertilizer and pesticide use have to be 
assessed jointly. Empirical studies highlight the important interaction of 
fertilizer application and pesticide use. More specifically, higher levels of 
nitrogen fertilizer use have been reported to increase herbicide, insecticide 
and fungicide use, caused by positive effects on, for instance, weed growth, 
aphids and mildew (e.g. Bürger et al., 2012). In addition, the value of the 
marginal product of pesticides increases for fields with high yield potentials 
due to high fertilization levels. Thus, regulating nitrogen fertilizer use also 
affects pesticide use. However, such regulation via fertilizers cannot account 
for the risks for humans and the environment by specific pesticides. Third, 
pesticide policies and taxes can have important spill-over effects towards 
other policy goals. The above presented finding of the demand for herbi-
cides being more elastic, implies that a pesticide tax may also affect tillage 
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intensities, potentially diminishing benefits from minimal soil disturbance 
(Hobbs et al., 2008). The relevance of this interdependence between policy 
goals to restrict pesticide use and increase soil conservation has been high-
lighted in Europe's debate on the ban of glyphosate. Fourth, effects of pesti-
cides on income risks and farmers' risk preferences can be crucial for policy 
design. For instance, recent shifts in agricultural policies towards the provi-
sion of better risk management instruments and subsidizing insurances (e.g. 
El Benni et al., 2016) may affect pesticide use and the effects of a taxation 
scheme. If pesticides are risk reducing, risk averse farmers would use larger 
than profit maximizing quantities of pesticides. However, pesticides have 
often been found to even have risk increasing effects (e.g. Horowitz and 
Lichtenberg, 1994). This is one of the reasons why yield and revenue insur-
ances do not necessarily substitute for pesticide use. In contrast, empirical 
studies show that insurance uptake often leads to higher farm-level pesticide 
use (e.g. Finger et al., 2016b). Especially the effects of insurance on land 
use decisions, i.e. extensive margin effects, matter (e.g. Wu, 1999). Insur-
ance solutions are often more attractive for intensive-input crops. Providing 
better insurance opportunities might thus lead to a land allocation towards 
these crops and increase total pesticide use at the extensive margin. Based 
on this background, insurance mechanisms should be developed that are 
specifically targeted for reductions of pesticide use (e.g. targeted index solu-
tions, or insurances supporting low-pesticide production systems, e.g. Nor-
ton et al., 2016; Serra et al., 2008) and avoid land allocation effects. 
A.4 Conclusions 
Based on the above findings, we conclude the following for the design of 
pesticide policies and pesticide taxation schemes: 
1) Differentiated pesticides taxes can effectively reduce risks for 
human health and the environment, induced by pesticides use. 
Substitution to less risky pesticides and non-chemical plant pro-
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tection strategies can be incentivized when pesticides are taxed 
according to their potential riskiness and thus linking taxation 
more closely to external effects than an ad-valorem or per unit 
tax. Such a system keeps the average tax burden for pesticides 
low and can be adjusted to country specific policy goals. 
2) Pesticide policies, including pesticide taxes have potentially 
large interdependencies with other policy targets and instru-
ments with respect to risk management, fertilizer use and con-
servation agriculture that need to be accounted for in policy de-
sign. 
3) The small but significant price elasticity of demand for pesti-
cides implies that tax rates for highly toxic pesticides have to be 
large to generate a relevant decrease in their demand. 
4) Low transaction costs for pesticide taxation allow re-distribution 
of tax revenues. 
5) A reimbursement of tax revenues to the agricultural sector helps 
prevent income effects. Leverage effects on pesticide use can be 
created if this reimbursement is made via instruments which fur-
ther reduce risks of pesticide use. The introduction of a tax 
scheme on pesticides should only be part of a portfolio of coher-
ent accompanying policy measures, focusing on measures that 
do not imply reductions of production levels (e.g. better applica-
tion technologies and better non-chemical plant protection) in 
order to avoid leakage problems. This especially applies for the 
case of production systems with small price elasticities of de-
mand for pesticides. 
6) Pesticide taxes do not have considerable short-run effects on 
pesticide use, because the elasticity of demand is small in the 
short-run and strong hoarding activities are induced. Pesticide 
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taxes, however, incentivize the long-run reduction of the risks 
caused by pesticide use for human health and nature. 
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